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1. Introduction 
Background and Purpose of the Research 
In most industrialised countries, governments have supplied public transportation 
services and are responsible for supervising and managing their quantity and/or 
quality in present. However, the issue of efficiency in the transportation system has 
recently come into question. Public ownership, subsidies, operating deficits, and 
inefficient operation are the main issues of debate on urban transportation. 
Table 1.1 The ratio of fares to operating costs for public transit system 
Country System Farebox ratio (%) Year 
Hong-Kong MTR 186 2012 
Taiwan MRT (Taipei) 119 2012 
Singapore SMRT 134 2012 
U.K. London underground 92 2012 
France RATP (Paris) 96 2012 
Finland HSL (Helsinki) 62 2012 
U.S. CTA (Chicago) 61 2013 
Japan Hankyu railway (Osaka) 146 2010 
Japan Tokyu railway (Tokyo) 145 2010 
Source: Annual report and financial report of each operator, Suji de Miru Tetsudo (2011) 
(The original source was adapted for purposes of the study.) 
Especially, many industrialised countries are suffering from operating deficit, which 
is that operating revenue cannot cover the operating costs. Table 1.1 presents the 
farebox ratio, which is the ratio of operating costs to fare revenues, of public transit 
in major cities of the world. As described in Table 1.1, most of the systems cannot 
cover their operating expenses by its fare revenues, except for the two Japanese 
companies and the systems operated in the high-density populated urban area. 
Although the farebox ratio is not highly confident measure considering differences in 
accounting rule, subsidising system, details of operating revenue and accounting 
system for deficit of each country, it can be regarded as an indicator which provides 
background to understand the overall circumstance around the urban railway system 
of each city (Shoji, 2001).  
On the other hands, one of the most popular topics in public transport is using 
2 
 
private sector operations such as franchising and competitive tendering to overcome 
the low profitability and operational inefficiency of public transport discussed above 
(Yvrande-Billon, 2006; Hensher & Stanley, 2008). In fact, passenger transportation 
services operated by the private sector were a general form of provision during the 
‘railway boom’ that begun in Europe, Japan, and North America at the turn of the 20th 
century and led to the establishment of many private railway companies (PRCs 
hereafter). However, while numerous such PRCs went bankrupt because of financial 
difficulties, PRCs in Japan survived by operating profit-making passenger railways in 
urban areas. Further, most PRCs in Japan are now also engaged in sectors such as 
real estate, distribution (retail), and other transportation mode (taxis and buses) in 
addition to their core railway business. While the success of PRCs is driven by 
densely populated urban areas and mass prepaid commuter passengers (Killeen, 
1999), difficulty in raising railway fares and demand decreases due to the decline in 
the productive age population are threatening the operation of PRCs. 
 
Figure 1.1 Change in the ratio of the operating profit of the transportation segments 
and diversified segments of major PRCs in Japan (Year means) 
Nevertheless, as private enterprises, PRCs make their own business portfolio, 
such as diversification and investment decisions, and compete with other companies 
in some routes based on the market principle (Shoji, 2001). Further, the 
implementation of a diversification strategy is a unique feature of PRCs in Japan 
compared with those in other countries. Thus far, the diversification strategies of 
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PRCs in Japan have generally been considered to be motivated and deployed in 
order to support the railway business. However, the operating profit of diversified 
segments has been higher than those generated by railways and related businesses 
in some companies. Figure 1.1 illustrates the change in the ratio of the operating 
profit of the transportation segments and diversified segments to the total sales of 
major PRCs in Japan from 2000 to 2012. This figure shows that the ratio of the total 
operating profit of diversified segments to the total sales tended to increase compared 
with that of transportation segments. Some PRCs even announce expansions to the 
scale and extent of their diversified business in their annual reports or mid- or long- 
term management strategies, thereby emphasising the importance of diversification. 
In other words, diversification may no longer be considered to support the railway 
business, but rather be an essential business strategy for the sustainability of PRCs. 
Although diversification strategies seem to act importantly in PRCs, most previous 
research focuses on categorising the type of diversification and its relationship 
between diversification strategies and PRC’s performance quantitatively. In addition, 
it has not been investigated how they influence the railway business in terms of 
internal capital resource allocation for investment, focusing on the coexistence of 
railways, which are considered as to be public utilities, and diversified businesses. 
Previous research has noted the diversification strategies of Japanese PRCs, and 
investigated their effects, focusing on their contribution to the profitability of the 
railway business and to the entire company. However, most previous studies focus 
on the relation between diversification and performance at the firm-level; finding 
research on how diversification strategies influence performance in terms of a firm’s 
strategic efficiency and investment in the railway business for acquiring and 
upgrading assets is more challenging. Based on the foregoing, the purpose of this 
research is to clarify the factors influencing a firm’s performance, focusing on the 
technical efficiency and to investigate how the mechanism of internal capital 
allocation is worked in major PRCs focusing on the influence on railway business. In 
order to scrutinise the relationship between diversification strategies and a firm’s 
efficiency, and effect on railway business, two different empirical analyses are 
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performed using data of Japanese PRCs. Based on the review of previous research 
and the results of empirical analysis, this study aims to provide implication for private 
operators and authorities which consider introduction of private operation to public 
transport, and to contribute to designing innovate business model of operation of 
railway business which balance public interest and pursuit for profit and growth of the 
firm. 
 
Organisation of the Research 
The structure of the remainder of this dissertation is as follows. First, the previous 
research of diversification strategies in strategic management and industrial 
organisation is reviewed in chapter 2. Then, this study delineates railway system and 
business strategies of Japanese PRCs and introduces previous research on 
diversification strategies of Japanese PRCs in chapter 3. In chapter 4 and 5, 
diversification strategies of PRCs are analysed in perspective on technical efficiency. 
Before estimating production function of PRCs, chapter 4 provides theoretical 
explanation of production function and stochastic frontier analysis. In chapter 5, 
empirical analysis of diversification strategies and a firm’s efficiency is conducted and 
implication and conclusion are derived. Next, the effect of diversification on 
investment in railway companies is quantified using regression model and the result 
from estimation is discussed in chapter 6. Finally, summary, finding and implications 
of this dissertation are provided and further research questions are suggested in 
chapter 7. 
  
5 
 
2. Overview of Diversification Strategies 
Diversification can be described by the extent of participation in different 
businesses and the underlying relationships between the various businesses within 
each firm (Nayyar, 1992). It can be also explained as the set of strategies that consists 
of choosing the types of businesses the firm will enter, the extent of which the firm 
will rely on past competencies or require the development of new ones, and the total 
amount of diversity considered as appropriate in favour of a single strategy (Rumelt, 
1974).  
Literature on diversification has covered a wide range of research questions and 
issues within its broad scope. In this chapter, this study examines three major topics 
of diversification research: 1) motivation of diversification 2) type of diversification 
strategies, and 3) relationship between diversification strategies and the firm’s 
performance based on the previous research of strategic management and industrial 
organisation. 
 
Motivation of Diversification Strategies 
With regard to the motivation for diversification, Ansoff (1957) argues that a firm 
wants to be compensated for the deterioration of current technology, to diffuse risk, 
to utilise excess production capacity, to reinvest revenue, and to acquire superb 
operation abilities. Porter (1980) mentions the effect of cost reduction through 
accumulation of experience. He discusses that the cost reduction is amplified when 
the firm utilises its experience in the process of creating a new product which is similar 
to a firm’s current product, or when it fully utilises accumulated experience to other 
related business. In other words, the firm considers diversifying because it can lighten 
the burden of additional cost by sharing common factors, such as experience 
acquired from the operating business in the present for a new, highly similar one. 
Based on these arguments, Montgomery (1994) synthesises the three views of the 
motivation for the firm’s diversification followings, which are the market-power view, 
agency view, and resource view (see also Montgomery (1994)). 
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First, market-power view focuses on building conglomerate power in the market 
through diversification strategies. Diversified firms (or conglomerates) build the power 
in anti-competitive ways which are cross subsidisation, mutual forbearance and 
reciprocal buying, and these practices hinder market competition and lead to higher 
industry concentration. This view tends to emphasise the results of diversification and 
observe a positive relationship between diversification strategies and firm 
performance. 
On the other hand, agency view focuses on the effect of diversification strategies 
on firm value, rather than its profitability as performance, and is discussed by financial 
economists. In this view, life cycle of the firm and ownership structure of the firm are 
associated with motivation of diversification strategies. When core businesses of the 
firm generate plentiful cash to reinvest but matured and have scarce growth 
opportunity, managers are likely to use cash flows to pursue their own interests 
(Mueller, 1972). Absence of significant ownership stakes accelerates this tendency 
and managers utilise unused cash to diversify by investing in low-benefit or value-
destroying mergers (Jensen, 1986). Especially, if managers have little equity in the 
firm and monitoring is not easy because of dispersion of shareholders, corporate 
assets may be used to benefit managers, rather than shareholders. Previous 
literature refers that value-decreasing diversification occur because of managers’ 
behaviour, which emphasise their particular skills in diversifying and control 
employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). Therefore, agency 
view predicts a negative relationship between diversification strategies and firm value. 
Finally, resource view assumes that a firm diversifies in response to excess 
capacity in productive factors, called resources. Resources include factors purchased 
in the market, services created from productive factors, and special knowledge 
accumulated by the firm. The resources are not homogeneous, but heterogeneous 
for each firm and they are reformed as the firm’s asset and capabilities. Therefore, 
firm profitability and the extent of diversification strategies are related to the stock of 
the firm’s assets, core competencies, and distinctive capabilities. Especially, if these 
resources are hard to be copied and be transferred by competitors, they can be 
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potentially a source of competitive advantages in the markets. Heterogeneity of each 
firm and existence of competitive advantages are important factors to explain the 
relationship between diversification strategies and performance in this view. Because 
firms have different capabilities and resources which contribute to competitive 
advantages, their optimal level of diversification is not same. Thus, the firm with 
resources which have less impact on building competitive advantages may diversify 
to relatively high level of diversification, while the firm with resources which have more 
impact on building competitive advantages could gain higher profits than their 
competitors with lower level of diversification (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988). 
 
Types of Diversification Strategies 
Types of diversification strategies are based on the relatedness among the various 
businesses of the firm. Wrigley (1970) suggests a basic concept and Rumelt (1974) 
modifies it to assess the extent of diversification and the nature of relatedness among 
the business of a diversified firm (Nayyar, 1992). He also categorises the type of 
diversification strategies into four categories that can each be broken down into 
subcategories, to arrive at a total of nine categories.  
The four major categories defined by Rumelt (1974) are single, dominant, related 
and unrelated business, and all but the single business category can be further 
divided into subcategories. As a result, the nine categories are the following: 1) single, 
2) dominant-vertical, 3) dominant-unrelated, 4) dominant-constrained, 5) dominant-
linked, 6) related constrained, 7) related-linked, 8) unrelated, and 9) conglomerate. 
Each category is determined by the specialisation ratio (SR), related ratio (RR), and 
vertical ratio (VR), which are the ratios of operating profit for specialised, related, and 
vertical business as the followings (Rumelt, 1974): 
1) Specialisation ratio: the proportion of a firm’s revenues that can be attributed to 
its largest single business 
2) Related ratio: the proportion of a firm’s revenues attributable to its largest group 
of related businesses 
3) Vertical ratio: the proportion of the firm’s revenues that arise from all by-
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products, intermediate products, and end products of a vertically integrated 
sequence of processing activities 
The firm is likely to choose a type of diversification by considering the types of 
resources and tangible assets that it possesses. Intangible assets and financial 
resources are also considered important. Particularly, intangible assets from research 
activities like R&D are likely to be more connected with the related diversification 
(Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). 
 
Relationship between Diversification Strategies and Performance 
Palich, Cardinal and Miller (2000) synthesise diversification-performance literature 
and suggest three points of view for the profitability issue. Figure 2.1 shows the three 
types of relationship between diversification and performance. 
 
Figure 2.1 Models of diversification-performance linkage 
Source: Palich, et al. (2000), pp. 157 (Figure 1) 
Linear model assumes that the extent of diversification positively influences 
performance, thus, the more the firm diversifies, the higher the firm’s performance. 
Market power view supports linear relationship and assumes that expanding 
diversification may yield increased profit by raising market share through reciprocal 
buying. However, there are few empirical works which support linear relationship 
based on the market power view (Palich, et al., 2000).  
On the other hand, intermediate model presents a question about the difference in 
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performance between related firms and unrelated firms. Markides and Williamson 
(1994) argues that exaggerated relatedness resulting from simply exploiting 
resources and assets may not contribute to improvement of performance of the 
related firm. Nayyar (1992) also refers that potential benefits from relatedness is not 
easy to be realised because of lack of communication among divisions or subsidiaries 
and costly effort. Both arguments point out that some related business portfolios may 
not have any advantages over unrelated diversification due to difficulties exploiting 
relatedness, while unrelated diversification has an advantages of financial synergies 
by acquiring profitable businesses through takeovers and merger (Palich, et al., 2000). 
While a negative aspect of diversification is emphasised in previous two models, 
resource view regards diversification strategies is a good way to increase profitability 
(Goddard, et al., 2008) and knowledge-based and inimitable resources can achieve 
the benefits of diversification (Miller, 2006). Rumelt (1982) also demonstrates through 
empirical analysis that related-constrained firms have the highest profitability among 
the diversification categories. Thus, the inverted-U model is strongly supported by 
many studies. It explains how a firm’s performance improves as it diversifies to an 
appropriate level of related business, and it tends to decrease after a critical point 
(Bettis, 1981; Rumelt, 1982; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994; Markides & Williamson, 
1994; Robins & Wiersema, 1995; Palich, et al., 2000). It also explains how a firm’s 
performance improves the more it diversifies, from the single business to related 
business of appropriate level of diversification. On the contrary, if a firm diversifies 
into unrelated business, its performance worsens gradually (Palich, et al., 2000). 
Therefore, properly matching a firm’s resources or assets to its products or services 
may enhance its profitability. Regarding excellence of related firms in performance, 
Montgomery (1994) insists that industry concentration, profitability of industry and 
weighted average of the firm’s market share drive better performance of related firms 
than that of other firms. In addition, Bettis (1981) argues that related firms 
outperforms the other firms because they exploits its core knowledge and advantages 
latent in technologies without huge additional costs. Related firms utilise not only 
possessing relevant resources or assets simply, but also underutilised assets, 
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thereby reaping economies of scope by sharing resources and combining activities 
along the value chain. 
As discussed above, many previous studies support that related firms outperform 
other types of firms in performance, especially profitability, due to adequate 
diversification strategies. However, some studies also point out that diversification 
strategies influence strategic decision making at the business level due to complexity 
of the organisation and bureaucratic cost, whereby it affect the firm’s performance 
indirectly (Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997). In other words, there are other factors which 
are possible to influence performance like industry membership and business 
strategy, as well as diversification strategies. For example, Prahalad and Bettis (1986) 
emphasise the role of ‘dominant logic’ of top management and define dominant logic 
as a mindset, a world view or conceptualisation of the business and the administrative 
tools to accomplish goals and make decisions in the business.  
 
Diversification Strategies and Business Environment 
(1) Research on diversification strategies of the service industry oriented firm  
Japanese PRCs mostly deploy urban public transportation, real estate, distribution 
(retail), leisure and consumer service (tourism, amusement park, theatre, hotel, 
restaurant, etc.), information and network, and cultural business, as well as 
manufacturing (rolling stocks) and construction business. Although PRCs cover most 
of businesses categorised into the service industry except manufacturing and 
construction businesses (Shoji, 2001), most issues on diversification strategies of 
previous section focuses on the firms engaging manufacturing businesses. Therefore, 
this study reviews the research on the diversification strategies of service firms, 
considering the difference between manufacturing and service business which are 
closed to diversification strategies of PRCs. 
While some previous research agrees that service firms can benefit from 
economies of scope by sharing resources and assets of diversified businesses like 
manufacturing firms (Channon, 1979; Nayyar, 1993) and related firms also 
11 
 
outperform other firms in profitability (Channon, 1979; Nayyar, 1993; Normann, 2001; 
Capar & Kotabe, 2003), there is also evidence that diversification strategies which 
are deployed narrowly achieve superior performance in a sample of British service 
firms (Channon, 1979). For geographical diversification of service firms, Nayyar 
(1992) argues that geographically focused strategy effects on the firm’s performance 
positively. Because services are intangible items required interaction between the 
firm and the customer, production and consumption of them occur simultaneously 
and are limited by location and time (Berthon, et al., 1999; Lovelock & Wright, 2002). 
The firms can also form intimacy with customers while they should undertake high 
investment for expansion of business  (Capar & Kotabe, 2003). Thus, the firms can 
respond quickly and effectively with changes of the customers’ needs and meet with 
their needs thoroughly by operating within a limited geographic region (Nayyar, 1992). 
Moreover, geographical diversification may prevent the firm from adapting to the 
customers’ needs in limited areas. The firm should understand the cultural 
background of the new market and transmit information related to standardised rules 
from head office to subsidiaries to develop new products and services, as well as 
they should understand perfectly know-how and knowledge existing over a wide 
range of organisation of the firm. These processes require assimilation of extensive 
knowledge and need high cost and time. 
Information asymmetry between the firm and the customer also influences on the 
diversification strategies of service firms and is generally considered as obstacles 
causing costs for the firms and the customers in exchange. However, a firm may 
achieve better performance by exploiting benefit from information asymmetry. 
Availability of information before purchase is more important in the case of services 
than that of other industries, because purchase of service mostly relies on the 
experience or credence qualities. Hence, the reputation is potentially a better solution 
to reduce information asymmetry than signalling for the high-quality service like high 
prices for potential customers, due to the possibility of distortion of signalling. As a 
result, when a firm diversifies into service businesses expected that existing 
customers may buy a firm’s new service, it may create competitive advantages and 
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benefits exploiting the reputation formed by services having been provided by the 
firm so far because the customers tend to be reluctant to change service provider 
because of switching cost (Nayyar, 1990). 
With regard to the measurement of diversification strategies of service firm, Nayyar 
(1992) investigates the relationship between relatedness and performance of large 
diversified U.S. service firms using two different measurements, which are based on 
internal data and externally available data separately. He argues that the 
measurement based on externally available data is likely to reflect potential 
relatedness, rather than actual relatedness which can be captured by internal data 
collected by questionnaire, because conflict inside organisation and absence of 
communication intervene realisation of relatedness. He also insists on the necessity 
of collecting data, enabling to understand the actual relatedness among businesses. 
Relatedness is one of the issues which should be considered thoroughly in case of 
the service firms. Rumelt’s (1982) assumes for measures of relatedness that 
businesses must be related if a firm’s businesses consist of similar products, markets 
or technologies and the measures are calculated using external examination of the 
product-markets in which the businesses participated, and a knowledge of key 
elements which relies on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code in U.S. 
companies. However, many researchers point out that SIC-based measures have 
critical limitations, not adequately reflecting the difference in each industry. 
Gassenheimer and Keep (1998) point out that using SIC classification may not be 
appropriate for assessing diversification in all economic sectors. They argue that the 
implications of diversification in manufacturing should be applied to non-
manufacturing sectors under the careful consideration of the validity of previous 
research and additional information is needed. They also emphasis that the evidence 
supporting positive relationships between ROA and levels of related diversification is 
hard to find in non-manufacturing sectors. 
 
(2) Research on diversification strategies of public utilities  
Public utilities regulated by the law have faced changes of deregulation and forced 
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to take strategic action to adapt changed circumstance like Japanese PRCs (Russo, 
1992; McGuinness & Thomas, 1997; Jandik & Makhija, 2005). Regarding public 
utilities, the regulation can be considered as the factor influencing a firm’s strategic 
choice like diversification strategies and vertical integration (Russo, 1992). Most of 
previous research on public utilities focuses on the case of post privatised companies 
and utilities whose core business is regulated. 
Diversification strategies of electric utilities of the U.S. are closely associated with 
regulations and corresponding legislations. Especially, The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
(EPACT) is a significant momentum of strategic changes to investor-owned electric 
utilities. They started its first step to business diversification in the early 1980 due to 
decreased rapid growth in electricity demand. Because of decrease in demand, many 
utilities reduce construction expenses and use extra cash flow to invest new 
businesses, rather than returning to investors as common dividends. Diversifying 
activities are strongly monitored and restricted by regulators to prevent them from 
unfair transaction, which is to buy supplies at an improper price and to make profits 
to upstream subsidiaries handsomely at the utility’s expense, between parent 
companies and subsidiaries (Russo, 1992; Jandik & Makhija, 2005). Authorities (PUC: 
Public Utility Commissions) and utility ratepayers are sceptics about diversification of 
electric utilities, rather than expecting gains from synergies. From mid-80’s, many 
PUCs responded by making the model legislation and developing detailed 
procedures to diversified electric utilities, although there was no state-level regulation 
in the early 80’s. PUCs defined barrier between the utility and non-utility businesses 
to control diversifying activities of electric utilities. As a result, diversified non-utility 
businesses were separated from utility activities, thereby taking formation of isolated 
corporate subsidiaries. The PUC also regulated reciprocal transaction between the 
utility and non-utility subsidiaries and the proportion of the non-utility businesses 
(Jandik & Makhija, 2005). Although they mainly diversified into vertically integrated 
business and the sales of excess natural resources which are used to generate 
electricity until 1980, they expanded their activities outside core business such as 
insurance companies, telecommunications, and cable TVs through acquisitions and 
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takeovers (Jandik & Makhija, 2005; Yokoyama, 2007). They even moved into new 
lines of businesses which seem not to be related electricity business, such as leasing 
aircraft, acquiring insurance company, and buying a chain of drug stores and 
pharmaceutical subsidiary (Jandik & Makhija, 2005). However, after the enforcement 
of EPACT, electric utilities reached a turning point in their diversifying activities, which 
is to focus on the energy related business (Yokoyama, 2007) and to branch outside 
their traditional domain because unregulated entities are allowed to participate in 
generating and selling electricity at wholesale prices (Jandik & Makhija, 2005). They 
faced increased competition in the electric generating sector due to the deregulation 
which encourages the entry of independent power producers (Delmas & Tokat, 2005; 
Jandik & Makhija, 2005). At last, the transmission lines were opened in 1996 and 
regulators allowed retail deregulation initiatives in electric markets from 1998 (Delmas 
& Tokat, 2005). Mergers and acquisitions were observed in investor-owned electric 
utilities to enlarge scale and scope of business and increase power in competitive 
markets, mainly in the energy industry. As well as M&A activities, they have divested 
their non-core assets and reformed corporate structure focusing on the core business 
to reduce expenses by exiting from unrelated non-core businesses (Yokoyama, 2007). 
Russo (1992) adopts a transaction cost economics perspective to investigate the 
relationship between regulatory monitoring and diversification strategies of American 
electric utilities and argues that monitoring effort of regulatory drives the firm to 
expand businesses which are not associated with regulation and facilitates 
externalisation to avoid high monitoring costs under unified governance. Jandik and 
Makhija (2005) suggest evidence that the degree of diversification is positively related 
to the excess value measures by preventing over investment in the electricity 
business and diversified utilities show significant diversification premiums under the 
strict regulation. However, they insist that these diversification premiums disappeared 
when partial deregulation of the industry is implemented. 
Diversification strategies of water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England 
and Wales and newly privatised UK utilities, water and electricity companies, is also 
examined by previous literature. Since privatisation in November 1989, the water 
15 
 
sector in England and Wales consists of 10 regional monopolies providing both water 
and sewerage service (WaSCs) and 9 water-only companies (WoCs) with regional 
monopolies operating in the areas of the WaSCs (OFWAT, 2015). Especially, WaSCs 
exist as group structure and each licensed water company is owned by a parent 
company (water holding company). Water subsidiaries can also deploy non-regulated 
business as same as other subsidiaries in the group company (OFWAT, 2006). While 
The Water Act 1973 constrained other activities except water supplies, the authorities 
were partly permitted to enter the overseas activities such as advice, assistance and 
training, only under the agreement of central government after The Water Act 19831. 
Finally, The Water Act 1989 offered the opportunity for diversification into non-
regulated businesses, as well as introduction of commercial decision making to the 
regulated core business (McGuinness & Thomas, 1997; OFWAT, 2006). At the first 
stage of privatisation, WaSCs had abundant cash, but its core business was matured, 
regulated, and uncertain about future profitability, thus, these situations motivated 
them to enter unregulated markets, which allow greater freedom to make strategies 
and expect future growth (McGuinness & Thomas, 1997; Thompson, 1999). 
McGuinness and Thomas (1997) argued that managements of WaSCs desired 
diversification strategies to secure alternative sources of income and profit because 
it is difficult to expect high growth for regulated water business and water business 
required a large scale investment to satisfy enhance environmental regulations and 
to improve the level of service. Therefore, they transferred their funds to enter the 
new opportunity to diversify as described in the situation of free cash flow 
(McGuinness & Thomas, 1997; Thompson, 1999). Most companies tended to 
diversify into businesses involving water and sewerage activities. In addition, WaSCs 
extended their business area into property development, hotels and fisheries; 
regional television broadcasting; landscaping; and security services (McGuinness & 
Thomas, 1997). In the report of OFWAT (2006), diversifying activities of WaSCs are 
defined as following ways: 1) by shifting some regulated businesses (e.g. transport, 
                                                                
1 According to McGuinness and Thomas (1997), the water authorities invested in telemetry 
(computerised remote monitoring and control of operations), digital mapping, computerised 
systems, and closed circuit television surveying of mains and sewers before privatisation. 
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IT, scientific or customer services) to separate companies which continue to trade 
with the regulated business; 2) by assigning the non-regulated businesses to 
subsidiaries and offering these services to third parties and to the regulated business; 
3) by developing services or companies which supply goods or services to the 
regulated business as a form of subsidiary; 4) by entering into joint ventures with 
other companies. Diversification strategies of WaSCs are regulated by directors 
(OFWAT) to prevent the customers from undeserved burden caused by potential 
losses or higher charges which may be caused by diversification, through monitoring 
any transactions with group firms (OFWAT, 2006). 
McGuinness and Thomas (1997) illustrate the conformity to the privatisation of the 
WaSCs resource view. After privatisation, WaSCs deploy diversification strategies to 
overcome slow growth of water and sewerage industry, and to secure funds for 
investment in infrastructure in order to improve service level. In this circumstance, 
WaSCs strive to exploit core competencies like customers, network, and work 
routines built by operating water and sewerage business, for diversification. They 
expand the extent of business by overcoming disadvantages through merger and 
acquisition, and strategic alliance, and building new core competencies. Thomson 
(1999) investigates the post-privatisation UK energy and water utilities aspects of the 
free-cash flow hypothesis. Because of weak governance and strong cash-flow after 
privatisation, their diversification strategies are encouraged and non-core revenues 
are also increased. 
On the other hand, telecommunication industry in the U.S. focuses on international 
diversification. Before 1996, when The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enforced, 
the telecommunications markets in the U.S. were separated into two sectors, which 
were regional bell operating and long distance services including international calling. 
With developments in technology, the third sector, offering cellular or paging services, 
appeared later, thus, there were three types of market in telecommunications industry. 
Originally, there was boundary within industry, which didn’t allow each firm to transfer 
from its own sector to the other sectors (Ware, 1998). Therefore, they were only 
allowed to compete in other sectors within its jurisdiction, in noncore business in the 
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other firms’ operating regions, or in overseas markets because it is legally restricted 
to operate core business in other regions of U.S. (Kashlak & Joshi, 1994; Ware, 1998). 
As a result, telecommunications firms diversified into closely related markets (e.g. 
regional toll of long distance companies and carrier access for large customers) and 
new region geographically and internationally. However, the implementation of The 
Telecommunications Act 1996 increased competition in telecommunications market 
by allowing long distance companies to provide local services, and between cable TV 
and telephone companies. In other words, the law gave the firms opportunities to 
deploy their businesses over nationwide and various industries by eliminating 
regional and industry boundaries (Joshi, et al., 1998; Ware, 1998). As well as 
regulatory reason, network economies (e.g. economies of scale and scope obtained 
by intensive use of the existing network) also motivated diversification. Particularly, 
customers’ needs to one-stop-shopping made the firms to diversify into competitors’ 
markets in order to stimulate demand (Ware, 1998). As a result, the 
telecommunications companies have formed full service firms providing several 
telecommunication services, such as regional and long distance, mobile telecom, 
internet and cable TV, and entered the international market. Kashlak and Joshi (1994) 
use the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) in U.S. as the sample and 
assume that the diversification strategies of RBOC are determined by core business 
growth and degree of government regulation. They point out that regulated 
telecommunication firms might invest in international diversification if the growth of 
core business is stagnant.  
 
Summary 
The aim of diversification strategies is to create value, to make firms grow, and to 
improve profitability. The firms also seek expansion of business, stabilisation of profit, 
and compensation for the deterioration of technologies and low growth of core 
business by diversifying. In perspectives for the motivation of the firm’s diversification, 
three points of view are suggested: 1) market power view, 2) resource view, 3) agency 
views. 
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Types of diversification strategies are also a main issue of research on 
diversification. Rumelt (1974) classifies types of diversification in nine categories 
including four main categories and five subcategories which are derived from main 
categories, based on the relatedness existing among the firm’s various businesses. 
Intangible assets and financial resources which the firm possesses, especially 
obtained from research activities, are likely to be associated with the related 
diversification.  
Relationship between the extent of diversification strategies and the firm’s 
performance is examined by lots of literature. Most of them support that related 
diversification is the most effective way to increase profitability and this is represented 
by inverted-U model. According to inverted-U model, the firm’s performance tends to 
decrease after critical point, thus, unrelated diversification might not yield high 
profitability. 
While research on diversification strategies generally uses manufacturing and 
unregulated firms as a sample, diversification strategies of non-manufacturing firms 
and regulated firms are also investigated under the diverse view. The cases of 
American electric utilities, public utilities in the U.K., and telecommunication industry 
are reviewed. Public utilities expand their business into non-regulated industry and 
beyond the geographic region to attenuate monitoring costs and use core 
competencies built by core business. From the next chapter, diversification strategies 
of Japanese PRCs will be discussed based on various discussions of this chapter 
and environment of urban transportation is also reviewed. 
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3. Diversification Strategies of Japanese PRCs 
While many operators of urban public transportation are suffering from a decrease 
of ridership and operating deficits due to inefficient operation in most industrialised 
countries, railway transportation in large urban areas of Japan is differentiated by its 
operation making a profit and efficiency. Railway transportation in Japan can be also 
characterised by operators run independently of the government and its business 
strategies. In this chapter, this study reviews the current situations of urban transport 
systems and private railway operators in Japan. 
 
Overview of Urban Transportation in Japan 
In Japan, high public transit usage in huge metropolitan areas, which are Tokyo 
metropolitan area and Keihanshin area, is the main feature of urban transportation. 
Table 3.1 presents mode share in Tokyo metropolitan area (TMA), Keihanshin 
metropolitan area (KMA), and Chukyo metropolitan area (CMA).  TMA and KMA show 
high proportion of public transit, including railway, bus and taxi, and it is more than 
half, while car is the most overwhelming mode in CMA as accounting for 72.9%.  
Table 3.1 Mode share in three metropolitan areas of Japan (2008) 
 Railway Bus Taxi Car 
Total (three areas) 51.0 6.6 2.7 39.7 
Tokyo metropolitan area 58.2 6.8 2.7 32.3 
Keihanshin metropolitan area 48.4 7.8 3.2 40.6 
Chukyo metropolitan area 21.7 3.6 1.8 72.9 
Note 1) Trams are included in the bus. 
2) The original data was adapted for the purpose of study 
Source: Transportation Policy Studies (Unyu Seisaku Kenkyu Kikou), 2011 
(1) Pure private railway companies and operation independently of governments 
Many of the companies established during the large-scale construction of railways 
in the late 19th century and the early 20th century in Japan, still exist today in the form 
of PRCs. On the contrary, the main operators of urban railways in the United States 
and Europe have changed from the private to the public sector because of financial 
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difficulties or through the discontinuation of deficit-ridden railway lines (Shoji, 2001). 
The main operators of urban railway in Japan are usually classified into, JRs 
(Japan Railway), private railways and public and quasi-public firms. Among these 
operators, Private railway companies (PRCs hereafter) play a large role as 
organisations run independently of the government. According to the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan, there are 177 passenger railway 
operators in Japan (excluding cable car, ropeway and non-passenger rail operators 
like freight operator) and 142 of these firms are categorised as PRCs (major, semi-
major and minor) in 2012. Of these, 16 firms were ‘major’ companies, namely those 
that provided services in Japan’s three metropolitan areas, which are characterised 
as having large demand for railway services (except Nishi Nippon Railroad). 
Operators of subway lines like Tokyo Metro and Osaka Municipal Transportation 
Bureau, and six JR companies (JR Hokkaido, JR East, JR Tokai, JR West, JR 
Shikoku, JR Kyushu) are not included in private railway. 
Most of Japan’s 16 PRCs and three JR companies (JR East, JR Tokai, and JR 
West) in Honshu are listed on Tokyo stock market, and these have formed group firms 
that have several subsidiary companies. They receive few operating subsidies from 
the government, although some financial support programmes are available such as 
loans without interest or with interest relief and tax relief on funds for infrastructure 
investment (Shoji, 2001). Therefore, they design and provide services independently 
without government intervention. Although PRCs generally face regulations related 
to market entry, fares (full-cost pricing), and safety standards in the railway business, 
owing to public concerns, they are not operated or managed by the public sector. 
 
(2) Urban railway operation in surplus 
While numerous PRCs in Europe and North America established during the ‘railway 
boom’ went bankrupt because of financial difficulties, PRCs in Japan survived by 
operating profit-making passenger railways in urban areas (see Figure 3.1). 
Especially, major PRCs in urban area do not receive any subsidies for their operation 
and this distinguishes Japanese PRCs from urban railway operators of other 
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developed countries. In addition, they invest to construct and maintain infrastructure 
by their own funds without any subsidies from the public sector in substance (Shoji, 
2001). Japanese PRCs in urban areas can be profitable because 1) they operate in 
densely populated urban centres 2) they operate in a competitive environment under 
competitive principles, and 3) they have a stable base of pre-paid commuter 
passengers (Killeen, 1999). Because they usually started operations in relatively 
undeveloped areas, it is especially remarkable that the most of them are making profit 
considering poor initial condition (Saito, 1993; Killeen, 1999; Shoji, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Net profit of major PRCs in TMA and KMA for 5 years  
(Unit: one hundred million Yen) 
Source: The data book of the major private railways (2011-2014), The Association of 
Japanese Private Railway 
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(3) Diversification and integration strategies of PRCs 
PRCs diversify into several different fields, as well as railways and employ 
integration strategies. Diversification strategy has been employed in a form of not 
only business unit inside a corporation, but also subsidiaries in group system. They 
have faced with price regulations (e.g. full-cost pricing) and fare regulations, thereby 
limited profitability. Therefore, considering the limited profitability of the railway 
business because of these regulations, it is regarded as natural and rational for PRCs, 
as private enterprises, to participate in new businesses that are free from regulation 
(Shoji, 2001). They also try to capture externalities due to the initial railway 
infrastructure investment (Killeen, 1999). Diversification of public utility companies 
can be observed in case of the electric utility industry in the U.S. and the water and 
sewerage companies in England and Wales, as well as private railway companies in 
Japan (Russo, 1992; McGuinness & Thomas, 1997). Retaining enough population 
density is often referred as the key point for the profitable operation of railway 
business; however, Killeen (1999) insists that it is not the only factor that guarantees 
success. Hard condition starting business in the undeveloped areas, having scarce 
ridership, at the initial stage made PRCs to struggle to create demand for an increase 
of ridership. In other words, they achieve profitable operation of railways by property 
development of surrounding areas, station development and other business ventures, 
thereby making new demand, rather than relying on the living population already 
existed. However, it should not be forgotten that income from diversified non-rail 
businesses cannot be used to make up for the loss of railway business because 
railway and other diversified businesses are strictly seperated by Railway Accounting 
Ordinance (Tetsudo kaikei kisoku) which prohibits cross-subsidisation in terms of cost 
allocation between railway and diversified non-rail businesses (Shoji, 2001). 
 
Diversification Strategies of PRCs in Japan 
(1) Overview of diversification strategies of PRCs in Japan 
Major PRCs in Japan have mostly diversified into real estate and distribution, 
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including the retail business. Leisure and service business are also important, such 
as the hotel business locally and nationwide. The maintenance of buildings and the 
manufacturing or maintenance of railway carriages are other main businesses, 
although the proportion of revenue of these is low compared with that of other 
businesses, because of vertical integration, which reduces operating costs. Although 
classification of segment is different by each PRC, they generally operate the 
following businesses (Shoji, 2001): 1) transportation (passenger transportation 
including railway, bus and taxi, and freight transportation), 2) real estate and 
construction (constructing, selling and leasing houses and buildings, and building 
management), 3) distribution (department stores, convenience stores, and 
supermarkets inside or around their terminal buildings and stations), 4) leisure (travel, 
amusement park, hotel, and sport facilities and teams), 5) manufacturing (railway 
carriages and plants), 6) IT and service (CATV, communication, advertisement and 
finance and insurance), 7) culture and entertainment (museum, opera company, and 
nursing home). 
In recent years, as main diversified business, PRCs have actively operated real 
estate business focusing on the selling and leasing of houses and buildings near their 
routes, as well as development residential and commercial area and construction of 
building and house. Distribution business is also a main diversified business in PRCs, 
especially focusing on the retailing. It is not hard to find convenience stores, which 
are brand of PRCs, inside or near a terminal building and station, such as ‘Asnas 
(Hankyu-Hanshin Holdings)’ and large department store, such as ‘Hankyu 
department store’, ‘Tokyu department store’, or ‘Kintetsu department store’ named 
after the name of PRCs. In addition, the proportion of diversified businesses including 
real estate and distribution to entire segments is quite high, according to the financial 
statement and annual report of each company. In other words, PRCs diversify their 
businesses by utilising the physical resources which are emphasised in the railway 
business. PRCs also try to attract passengers using their railway service to 
commercial facilities operated by them and utilising customer asset to increase 
profitability. 
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On the other hand, PRCs also deploy leisure and service business even in country 
wide and abroad, as well as near operating area. Especially, one of the subsidiary of 
Hankyu-Hanshin Holdings, “Hankyu Travel” provides services for domestic and 
overseas travels, and Tokyu Corporation develops resort facilities and sports facilities 
outside operating area. Building maintenance and manufacturing or maintenance of 
rolling stocks is also one of the diversified businesses, but, the proportion is not high 
compared with other businesses. These are usually considered as the result of 
vertical integration in order to reduce operating cost (Shoji, 2001). 
 
(2) The analysis of diversification strategies of Japanese PRCs 
Many previous studies investigating diversification strategies of Japanese PRCs 
focus on the classification of type of diversification strategies, discussed in strategic 
management. Although the relationship between strategic type and profitability is also 
one of the main topics of diversification strategies of Japanese PRCs, there are few 
studies examine this relationship quantitatively, except for the research of Yoshida 
(1986), Killeen (1999), Shoji (2001), and Kamata and Yamauchi (2010). Of these, 
Yoshida’s (1986) research is the first quantitatified one which adopts Rumelt’s (1974) 
method, which is modified considering the industry characteristics of the 
transportation industry in Japan. He analyses the relationship between type of 
diversification and performance, focusing on profitability. Table 3.2 presents the 
comparison of classification of diversification strategies by Rumelt and Yoshida.   
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Table 3.2 Classification of diversification strategies of Rumelt and Yoshida 
Rumelt (1974) Yoshida (1986) 
Category Criteria Category Criteria 
Single business SR ≥ 0.95 Single business SR > 0.90 
Dominant vertical SR < 0.95 or VR ≥ 0.7 
Dominant 
vertical 
VR > RR > 0.70 
Dominant 
Constrained  SR ≥ 0.7, VR < 0.7 
Dominant 
business 
SR > 0.70 Dominant Linked 
Dominant unrelated 
SR ≥ 0.7, VR < 0.7, 
RR < 
1
2
(SR+1) 
Related constrained  SR < 0.7, VR < 0.7, 
RR ≥ 0.7 
Related 
business 
RR > 0.70 
Related linked 
Unrelated business  
SR < 0.7, VR < 0.7, 
RR < 0.7 
Unrelated 
business 
 
Note 1) SR (Specialization Ratio): The proportion of a firm’s revenues that is attributable to its 
largest discrete product-market activity    
2) VR (Vertical Ratio): The proportion of a firm’s revenues attributable to all of the by-
products intermediated products, and final products of a vertically integrated 
sequence of manufacturing operations 
3) RR (Related Ratio): The proportion of its revenues that is attributable to the largest 
group of businesses that are related in some way to one another 
Source: Rumelt (1974), Yoshida (1986) (The original source chart and table were adapted for 
purposes of the study.) 
After Yoshida (1986), Killeen (1999) and Shoji (2001) also classify types of 
diversification strategies of the fifteen major PRCs using Yoshida’s (1986) method. 
They find that the strategic positioning of these is steadily maintained, and related 
diversified firms can be observed in the KMA more than in the TMA. In addition, the 
profitability of related diversified firms is higher than that of any other firms in the 
sample. This indicates that an increase in the extent of diversification may cause a 
decrease of performance above a certain degree of diversification. This is consistent 
with Rumelt’s (1974) results. However, Kamata and Yamauchi (2010) claim that the 
profitability of dominant firms is higher than that of any other types in the analysis of 
major PRCs and three of JR companies including data after 1996. They find that the 
profitability of dominant firms is higher than that of other categories (single and 
unrelated type). 
Different conclusions of these studies may result from the difference in data which 
are used in the analysis. While Killeen (1999) and Shoji (2001) focus on the in-house 
level strategies and use the data of securities report of each subsidiary, Kamata and 
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Yamauchi (2010) set the range of analysis in the group-level and use the data from 
consolidated financial statement. Although the in-house level strategies generally 
tend to focus on the increase railway ridership, the group-level strategies are likely to 
emphasise to improve profitability and growth of the entire firm (Saito, 1993; Mizutani, 
2006). Moreover, most of Japanese firms, as well as PRCs, experienced the change 
of accounting rule after 2000. The consolidated financial statement, which Kamata 
and Yamauchi (2010) used, is an accounting rule considering the holding company’s 
subsidiaries into its aggregated accounting figure and it focuses on the performance 
of the group as a single entity. Therefore, it is hard to capture the activities of 
subsidiaries which are not needed to be obliged to announce financial statements 
because all intragroup transactions and balances are excluded to avoid double 
counting. 
Difference in the definition of vertical and relatedness business is also considered 
as the reason of different conclusion. Kamata and Yamauchi (2010) adopt segments 
written in the consolidated financial statement as business categories and each PRC 
decides segments based on its managerial decision. However, Killeen (1999) and 
Shoji (2001) adopt modified standards, which apply the rules of Kintetsu Electric 
Railway, to unify the business categories of each PRCs. They define business 
categories by ‘vertical’, ‘related’ and ‘unrelated’ ratio of each business considering the 
actual condition of PRCs. 
Shoji (2001) also analyses diversification strategies of PRCs in the group-level, but 
he redefines business segments as similar to the in-house level analysis. In this 
analysis, he investigates diversification strategies by the proportion of revenue and 
profit of each segment to the entire firm, rather than categorising the type of 
diversification strategies. He also refers that PRCs may be classified into unrelated 
type in the group-level analysis because PRCs deploy business not only near the 
route and related to transportation business, but also outside the route and not highly 
related to transportation business. In this group-level analysis, he insists that 
diversification beyond the appropriate level influences on the firm’s profitability 
negatively by comparing the ratio of profit of each segment to entire firm and 
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transportation and real estate segment are important businesses for PRCs because 
the profit of PRCs consists of those from two businesses. 
Analysis for minor PRCs is also conducted by Shoji and Killeen (2001). Minor PRCs 
include all the firms except major PRCs and JR companies, and they provide railway 
services in local city areas, as well as operating a sightseeing train. Comparing to 
major PRCs, while the size of the railway business is not large and varies depending 
on the operator, most of minor PRCs diversify into various businesses as major PRCs 
do. Shoji and Killeen (2001) compare the extent of diversification strategies and 
composition of the operating income of each segment. They argue that the 
diversification index of minor PRCs which represents the extent of diversification 
strategies is not largely different from that of major PRCs, although they are likely to 
diversify more into the automobile business including bus and taxi. The tendency of 
high proportion of automobile business is due to poor demand condition of local area, 
thus, bus transportation functions complementary with railway service. They also 
investigate the type of diversification strategies of minor PRCs using Rumelt’s method 
and suggest that more than half of the firm classified into unrelated firm, although 
diversification index is not largely greater than that of major PRCs.  Shoji and Killeen 
(2001) interpret that this result is attributed to weak business foundation of railway 
operation and also argue that same tendency with major PRCs is observed in the 
relationship between the extent of diversification and profitability.  
 
(3) Effect of diversification strategies on railway business 
Killeen (1999) refers cross-traffic effect on his doctoral thesis for the almost first 
time. Cross-traffic effect can be defined as increased ridership by developing housing 
and land in the area along railway routes or utilising railway passenger (Shoji, 2001). 
The concept of cross-traffic effect was started from the question why the firms 
continue to operate deficit diversified businesses and do not divest non-profitable 
segments. If cross-traffic effect, facilitating railway demand by diversified businesses, 
exists, the divestiture of non-profitable businesses might negatively influence railway 
business. Killeen (1999) and Sugiyama (2000) estimate quantitative models based 
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on the demand function using ordinary least squares (OLS hereafter). Table 3.3 
presents the models of two research. 
Table 3.3 Models of cross-traffic effects 
Variables 
Data 
Killeen (1999) Sugiyama (2000) 
D (Dependant Variables) 
Total passenger Total passenger 
Non pass holders Non pass holders 
EC (Economic Conditions) 
Real economic growth 
rate 
Real economic growth rate 
Total population (along 
the railway line) 
Total population (along the 
railway line) 
SU  
(Price of Substitute Services) 
Gasoline retail price index 
Gasoline retail price index 
Total number of cars 
FA (Rail Fares) Fare indicator 
Average fare (commuter/ 
excepting commuter) 
QS (Quality and quantity of 
Service) 
Rail traffic density 
Operation kilometer 
Number of rail employees 
DO 
(Effects of Diversified 
Operations) 
Rail investment 
Goods, land and objects 
(inventory assets) 
Investment on diversified 
operations 
Income from the lease 
business of land and 
building 
Income from other 
diversified businesses 
Source: Killeen (1999), Sugiyama (2000) 
Regarding comparison of two models, while Sugiyama (2000) tries to capture the 
effect of diversified businesses by classifying income from diversified businesses into 
real estate oriented and others, Killeen (1999) considers railway operation and others 
only. Killeen (1999) also assumes that investment in diversified businesses might 
influence on the passengers’ usage status excepting commuters, however, this is not 
statistically significant. On the contrary, Sugiyama (2000) suggests statistically 
significant evidence that investment in diversified businesses influences on non-
commuter passengers. Difference of conclusions of two model results from difference 
of used sample in analysis. While Killeen (1999) uses the data of the business units 
of Hankyu Railway, Sugiyama (2000) estimates model using data of Keihan Electric 
Railway (Keihan) and Kintetsu Electric Railway (Kintetsu). In his analysis, although 
Keihan acquires passengers by diversifying into the real estate and other businesses, 
it is not observed in the case of Kintetsu. However, it is hard to conclude that Kintetsu 
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does not receive any benefits from diversification strategies for increase ridership. He 
refers that the strategic level (in-house or group) of diversification should be 
scrutinised to clarify the effect of diversification strategies on railway ridership. 
 
Summary 
PRCs are the most important transportation in urban areas of Japan for now, 
attracting a large number of riders. They provide passenger railway services making 
a profit, although they are regulated in terms of fare, pricing, and safety, and there 
are only minimal financial support schemes for building and maintaining infrastructure. 
Innovative diversification strategies contribute to the successful operation of PRCs 
by making various income sources which enable them to overcome limited 
profitability of railway business. 
Diversification strategies of PRCs are the most distinctive feature comparing with 
other operators in developed countries. PRCs have mainly diversified into the 
businesses significantly associated with passengers’ daily life, like retail and real 
estate focused on selling and leasing, while transportation business, including railway 
business is still an important business generating stable profit to the firm. Previous 
studies investigate the relationship between diversification strategies and 
performance of PRCs in terms of profitability, by classifying the type of diversification 
strategies. For the relationship between diversification strategies and profitability, 
Killeen (1999) and Shoji (2001) insist that related diversified firms are the most 
profitable while Kamata and Yamauchi (2010) suggest different conclusion. 
Disagreement of results resulted from different data structure and different standard 
to decide vertical and related businesses. With the regards of types of diversification 
strategies, quantitative models are estimated to measure cross-traffic effects, while 
only small number of research tries. From the next chapter, the empirical analysis on 
Japanese PRCs using quantitative model will be conducted based on the discussion 
of diversification strategies reviewed so far. 
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Appendix 3.A List of Diversified Businesses of Japanese PRCs2 
Operator Core business Diversified segments 
Tobu 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus and taxi 
- Freight 
Leisure 
- Amusement park, 
tourism 
- Sports business 
- Hotels 
- Restaurant 
Real estate 
- Leasing and selling 
- Development of 
Tokyo Sky Tree 
 
Distribution 
- Retail (department 
store) 
 
Others  
- Construction of 
housing 
 
Seibu 
Urban transportation 
and regional 
business 
- Railway 
- Bus 
- Leisure business in 
operating region of 
railways 
Hotel & leisure 
- Hotel 
- Resort 
- Golf courses 
Real estate 
- Leasing 
- Stores in stations 
Construction 
- Construction of 
railway facilities and 
housing 
Hawaii 
- Hotel and resort 
Others  
- Leisure business of 
subsidiaries operating 
local railways  
- Baseball team 
Keisei 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus and taxi 
Distribution 
- Department store 
- Wholesale of garden 
plants 
- Shopping mall 
Real estate 
- Leasing and selling 
- Management of 
property 
Leisure & Service  
- Restaurant and 
theatre 
- Hotel 
- Advertising 
- Tourism 
Construction 
- Construction of 
housing 
Others 
- Maintenance of 
rolling stocks 
- Car manufacturing 
- Insurance agency 
Keio 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus and taxi 
Distribution 
- Department store 
- Retail store 
- Book store 
- Stores in stations 
Real estate 
- Leasing and selling 
 
Leisure & service 
- Hotel 
- Tourism 
- Advertising 
Others  
- Building management 
- Maintenance of 
rolling stocks 
- Construction 
 
                                                                
2 Diversified segments are lined up by following the order of financial statement of each company in 2012. 
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Operator Core business Diversified segments 
Odakyu 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus and taxi 
- Cable car 
Distribution 
- Department store 
- Retail store 
Real estate 
- Leasing and selling 
 
Others 
- Hotel 
- Restaurant 
- Tourism 
- Building management 
  
Tokyu 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus 
Real estate 
- Leasing and selling 
- Management of 
property 
Retail 
- Department store 
- Franchise store 
- Shopping mall 
Leisure & services 
- Advertising 
- Cable TV 
- Childcare 
Hotel Others 
- Manufacturing of 
rolling stocks 
Keikyu 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus and taxi 
Real estate 
- Leasing and selling 
Leisure & Services 
- Hotel and restaurant 
- Leisure facilities and 
golf courses 
- Advertising 
Distribution 
- Department store 
- Retail store 
- Stores in stations 
Others 
- Construction 
- Building management 
 
Sagami 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus 
Construction 
- Construction of 
housing 
Distribution  
- Supermarket 
- Sales of gravel and 
pebble for 
construction 
Real estate 
- Leasing and selling 
Others  
- Building management  
- Hotel  
- Advertising 
 
Nagoya 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus and taxi 
Logistics  
- Trucks 
- Maritime 
transportation 
Real estate 
- Leasing and selling 
Leisure & service 
- Hotel 
- Operation of tourist 
facilities 
- Tourism 
Distribution 
- Department store 
 
Others 
- Maintenance of 
railway facilities 
- Aviation 
- Building management 
Kintetsu 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus and taxi 
- Maritime 
transportation 
- Maintenance of 
railway facilitates 
Real estate 
- Leasing and selling 
- Management of 
property 
Distribution 
- Department store 
- Retail store 
- Restaurant 
 
Hotel & leisure 
- Hotel 
- Tourism 
- Movie theatre 
- Leisure facilities 
Others 
- Cable TV 
- IT 
- Insurance agency 
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Operator Core business Diversified segments 
Nankai 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus 
- Maritime 
transportation 
- Freight 
- Maintenance of 
rolling stocks 
Real estate 
- Leasing and selling 
Distribution 
- Shopping mall 
- Retail store 
 
Leisure & services 
- Amusement park 
- Building maintenance 
- Printing 
- Advertising 
Construction Others 
Keihan 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus and taxi 
Real estate  
- Leasing and selling 
- Construction 
Distribution  
- Department store 
- Shopping mall 
- Retail store 
Leisure & services Others  
Hankyu-
Hanshin 
Urban 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus and taxi 
Real estate  
- Leasing and selling 
- Development of 
commercial facilities 
Entertainment & 
communication 
- Baseball team 
- Musical theatre 
troupe 
- Cable TV 
- Leisure facilities 
Tourism & 
international 
transportation 
Hotel 
 
Distribution 
- Retail store 
- Restaurant 
 
Others 
- Construction 
- Domestic logistics 
Nishitetsu 
Transportation 
- Railway 
- Bus and taxi 
Real estate  
- Leasing and selling 
Distribution 
- Retail store 
Logistics 
- International logistics 
- Domestic logistics 
Leisure & service 
- Hotel 
- Tourism 
- Entertainment 
- Restaurant 
- Advertising 
Others 
- Maintenance of 
rolling stocks 
- Construction 
- Recycling metals 
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4. Diversification Strategies and Technical Efficiency 
as Performance 
Although performance encompasses multiple dimension of a firm’s strategy, most 
of research on the relationship between diversification strategies and performance 
focuses on the accounting-based measures related to financial returns. In this chapter, 
the relationship between diversification strategies and performance is discussed  
based on the different perspective with previous research, which considers a firm’s 
performance as the level of efficiency with consideration for economies of scale and 
scope. 
 
A Firm’s Efficiency and Performance 
Since Porter (1985) refers competitive advantages relative to the majority of rivals, 
assessing its effect on a firm’s performance is a challenge for many researchers. 
Previous studies on Japanese PRCs assume that the type and the extent of 
diversification strategies is one of the factors bringing on competitive advantages to 
the firms and that struggle to clarify the effect of diversification strategies on the firm’s 
performance.  
Chen, Delmas, and Lieberman (2015) point out that most of previous research on 
strategic management cannot capture a diverse array of objectives and actions 
regarding the creation of competitive advantage. They also argue that the firm’s 
performance has been measured by imperfect measurements which only identify 
average effects in a sample and assess a single performance dimension, and that 
purely financial measures can ignore a firm’s efficiency transforming resources, which 
may be a major source of competitive advantage. Further, in resource view, 
competitive advantages are linked to resources and capabilities which the firm owns 
and these are connected with superior performance (Porter, 1985). Especially, 
capabilities imply the ability of the firm combining efficiently resources it owns to 
accomplish productivity and  certain objective (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Dutta, et 
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al., 2005; Lieberman & Dhawan, 2005). Therefore, capabilities can be considered as 
the efficiency with which a firm uses its own inputs and converts them into desirable 
outputs for it, and are related to an ‘intermediate transformation ability’ between 
resources and products (or objectives) (Dutta, et al., 2005). 
Diversified firms produce multiple outputs using multiple inputs, which are labour, 
capital and other potential inputs. In the same industry, some firms achieve more 
productive outputs than those of other firms and it is represented by differences of 
quality of quantity of outputs the firm produce. These differences originate from the 
firm’s capabilities, transforming inputs to outputs, and can be also considered as 
efficiency among the firms, as discussed above. The firm’s activity, producing outputs 
using inputs, is captured by production function, and stochastic frontier analysis 
provides a framework assessing efficiency and offers advantages by estimating both 
production function and the determinants of firm efficiency in a single stage 
(Lieberman & Dhawan, 2005). 
On the other hand, productivity and efficiency have been used interchangeably, 
however, these are not exactly the same concept in fact (Coelli, et al., 2005). Although 
productivity is simply defined as the ratio of the outputs of the firm to the inputs used 
which is described as the tangent of the line from O the point of the production set, 
efficiency is related to whether a firm produces its outputs on maximum level given 
inputs, described as differentiation at the point of the production set. Especially, 
technical efficiency refers to the ability to minimise input use in the production of a 
given output set, and technically efficient firm operates on a line of production frontier, 
while a firm operating beneath the frontier line is technically inefficient (Kumbhakar & 
Lovell, 2003; Coelli, et al., 2005). Figure 4.1 describes production frontiers and 
technical efficiency. Although a firm operating at point B and C is efficient, a firm 
operating at point A is inefficient, because it could technically increase output to the 
level of the point B without requiring more input. 
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Figure 4.1 Production frontiers and technical efficiency 
Source: Coelli, et al. (2005), pp. 4 
Technical efficiency is broadly used in many research fields, such as retailing (Park 
& King, 2007) and agriculture (Paul & Nehring, 2005; Newman & Matthews, 2006). 
In the strategic management, Lieberman and Dhawan (2005) and Chen, et al. (2015) 
link the effects of resources and capabilities to the firm performance measured by 
technical efficiency using data on Japanese and U.S. automobile manufacturing firms. 
Dutta, et al. (2005) also investigate the effects of R&D activities of the firms on the 
firm’s production of innovative technologies using data of the firms which produce 
semiconductors and computers in U.S. by estimating R&D frontier/transformation 
function and comparing efficiency of each firm which represents R&D capability. 
 
Describing Multiple Inputs – Multiple Outputs Production Technology 
Shephard suggested distance functions to define production technology using 
multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs. There are two types of distance functions, 
which are input and output distance functions. Input distance functions characterise 
input sets, and output distance functions characterise output sets (Kumbhakar & 
Lovell, 2003).  Distance functions describe the structure of production technologies 
and the estimates measured by distance functions relate to the measures of technical 
efficiency. This study focuses on the output distance functions. 
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3The graph of the firm’s production technology using input vector 𝐱 can be defined 
as 𝑃(𝐱) , which represents the set of all output vectors, 𝐲 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑀 , which can be 
produced using the input vector, 𝐱 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑁. Therefore, 𝑃(𝐱) can be described as follows: 
𝑃(𝐱) =  {(𝐲, 𝐱) ∶ 𝐱 can produce 𝐲}                                               (4.1) 
Output set 𝑃(𝐱) satisfies the following properties (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2003): 
1) 𝑃(0) = {0} 
2) 𝑃(𝐱) is a closed set. 
3) 𝑃(𝐱) is bounded for 𝐱 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑁. 
4) 𝑃(𝜆𝐱) ⊇ 𝑃(𝐱) for 𝜆 ≥ 1 
5) 𝐲 ∈ 𝑃(𝐱) → 𝜆𝐲 ∈ 𝑃(𝐱) for 𝜆 ∈ {0, 1} 
6) 𝐱1 ≥ 𝐱2 → 𝑃(𝐱1) ⊇ 𝑃(𝐱2) and 𝐲1 ≤ 𝐲2 ∈ 𝑃(𝐱) → 𝐲1 ∈ 𝑃(𝐱) 
7) 𝑃(𝐱) is a convex set for 𝐱 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑁. 
An output distance function is defined on the output set, 𝑃(𝐱), as (4.2): 
𝐷𝑂(𝐱, 𝐲) = min{𝜇: 𝐲 𝜇⁄ ∈ 𝑃(𝐱)}                                               (4.2) 
The function measures the distance from a producer to the boundary of production 
possibilities. The distance gives information about whether an output vector can be 
closer to optimal production possibilities and remains producible with a given input 
vector. Figure 4.2 illustrates an output distance function in case of producing two 
outputs. The firm can still produce at the output vector 𝐲 using input vector 𝐱, but 
expand production radically to output vector (𝐲 𝜇∗⁄ ), and so 𝐷𝑂(𝐱, 𝐲) = 𝜇
∗ < 1. 
                                                                
3 For details, see Coelli & Perelman (2000). 
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Figure 4.2 An output distance function (M=2) 
Source: Kumbhakar & Lovell (2003), pp. 31 (Figure 2.11) 
The output distance functions satisfies the following properties because it is defined 
by the output sets, 𝑃(𝐱) (Lovell, et al., 1994): 
1) 𝐷𝑂(𝐱, 𝐲) is nondecreasing, positively linearly homogeneous. 
2) 𝐷𝑂(𝐱, 𝐲) is a convex function in 𝐲, and decreasing in 𝐱. 
3) 𝐷𝑂(𝐱, 𝐲) ≤ 1 if 𝐲 ∈ 𝑃(𝐱) 
4) 𝐷𝑂(𝐱, 𝐲) = 1 if 𝐲 ∈ Isoq 𝑃(𝐱) =  {𝐲: 𝐲 ∈ 𝑃(𝐱), 𝜔𝐲 ∉ 𝑃(𝐱), 𝜔 > 1 } 
Therefore, the output isoquant described above is a possible standard against 
which to measure the technical efficiency of output production. If the firm’s production 
set lies on the frontier (isoquant), the firm efficiently produces outputs at the optimal 
point.  
 
Production Function 
The functional relationship between inputs and outputs in generally expressed by 
the production function (Coelli & Perelman, 2000), and the output distance function 
can be described by production function. In case of the firm producing only one output 
using multiple inputs, production function can be written in the form: 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥1, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛)                                                (4.3) 
where, 𝑦 is the dependent variable, 𝑥𝑛 (𝑛 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑁) are explanatory variables, 
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and 𝑓(∙)  is a mathematical function. Regarding inputs, capital and labour are 
generally used and, land, law materials, and machinery are also used depending on 
the production process. To estimate the relationship between the dependent variable 
and independent variable, functional form should be specified based on the economic 
theory (Coelli, et al., 2005).  Table 4.1 lists some common functional forms generally 
used in research estimating production function, and γ, 𝛽𝑛 and 𝛽𝑚𝑛 are unknown 
parameters to be estimated. Especially, 𝛽𝑚𝑛s satisfy a symmetry condition, which is 
𝛽𝑚𝑛 = 𝛽𝑛𝑚 for all 𝑛 and 𝑚 . Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas is a special form of the 
translog when all 𝛽𝑚𝑛s equal to 0. 
Table 4.1 Common functional forms of production function 
Linear 𝑦 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
Cobb-Douglas 𝑦 =  𝛽0 ∏ 𝑥𝑛
𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
Quadratic 𝑦 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑚𝑥𝑛𝑥𝑚
𝑁
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
Normalized quadratic 𝑦 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 (
𝑥𝑛
𝑥𝑁
)
𝑁−1
𝑛=1
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑚 (
𝑥𝑛
𝑥𝑁
) (
𝑥𝑚
𝑥𝑁
)
𝑁−1
𝑚=1
𝑁−1
𝑛=1
 
Translog 𝑦 =  exp (𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑚 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑚
𝑁
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
) 
Generalized Leontief 𝑦 = ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑚(𝑥𝑛𝑥𝑚)
1 2⁄
𝑁
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) 𝑦 =  𝛽0 (∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛
𝛾
𝑁
𝑛=1
)
1 𝛾⁄
 
Source: Coelli, et al. (2005), pp. 211 
For choosing proper functional form between different forms listed in Table 4.1, 
following properties are considered (Coelli, et al., 2005): 
1) Flexibility: While a functional form has enough parameters to provide a first-
order differential approximation and a second-order approximation to an 
arbitrary function at a single point, a second-order flexible functional form is 
preferred when other conditions are equal. However, increased flexibility may 
cause some econometric difficulties like multicollinearity owing to increased 
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parameters to estimate.  
2) Linear in parameters: A functional form to estimate is usually used in a linear 
form. Most of Functional form listed in Table 4.1 can be transformed to linear 
equation by taking the logarithms of both sides. 
3) Regular: Regularity is related to concavity of a function. A function convex in 𝑥 
satisfies homogeneous of degree 𝑘  automatically or by imposing simple 
restrictions on the parameters that are sufficient for certain properties to be 
satisfied. If the production function is continuously differentiable, concavity 
implies all marginal products are non-increasing. 
4) Parsimonious: It is better to choose the simplest functional form, giving 
adequate result, because including too many parameters or adapting functional 
form which does not fit to data pattern causes statistically insignificant 
improvements in sum of squared prediction errors, likelihood, or whatever 
criterion is employed.  
Among the various functional forms, the Cobb-Douglas function and translog 
function are generally used as distance production function. Although the Cobb-
Douglas form is flexible and easy to calculate, it doesn’t satisfy regularity, not 
permitting to impose homogeneity, because of its restrictive elasticity of substitution 
and scale properties. The Cobb-Douglas function is not appropriate to a purely 
competitive industry because it is not concave (Coelli & Perelman, 2000)4. Therefore, 
in this research, a translog function is specified for the distance production functions. 
In the case of M outputs and K inputs, the distance production function as the form 
of translog is described as follows (Coelli & Perelman, 2000): 
ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚 ln 𝑦𝑚𝑖
𝑀
𝑚=1
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛 ln 𝑦𝑚𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑛𝑖
𝑀
𝑛=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖
𝐾
𝑘=1
 
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖 ln 𝑥𝑙𝑖
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑚𝑖
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
    𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁                (4.4) 
                                                                
4 However, Coelli & Perelman (2000) points out that this is not a serious problem when the 
primary interest is just to obtain technical measures. 
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where, 𝑖 denotes the 𝑖th firm in the sample. The frontier surface can be obtained if 
𝐷𝑂𝑖 is set to equal to 1, which implies the left hand side of Equation (4.4) is equal to 
zero. The restrictions on parameters are required to satisfy homogeneity of degree 
+1 in outputs are: 
∑ 𝛼𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
= 1                                                            (4.5a) 
and 
∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛
𝑀
𝑚=1
= 0 (𝑚 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑀) and ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚 = 0
𝑀
𝑚=1
 (𝑘 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝐾)                             (4.5b) 
And those required for symmetry are: 
𝛼𝑚𝑛 =  𝛼𝑛𝑚 (𝑚, 𝑛 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑀) and 𝛽𝑘𝑙 = 𝛽𝑙𝑘 (𝑘, 𝑙 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝐾)                                   (4.6) 
Recalling the linear homogeneity of distance function, the output distance function 
is rewritten as 𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝜔𝑦) = 𝜔𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝑦) , for any 𝜔 > 0 . In order to impose the 
homogeneity constraint upon distance function, one of the outputs should be 
arbitrarily chosen, such as 𝑀th output, and set 𝜔 = 1 𝑦𝑀⁄ . Thus, the output distance 
function with the translog form can be described as follows:  
ln(𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝑦𝑀𝑖⁄ ) = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚 ln 𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛 ln ln 𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗ ln 𝑦𝑛𝑖
∗
𝑀−1
𝑛=1
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖
𝐾
𝑘=1
 
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖 ln 𝑥𝑙𝑖
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
    𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁                (4.7) 
where, 𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗ = 𝑦𝑚𝑖 𝑦𝑀𝑖⁄ . Equation (4.7) is summarised as follows: 
ln(𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝑦𝑀𝑖⁄ ) = TL(𝑥𝑘𝑖, 𝑦𝑚𝑖 𝑦𝑀𝑖⁄ , 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿)      𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁                  (4.8) 
or 
ln(𝐷𝑂𝑖) − ln(𝑌𝑀𝑖) =  TL(𝑥𝑘𝑖, 𝑦𝑚𝑖 𝑦𝑀𝑖⁄ , 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿)      𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁              (4.9) 
Therefore, finally the equations above can be rewritten as Equation (4.10): 
− ln(𝑌𝑀𝑖) =  TL(𝑥𝑘𝑖, 𝑦𝑚𝑖 𝑦𝑀𝑖⁄ , 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿) − ln(𝐷𝑂𝑖)       𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁            (4.10) 
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Stochastic Frontier Analysis: Estimating Technical Efficiency 
The distance function form described above is a deterministic form, which ignores 
the effect of random shocks in the production process. Some groups of researchers 
introduced another random variable representing statistical noise to consider 
measurement errors and other sources of statistical noise (Coelli, et al., 2005). The 
model, including two types of error terms, which are statistical noise and inefficiency 
term, is called as a stochastic frontier model (SF model) and stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) is the method to estimate the parameters and inefficiency of the model. 
SF model was developed simultaneously by two groups of researchers, Aigner, Lovell 
and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). SFA is widely used in 
many previous studies that either  analyse the efficiency of railway transport by 
estimating the production function (Coelli & Perelman, 2000; Lan & Lin, 2006), 
investigate the efficiency of yardstick regulation by estimating the cost function 
(Mizutani, et al., 2009), or estimate the cost efficiency of the UK railway (Kennedy & 
Smith, 2004). Equation (4.11) describes proposed model of single-output and 
multiple-input case: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝜷, 𝛼, 𝛿) ∙ exp (𝑣𝑖) ∙ exp (−𝑢𝑖)                                           (4.11) 
where including a symmetric random error, 𝑣𝑖, which represents statistical noise. The 
random error 𝑣𝑖 can be positive or negative, thus, statistical frontier outputs distribute 
below or above the deterministic part of the model, 𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝜷, 𝛼, 𝛿) . Therefore,  
‘𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝜷, 𝛼, 𝛿) ∙ exp (𝑣𝑖)’ is the stochastic production frontier (SPF). The deterministic 
part of the model is common to all producers, while exp (𝑣𝑖) is a producer-specific part 
and related to the effect of random shocks on each producer (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 
2003). Another error term, 𝑢𝑖 is a non-negative and associated with the technical 
inefficiency. Since 𝑢𝑖 illustrates the technical efficiency, equation (4.11) is rewritten as 
follows: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝜷, 𝛼, 𝛿) ∙ exp(𝑣𝑖) ∙ exp(−𝑢𝑖) = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝜷, 𝛼, 𝛿) ∙ exp(𝑣𝑖) ∙ 𝑇𝐸𝑖                 (4.12) 
In figure 4.3, the inputs and outputs of two firms are plotted and the curve which 
represents the deterministic part of the product frontier model in equation (4.12). Two 
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firms produce the outputs (𝑦1, 𝑦2) using the input of each firm (𝑥1, 𝑥2). If there were no 
inefficiency effects (𝑢1, 𝑢2 = 0) and only statistical noise (𝑣1, 𝑣2), the frontier outputs 
of firm 1 is above the deterministic part of the product frontier model (𝑣1 < 0) and 
those of firm 2 is below the deterministic part of the product frontier model (𝑣2 > 0). 
However, considering the existence of inefficiency effects, the outputs of two firms lie 
below the deterministic part of the frontier because inefficiency effects and the sum 
of statistical noise and inefficiency effect are negative. Generally, observed outputs 
tend to lie below the deterministic part of the frontier, while unobserved frontier 
outputs are evenly distributed above and below of that of the frontier. However, to 
place observed outputs above deterministic part, the statistical noise should be 
positive and larger that the inefficiency effect (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 > 0) (Coelli, et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 4.3 The Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Source: Coelli, et al. (2005), pp.244 
The technical efficiency, the last term of inefficiency effect in equation (4.12), is 
output-oriented measure in this study and is defined as the ratio of observed output 
to the corresponding stochastic frontier output (Coelli, et al., 2005): 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 =
𝑦𝑖
𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝜷, 𝛼, 𝛿) ∙ exp(𝑣𝑖)
= exp (−𝑢𝑖)                                   (4.13) 
Technical efficiency measure, 𝑇𝐸𝑖 , takes a value between zero and one. If a firm 
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achieves a fully-efficient production, 𝑇𝐸𝑖 equals to one. 𝑇𝐸𝑖 is a producer-specific 
measure because it is characterised by exp(𝑣𝑖)  which varies across the firms. 
Technical efficiency can be predicted by estimating the parameters of the SPF model. 
On the other hand, intercept is biased downwards because it does not provide 
predictions of produce-specific technical efficiency, although OLS provides consistent 
estimate for slope coefficient in equation (4.11) or (4.12). However, OLS can be used 
as simple test to check the presense of technical inefficiency. If technical inefficiency 
does not exist in the data (𝑢𝑖 = 0), then the error term only consists of random noise 
(𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖) and it is symmetric. Thus, the assumption of SF model of the data is wrong. 
However, if technical inefficiency exists in the data (𝑢𝑖 > 0), the error terms have two 
componets (𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖), and is negatively skewed
5. Thus, if the negative skewness 
in OLS residuals is confirmed, it is the evidence of presence of technical inefficiency 
in the data and it makes sense to proceed to the estimation of a SPF (Kumbhakar & 
Lovell, 2003). But, due to complexity of test of OLS residuals, the likelihood ratio test 
of full model (SF model) and nested model (OLS) is generally used in the analysis 
using statistical software packages like STATA, LIMDEP, and SHAZAM. 
Again, OLS cannot be used to predict the measure of technical efficiency, but, 
corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) can be solution to correct the bias in the 
intercept term. The function is fitted in two steps by COLS: 1) regressing 𝑦𝑖 on 𝑓(∙) 
by using the OLS to interprete the unobserverble term, and 2) adjusting intercept by 
adding the largest negative OLS residual to it, thereby the function bounds the 
observed points from above, not passing through the centre of them. However, the 
best solution to estimate SPF is to extract 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 from predictions of 𝜀𝑖 for each 
producers, and this requires to make some distributional assumptions concerning two 
error terms. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) because ML 
estimators have many desirable large sample properties (Coelli, et al., 2005). As a 
result, the estimation of SPF is performed in two-step procedure: 1) estimating the 
slope parameters using OLS, and 2) estimating the intercept and the variances of the 
                                                                
5 See Appendix 4.B regarding how to check the existence of technical inefficiency using 
OLS residuals. 
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two error components by ML. Thus, distributional assumptions are used in the second 
step because it is used in the ML method (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2003). As 
distributional assumptions of error terms, while it is assumed that statistical error term, 
𝑣𝑖, is independently and identically distributed (iid) normal random variables with zero 
means and variances 𝜎𝑣
2 , half-normal, exponential, truncated normal, and gamma 
distribution are used as distributional assumptions of the technical efficiency term, 𝑢𝑖 
(see Appendix 4.A).  
SPF and technical efficiency discussed above concern the cross-sectional data 
which does not consider change of the time. However, a panel data set contains more 
information than a cross-sectional data set. Thus, it is expectable that the panel data 
will moderate some of the strong distributional assumptions in cross-sectional data 
and enable to obtain more reliable estimates of technical efficiency than that of cross-
sectional data, with more desirable statistical properties (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2003). 
With regard to prediction of technical efficiency of panel data, several literature 
proposed the models in which inefficiency component is assumed to be time-invariant 
(Pitt & Lee, 1981; Battese & Coelli, 1988) and time-varying (Cornwell, et al., 1990; 
Kumbhakar, 1990; Battese & Coelli, 1992; Lee & Schmidt, 1993; Cuesta, 2000).  
Given observations on a sample of N firms over T time periods, equation (4.11) can 
be redefined as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝜷, 𝛼, 𝛿) ∙ exp (𝑣𝑖𝑡) ∙ exp (−𝑢𝑖𝑡)                                           (4.14) 
Battese and Coelli (1988) define the firm specific technical efficiency which assumes 
that production technology is constant through time (𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 ). The firm specific 
technical efficiency is the ratio of mean production of the firm, given its realised firm 
effect, to the corresponding mean production if the firm effect was zero.  
𝑇𝐸𝑖 =
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ |𝑢𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1, 2, ⋯ )
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ |𝑢𝑖 = 0, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1, 2, ⋯ )
                                              (4.15) 
Because they define technical efficiency term is random variable, distributional 
assumptions are needed and assumed a truncated normal distribution 
(𝑢𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁
+(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2)). They also define the equation of 𝑇𝐸𝑖 using conditional probability 
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density function (PDF) of 𝑢𝑖, which is the function of truncated normal distribution, 
and the equation is described as follows: 
𝑇𝐸?̂? ≡ 𝐸{exp(−𝑢𝑖) |𝑞𝑖} = [Φ (
𝑢𝑖
∗
𝜎∗
− 𝜎∗) Φ (
𝑢𝑖
∗
𝜎∗
)⁄ ] exp {
𝜎∗2
2
− 𝑢𝑖
∗}                       (4.16) 
where, Φ(𝑥) is the cumulative distribution function. 
On the other hand, time-varying ineffiency assumes that technical inefficiency 
varies over time and takes the form as follows: 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑡) ∙ 𝑢𝑖                                                            (4.17) 
Battese and Coelli (1992) define the technical inefficiency, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, as follows: 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖 = {exp[−𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)]}𝑢𝑖,      𝑡 ∈ 𝜗(𝑖); 𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁                (4.18) 
where, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are the outputs and inputs for the 𝑖 th firm at the 𝑡 th period of 
observation.  𝑣𝑖𝑡s are assumed to have normal distribution (𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑 N(0, 𝜎𝑣
2)) and 𝑢𝑖𝑡s 
are assumed to have non-negative truncated normal distribution (𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑N(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2)). 𝜂 
is an unknown scalar parameter. Equation (4.15) implies 𝑢𝑖𝑡  can decrease or 
increase by the change of 𝑡 , if 𝜂 > 0 or 𝜂 < 0 , respectively. Especially, if 𝜂 = 0 , 
technical efficiency remains constant regardless of change of time. In addtion, as 
desribed in equation (4.15), technical effeciency must either increase at a decreasing 
rate (𝜂 > 0), decrease at an increasing rate (𝜂 < 0), or remain constant (𝜂 = 0) owing 
to time parameter representing the behavior of the firm effects over time. Given the 
equation (4.14) and (4.15), the minimun-mean-squared-error predictor of technical 
efficiency of the 𝑖th firm at the 𝑡th period is decribed as follows: 
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸[exp (−𝑢𝑖𝑡)|𝜀𝑖] = {
1 − Φ[𝜂𝑖𝑡𝜎𝑖
∗ − (𝜇𝑖
∗ 𝜎𝑖
∗⁄ )]
1 − Φ(−𝜇𝑖
∗ 𝜎𝑖
∗⁄ )
} exp [−𝜂𝑖𝑡𝜇𝑖
∗ +
1
2
𝜂𝑖𝑡
2𝜎𝑖
∗2]      (4.19) 
where, 𝜀𝑖 is the (𝑇𝑖 × 1) vector of 𝜀𝑖𝑡s (𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡); 
𝜇𝑖
∗ =
𝜇𝜎𝑣
2 − 𝜂𝑖
′𝜀𝑖𝜎
2
𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜂𝑖
′𝜂𝑖𝜎2
, 𝜎𝑖
∗2 =
𝜎𝑣
2𝜎2
𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜂𝑖
′𝜂𝑖𝜎2
                                                 (4.20) 
where 𝜂𝑖 represents the (𝑇𝑖 × 1 ) vector of 𝜂𝑖𝑡 and Φ(∙) represents the distribution 
function for the standard normal random variable. 
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The mean technical efficiency of firms at the 𝑡th time period can be described as 
follows: 
𝑇𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸[exp(−𝜂𝑡𝑢𝑖)], where 𝜂𝑡 = exp[−𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)]                           (4.21) 
Technical efficiency in equation (4.18) is obtained by integration with the density 
function of 𝑢𝑖: 
𝑇𝐸𝑡 = {
1 − Φ[𝜂𝑡𝜎 − (𝜇 𝜎⁄ )]
[1 − Φ(−𝜇 𝜎⁄ )]
} exp [−𝜂𝑡𝜇 +
1
2
𝜂𝑡
2𝜎2]                                (4.22) 
If the firm effects are fixed, the mean technical efficiency of firms in the industry is 
obtained by equation (4.22) by substitution of 𝜂𝑡 = 1. Predictions of equation (4.19) 
and (4.22) are obtained by substitutiting parameters by ML estimators (Battese & 
Coelli, 1992). While time-invariant specification of Battese and Coelli (1988) is 
defined in terms of firm-specific explanatory variables, this time-varying inefficiency 
is not firm-specific estimate as describe in equation (4.22) (Battese & Coelli, 1993). 
 
Technical Inefficiency Effects 
With estimaion of techinical efficiency, explaining why inefficiency occurs in 
production process is the one of the important issues in stochastic frontier analysis 
and several approaches to estimate technical inefficiency effects were proposed 
(Kumbhakar, et al., 1991; Reifschneider & Stevenson, 1991; Huang & Liu, 1994; 
Battese & Coelli, 1995). Especially, Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed the two-stage 
approach, in which the technical inefficiency is predicted by estimating SPF at the 
first stage and the determinants of the model of technical inefficiency is estimated by 
regression at the second stage, for panel data and time-varying technical efficiency 
model. They assume technical inefficieny, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , predicted by SPF as dependent 
variable and the regression model consists of explanatory variables as following: 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡                                                      (4.23) 
where,  𝑧𝑖𝑡 is a set of explanatory variables related to technical inefficiency and 𝜃 is 
a set of coefficients of 𝑧𝑖𝑡. 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution 
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with zero mean and variance, 𝜎2. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the normal 
distribution with mean, 𝑧𝑖𝑡, and variance, 𝜎
2. The set of explanatory variables, 𝑧𝑖𝑡, can 
include some input variables in the SPF. 
Thus, technical efficiency of production for the 𝑖 -th firm at 𝑡 -th observation is 
defined by equation (4.24): 
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = exp(−𝑢𝑖𝑡) = exp(−𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 − 𝜔𝑖𝑡)                                  (4.24) 
Note that 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 > 𝑧𝑖′𝑡𝜃 + 𝜔𝑖′𝑡  for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑖
′  does not mean that 𝑧𝑖𝑡′𝜃 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡′ >
𝑧𝑖′𝑡′𝜃 + 𝜔𝑖′𝑡′ for 𝑡
′ ≠ 𝑡. That is, ordering of firms in terms of technical efficiency may 
vary with time, as similar to time-varying inefficiency models. 
 
Summary 
Accounting-based measures, related to financial returns, are widely used as 
proxies of the firm’s performance in previous research, but, these traditional 
measures focus on the profitability, rather than the firm’s capability transforming 
resources or strategic assets into core competencies. Diversified firms produce 
multiple outputs using multiple inputs and the productivity is varied with the firm. 
Therefore, the ability of a firm effectively combining resources, which it owns, can be 
measured by technical efficiency in the production process and a firm’s activity, and 
producing outputs using inputs can be described using production function. Likewise, 
stochastic frontier analysis provides a framework estimating production function and 
predicting determinants of a firm’s technical efficiency simultaneously. 
While several functional forms are known as form of production function, Cobb-
Douglas form and translog form are mostly used in the research, considering 
properties which production function should satisfy. To predict technical efficiency, 
two error terms, statistical noise and ineffiency term, are included in production 
function, and technical efficiency can be calculated by stochastic frontier analysis. 
With prediction of technical efficiency, containing set of explanatory variables and 
dependent variable represented by inefficiency terms, can be estimated to investigate 
what influeces on inefficiency, and be described as the regression model. 
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Appendix 4.A Distributional Assumptions of Error 
Terms6 
Distributional assumptions are necessary to estimate the intercept and the 
variances of two error components using maximum likelihood. Because distributions 
of error terms is like to largely influence on sample mean efficiencies, the 
distributional assumptions should be chosen carefully. Although this section gives 
description of distributional assumptions focusing on the cross-sectional data model, 
all the assumptions can be applied to panel data stochastic frontier model. 
 
The Normal-Half Normal Model 
 Distribution assumptions for the model with a normal distribution on 𝑣𝑖 and a half-
normal distribution on 𝑢𝑖 are described as follows: 
i 𝑣𝑖 ~ iid 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
ii 𝑢𝑖 ~ iid 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) (nonnegative half normal) 
iii 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 are distributed independently of each other, and of the regressors 
The normal-half normal model is widely used because it is relatevely easy to derive 
the distribution of the sum of 𝑣 and 𝑢. Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) used the 
normal-half normal model in their study to obtain ML estimates for the first time. They 
estimated parameters of the log-likelihood function for half-normal model in terms of 
𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2  and 𝜆2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 𝜎𝑣
2⁄ ≥ 0 . 𝜆 = 0  indicates no existence of technical 
inefficiency effects and all deviations from the frontier result from statistical noise7. 
The definitions of 𝜎2 and 𝜆2 are also applied to other distribution models. However, 
for 𝜆2, it is needed to beware of misinterpretation. Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell and Battese 
(2005) point out that 𝜆2 is not the ratio of the variance of the technical inefficiency 
effects to the variance of the random noise, although we can confirm the existence 
                                                                
6 This section is mainly based on the book of Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003). 
7 The definition of 𝜎2 and the check of existence of technical inefficiency effects by 𝜆2 is also 
applicable other distributional models introduced in later part of this section. 
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of technical efficiency in data through value of 𝜆2.  
Because 𝑢 and 𝑣 follow the normal (half normal) distribution, the density function 
of each error term can be written as follows: 
𝑓(𝑢) =  
2
√2𝜋𝜎𝑢
∙ exp {−
𝑢2
2𝜎𝑢2
}                                               (4. A. 1) 
𝑓(𝑣) =  
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
∙ exp {−
𝑣2
2𝜎𝑣2
}                                               (4. A. 2) 
Considering assumption that 𝑢 and 𝑣 are distributed independently, the joint density 
function of 𝑢 and 𝑣 is the product of each individual density function. 
𝑓(𝑢, 𝑣) =  
2
2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝜎𝑣
∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝑢2
2𝜎𝑢2
−
𝑣2
2𝜎𝑣2
}                                       (4. 𝐴. 3) 
Since 𝜀 = 𝑣 − 𝑢, the joint density function8 for 𝑢 and 𝜀 can be rewritten as: 
𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀) =  
2
2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝜎𝑣
∙ exp {−
𝑢2
2𝜎𝑢2
−
(𝜀 + 𝑢)2
2𝜎𝑣2
}                                       (4. A. 4) 
By integrating 𝑢 out of 𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀), the marginal density function of 𝜀 is obtained. 
𝑓(𝜀) =  ∫ 𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀) 𝑑𝑢
∞
0
=  
2
√2𝜋𝜎
∙ [1 − Φ (
𝜀𝜆
𝜎
)] ∙ exp {−
𝜀2
2𝜎2
} 
=  
2
𝜎
∙ 𝜙 (
𝜀
𝜎
) ∙ Φ (−
𝜀𝜆
𝜎
)                                                                         (4. A. 5) 
where, Φ(∙) and 𝜙(∙) are the standard normal cumulative distribution and density 
functions9.  
Generally, in the normal-half normal distribution, the marginal density function of 
error terms is negetively skewed with negative mode (mean) because 𝜎𝑢 > 0. The 
distribution parameters 𝜎 and 𝜆 in equation (4.A.5) are estimated together with the 
intercept parameter and coefficients of explanatory variables. Therefore, it is 
desirable to conduct a statistical test of the hypothesis that 𝜆 = 0, using log likelihood 
                                                                
8 The joint density funtion is also known as the likelihood function. 
9 The definitions of Φ(∙) and 𝜙(∙) are commonly applied in the case of other distributions 
which delineated later of this section. 
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ratio test based on the chi-square statistics, to check the existence of technical 
inefficiency. 
On the other hand, the marginal density function 𝑓(𝜀) is asymmetrically distributed 
with mean and variance, 
𝐸(𝜀) =  −𝐸(𝑢) = −𝜎𝑢√
2
𝜋
,  
𝑉(𝜀) =
𝜋 − 2
𝜋
𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2                                                 (4. A. 6) 
and, using equation (4.A.5), the log likelihood function of 𝑓(𝜀) is derived as follows: 
ln 𝐿 = constant − 𝐼 ln 𝜎 + ∑ ln Φ (−
𝜀𝑖𝜆
𝜎
)
𝐼
𝑖=1
−
1
2𝜎2
∑ 𝜀𝑖
2
I
𝑖=1
                   (4. A. 7) 
where, 𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 = ln 𝑞𝑖 − x𝑖
′𝛽 by definition of production function. Equation (4.A.7) 
is called as the log likelihood function. Maximum likelihood estimates of all 
parameters can be obtained from maximising the log likelihood function, by simply 
taking first derivative with respect to 𝛽, 𝜎 and 𝜆, and setting them to zero. However, 
the first-order conditions of equation (4.A.7) are nonlinear, and cannot be solved for 
𝛽, 𝜎 and 𝜆. Therefore, it is necessary to take an iterative optimisation procedure to 
maximise log likelihood function. The softwares such as STATA, LIMDEP, and 
SHAZAM parameterise the log-likelihood by taking different parameters each other.  
After maximising log likelihood function, the technical efficiency of each producer 
is obtained from the conditional distribution of 𝑢𝑖 given 𝜀𝑖. Jondrow, Lovell, Materov 
and Schmidt (1982) derived conditional mean of 𝑢𝑖 using the conditional distribution 
of 𝑢 given 𝜀: 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) = 𝜇∗𝑖 + 𝜎∗ [
𝜙(−𝜇∗𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
1 − Φ(−𝜇∗𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
] = 𝜎∗ [
𝜙(𝜀𝑖𝜆 𝜎⁄ )
1 − Φ(𝜀𝑖𝜆 𝜎⁄ )
− (
𝜀𝑖𝜆
𝜎
)]                  (4. A. 8) 
and, 
𝑀(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) = {
−𝜀𝑖 (
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎2
)          𝑖𝑓 𝜀𝑖 ≤ 0
         0               otherwise
                                               (4. A. 9) 
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where, 𝜇∗ = −𝜀𝜎𝑢
2 𝜎2⁄  and 𝜎∗
2 = 𝜎𝑢
2𝜎𝑣
2 𝜎2⁄ . Generally, 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) is more widely used 
than 𝑀(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) to obtain the technical efficiency. 
The technical efficiency of each producer can be obtained from: 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 = exp{−?̂?𝑖}                                                              (4. A. 10) 
where ?̂?𝑖 can be either 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) or 𝑀(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖). Estimates of technical efficiency for each 
producer can be also obtained using conditional mean of exponential value of −𝑢𝑖 
given 𝜀𝑖 (Battese & Coelli, 1988). 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸(exp{−𝑢𝑖} |𝜀𝑖) =  [
1 − 1 − Φ(𝜎∗ −𝜇∗𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
1 − Φ(−𝜇∗𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
] ∙ exp {−𝜇∗𝑖 +
1
2
𝜎∗
2}          (4. A. 11)10 
The estimates gained by equation (4.A.10) and equation (4.A.11) are different each 
other because exp{−𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖)}  and 𝐸(exp{−𝑢𝑖} |𝜀𝑖)  are not equal. However, 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) argue that the estimate of equation (4.A.11) is preferred 
to (4.A.10), particularly when 𝑢𝑖 is not close to zero, because (4.A.11) is closer to 
definition of technical efficiency, which is the ratio of observed output to maximised 
output, than (4.A.10), given produce-specific part of stochastic production output, 
exp{𝑣𝑖}, which captures the effect of random shocks on each producer. 
 
The Normal-Exponential Model 
 The distributional model for 𝑢𝑖  and 𝑣𝑖  can be extended as introducing new 
distributional assumption to 𝑢𝑖.  
i 𝑣𝑖 ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
ii 𝑢𝑖 ~ iid exponential 
iii 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 are distributed independently of each other, and of the regressors 
As described in the assumptions above, the assumptions for 𝑣𝑖 and distributional 
relationship between 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 are not changed. Thus, it is only needed to define the 
density functions of 𝑢𝑖 newly. 
                                                                
10 This is basically same with the equation (4.16), although in equation (4.A.11) 𝜇 is used to 
obtain technical efficiency, instead of 𝑢. 
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𝑓(𝑢) =  
1
𝜎𝑢
∙ exp {−
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
}                                                            (4. A. 12) 
The joint density function of 𝑢 and 𝑣 is product of their individual density functions. 
𝑓(𝑢, 𝑣) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝜎𝑣
∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
−
𝑣2
2𝜎𝑣2
}                                   (4. A. 13) 
Equation (4.A.13) can be rewriten as the joint density function of 𝑢 and 𝜀: 
𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝜎𝑣
∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
−
1
2𝜎𝑣2
(𝑢 + 𝜀)2}                   (4. A. 14) 
Thus, the marginal density function of 𝜀 is, 
𝑓(𝜀) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀) 𝑑𝑢
∞
0
= (
1
𝜎𝑢
) ∙ Φ (−
𝜀
𝜎𝑣
−
𝜎𝑣
𝜎𝑢
) ∙ exp {
𝜀
𝜎𝑢
+
𝜎𝑣
2
2𝜎𝑢2
}                        (4. A. 15) 
The marginal density function 𝑓(𝜀)  is asymmetrically distributed with mean and 
variance. 
𝐸(𝜀) =  −𝐸(𝑢) = −𝜎𝑢 
𝑉(𝜀) = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2                                                      (4. A. 16) 
Although the shape of the normal-exponential distribution is determined by 𝜎𝑢 and 𝜎𝑣,  
𝑓(𝜀) is negatively skewed with negative mean, same as the normal-half normal model. 
The distribution collapses to a negative exponential distribution as 𝜎𝑢 𝜎𝑣⁄  increases, 
while it converges to a normal distribution as 𝜎𝑣 𝜎𝑢⁄  increases. The log likelihood 
function of a sample of 𝐼 producers is: 
ln 𝐿 = constant −  𝐼 ln 𝜎𝑢 + 𝐼 (
𝜎𝑣
2
2𝜎𝑢2
) + ∑ ln Φ(−𝐴)
𝐼
𝑖=1
+ ∑
𝜀𝑖
𝜎𝑢
𝐼
𝑖=1
                          (4. A. 17) 
where, 𝐴 = − ?̃? 𝜎𝑣⁄   and ?̃? = −𝜀 − (𝜎𝑣
2 𝜎𝑢⁄ ) . The log likelihood function can be 
maximised by simply taking first derivative with respect to 𝛽, 𝜎 and 𝜆 , and setting 
them to zero. 
Technical efficiency of each producer can be obtained from either the mean or the 
mode of the conditional distribution of 𝑢 . The conditional distribution 𝑓(𝑢|𝜀)  is 
distributed as 𝑁+(?̃?, 𝜎𝑣
2), thus, mean and mode can be described as follows: 
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𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) = ?̃?𝑖 + 𝜎𝑣 [
𝜙(− ?̃?𝑖 𝜎𝑣⁄ )
Φ(?̃?𝑖 𝜎𝑣⁄ )
] = 𝜎𝑣 [
𝜙(𝐴)
Φ(−𝐴)
− 𝐴] 
𝑀(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) = {
?̃?𝑖         𝑖𝑓 ?̃?𝑖 ≤ 0
     0         𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                       (4. A. 18) 
Same as the normal-half normal model, both 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) and 𝑀(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) can be used to 
predict producer-specific estimates of technical efficiency by substituting into 
equation (4. A. 10) or (4. A. 11). 
 
The Normal-Truncated Normal Model 
The normal-truncated normal model assumes that 𝑢 follows normal distribution 
same as the normal-half normal model, although 𝑢 has a nonzero mode and is 
truncated below at zero. The distributional assumptions are described as follows: 
i 𝑣𝑖 ~ iid 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2). 
ii 𝑢𝑖 ~ iid 𝑁
+(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2) (nonnegative half normal) 
iii 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 are distributed independently of each other, and of the regressors 
As mentioned above, an additional parameter 𝜇  is included to the distributional 
assumptions, thus, the truncated normal distribution model allows more flexible 
representation of the pattern of efficiency in the data.  
The density function 𝑓(𝑣) is same with the normal-half normal model, thus, the 
truncated normal density function for 𝑢 ≥ 0 is: 
𝑓(𝑢) =  
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑢Φ(𝜇 𝜎𝑢⁄ )
∙ exp {−
(𝑢 − 𝜇)2
2𝜎𝑢2
}                                               (4. A. 19) 
where, 𝜇 is the mode of the normal distribution, which is truncated below at zero. If 
𝜇 = 0, 𝑓(𝑢) converges to the half normal density function. 
The joint density function of 𝑢 and 𝑣 is product of their individual density functions. 
𝑓(𝑢, 𝑣) =
1
2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝜎𝑣Φ(𝜇 𝜎𝑢⁄ )
∙ exp {−
(𝑢 − 𝜇)2
2𝜎𝑢2
−
𝑣2
2𝜎𝑣2
}                           (4. A. 20) 
The joint density of 𝑢 and 𝜀 is, 
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𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀) =
1
2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝜎𝑣Φ(𝜇 𝜎𝑢⁄ )
∙ exp {−
(𝑢 − 𝜇)2
2𝜎𝑢2
−
(𝜀 + 𝑢)2
2𝜎𝑣2
}                           (4. A. 21) 
The marginal density of 𝜀 is, 
𝑓(𝜀) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀) 𝑑𝑢
∞
0
=
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝛷(𝜇 𝜎𝑢⁄ )
∙ 𝛷 (
𝜇
𝜎𝜆
−
𝜀𝜆
𝜎
) ∙ exp {−
(𝜀 + 𝑢)2
2𝜎2
} 
=
1
𝜎
∙ 𝜙 (
𝜀 + 𝑢
𝜎
) ∙ 𝛷 (
𝜇
𝜎𝜆
−
𝜀𝜆
𝜎
) ∙ [𝛷 (
𝜇
𝜎𝑢
)]
−1
                                                (4. A. 22) 
where  𝜎 = (𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2)1/2  and 𝜆 = 𝜎𝑢 𝜎𝑣⁄  . The marginal density function 𝑓(𝜀)  is 
asymmetrically distributed with mean and variance, 
𝐸(𝜀) =  −𝐸(𝑢) = −
𝜇𝑎
2
−
𝜎𝑢𝑎
√2𝜋
∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
1
2
(
𝜇
𝜎𝑢
)
2
} 
𝑉(𝜀) = 𝜇2
𝑎
2
(1 −
𝑎
2
) +
𝑎
2
(
𝜋 − 𝑎
𝜋
) 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2                                                  (4. A. 23) 
where  𝑎 = [Φ(𝜇 𝜎𝑢⁄ )]
−1 . Although the normal-truncated normal distribution model 
contains additional parameter, 𝜇 , compared to other models, it is also negatively 
skewed with negative mode (mean) like other distributions. The log likelihood function 
of a sample of 𝐼 producers is, 
𝑙𝑛 𝐿 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 − 𝐼 𝑙𝑛 𝜎 − 𝐼 𝑙𝑛 𝛷 (
𝜇
𝜎𝑢
) + ∑ 𝑙𝑛 𝛷 (
𝜇
𝜎𝜆
−
𝜀𝑖𝜆
𝜎
)
𝐼
𝑖=1
−
1
2
∑ (
𝜀𝑖 + 𝜇
𝜎
)
2𝐼
𝑖=1
 (4. A. 24) 
where, 𝜎𝑢 = 𝜆𝜎 √1 + 𝜆2⁄ . The log likelihood function can be maximised by simply 
taking first derivative with respect to 𝛽, 𝜎 and 𝜆, and setting them to zero. 
Technical efficiency of each producer can be obtained from either the mean or the 
mode of the conditional distribution of 𝑢 . The conditional distribution 𝑓(𝑢|𝜀)  is 
distributed as 𝑁+(?̃?𝑖, 𝜎∗
2), thus, mean and mode can be described as follows: 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) = 𝜎∗ [
?̃?𝑖
𝜎∗
+
𝜙(?̃?𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
1 − Φ(−?̃?𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
] 
𝑀(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) = {
?̃?𝑖         𝑖𝑓 ?̃?𝑖 ≤ 0
     0         𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                            (4. A. 25) 
Same as the normal-half normal model, both 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) and 𝑀(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) can be used to 
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predict producer-specific estimates of technical efficiency by substituting into 
equation (4.A.10). If equation (4.A.11) is applied, the technical efficiency of each 
producer is written as follows. 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸(exp{−𝑢𝑖} |𝜀𝑖) =
1 − 𝛷[𝜎∗ − (?̃?𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )]
1 − 𝛷(−?̃?𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
∙ exp {−?̃?𝑖 +
1
2
𝜎∗
2}                   (4. A. 26) 
which converges to the equation proposed by Battese and Coelli (1988) in the 
normal-half normal distribution model when 𝜇 = 0. 
 
The Normal-Gamma Model 
The normal-gamma distribution model was introduced by Greene (1980) and 
Stevenson (1980). This model is defined by generalising the normal-exponential 
model, assuming that 𝑢 follows a gamma distribution. Therefore, the distributional 
assumptions are: 
i 𝑣𝑖 ~ iid 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2). 
ii 𝑢𝑖 ~ iid gamma 
iii 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 are distributed independently of each other, and of the regressors 
While the exponential distribution is a single-parameter distribution which has only 
scale parameter, the gamma distribution allows two parameters which are scale and 
shape parameter for 𝑢𝑖. In other words, the exponential distribution is a special case 
of gamma distribution. Thus, the gamma distribution model is appropriate to 
represent flexible pattern of technical efficiency.  
Because the density function 𝑓(𝑣) is same with that of other distributional modes, 
the gamma density function 𝑓(𝑢) for 𝑢 ≥ 0 is, 
𝑓(𝑢) =  
𝑢𝑚
Γ(𝑚 + 1)𝜎𝑢𝑚+1
∙ exp {−
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
} ,     𝑚 > 1                                   (4. A. 27) 
If 𝑚 = 0 , the gamma density function has the same desity function with the 
exponential distribution. For −1 < 𝑚 < 0 the shape of gamma density is same with 
the that of an exponential density, while the point concentrating density becomes 
farther away from zero as 𝑚 increases. The joint density function of 𝑢 and 𝑣 is, 
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𝑓(𝑢, 𝑣) =
𝑢𝑚
Γ(𝑚 + 1)𝜎𝑢𝑚+1√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
∙ exp {−
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
−
𝑣2
2𝜎𝑣2
}                                 (4. A. 28) 
and the joint density function of 𝑢 and 𝜀 = 𝑣 − 𝑢 is, 
𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀) =
𝑢𝑚
Γ(𝑚 + 1)𝜎𝑢𝑚+1√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
∙ exp {−
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
−
(𝜀 + 𝑢)2
2𝜎𝑣2
}                          (4. A. 29) 
Thus, the marginal density function of 𝜀 is, 
𝑓(𝜀) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀) 𝑑𝑢
∞
0
 
=  
𝜎𝑣
𝑚
𝛤(𝑚 + 1)√2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝑚+1
∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
𝜀
𝜎𝑢
+
𝜎𝑣
2
2𝜎𝑢2
} ∙ ∫ (𝑡 − 𝑤)𝑚 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝑡2
2
}  𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑤
    (4. A. 30) 
where 𝑤 = (𝜀 𝜎𝑣⁄ ) + (𝜎𝑢 𝜎𝑣⁄ ) ∙ 𝑓(𝜀)  is asymmetrically distributed, with mean and 
variance, 
𝐸(𝜀) = −𝐸(𝑢) = −(𝑚 + 1)𝜎𝑢 
𝑉(𝜀) = 𝜎𝑣
2 + (𝑚 + 1)𝜎𝑢
2                                              (4. A. 31) 
Because the marginal density function in equation (4.A.30) includes an integral term, 
Beckers and Hammond (1987) proposed a closed-form of the function. 
𝑓(𝜀) =
1
Γ(𝑚 + 1)√2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝑚+1𝜎𝑣
∙ exp {−
𝜀2
2𝜎𝑣2
} 
∙ ∫ 𝑢𝑚 exp {−
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
−
𝑢𝜀
𝜎𝑣2
−
𝑢2
2𝜎𝑣2
}  𝑑𝑢
∞
0
                                     (4. A. 32) 
where the integral 
∫ 𝑢𝑚 exp {−
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
−
𝑢𝜀
𝜎𝑣2
−
𝑢2
2𝜎𝑣2
}  𝑑𝑢
∞
0
= 𝐽(𝑚, 𝜎𝑢, 𝜎𝑣, 𝜀) 
is known as a closed-form of density function. Thus, the log likelihood function of 𝑓(𝜀) 
can be defined as follows: 
ln 𝐿 = constant −  𝐼 ln Γ(𝑚 + 1) − (𝑚 + 1)𝐼 ln 𝜎𝑢 − 𝐼 ln 𝜎𝑣 
−
1
2𝜎𝑣2
∑ 𝜀𝑖
2
𝐼
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝑙𝑛 𝐽𝑖(𝑚, 𝜎𝑢, 𝜎𝑣, 𝜀)
𝐼
𝑖=1
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= 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 −  𝐼 𝑙𝑛 𝛤(𝑚 + 1) − (𝑚 + 1)𝐼 𝑙𝑛 𝜎𝑢 + 𝐼 (
𝜎𝑣
2
2𝜎𝑢2
) 
+ ∑
𝜀𝑖
𝜎𝑢
𝐼
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝑙𝑛 𝛷 [−
(𝜀𝑖 + 𝜎𝑣
2 𝜎𝑢⁄ )
 𝜎𝑣
]
𝐼
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝑙𝑛 ℎ(𝑚, 𝜀𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1
                      (4. A. 33) 
where ℎ(𝑚, 𝜀𝑖) = 𝐸[𝑧
𝑚|𝑧 > 0, 𝜀𝑖] and 𝑧 = 𝑁[−(𝜀𝑖 + 𝜎𝑣
2 𝜎𝑢⁄ ), 𝜎𝑣
2]. 
Technical efficiency of each producer can be obtained from either the mean or the 
mode of the conditional distribution of 𝑢. The conditional distribution function 𝑓(𝑢|𝜀) 
is distributed as 𝑁+(?̃?𝑖, 𝜎∗
2), and mean and mode can be described as follows: 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) = ?̃?𝑖 + 𝜎∗ [
𝜙(− ?̃?𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
1 − Φ(−?̃?𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
] 
𝑀(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) = {
?̃?𝑖         𝑖𝑓 ?̃?𝑖 ≥ 0
     0         𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                             (4. A. 34) 
The producer-specific technical efficiency can be gained by substituting 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) and 
𝑀(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖)  into 𝑇𝐸𝑖 = exp{−?̂?𝑖} . An alternative estimator which is provided by the 
minimum squared error estimate can also be used to obtain the estimates of 
producer-specific technical efficiency by susbstituting equation (4.A.34) into 𝑇𝐸𝑖 =
exp{−?̂?𝑖}. Another estimate of producer-specific technical efficiency by Battese and 
Coelli (1988) is written as follows: 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝑢𝑖} |𝜀𝑖) =
1 − 𝛷[𝜎∗ − (?̃?𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )]
1 − 𝛷(−?̃?𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−?̃?𝑖 +
1
2
𝜎∗
2}                   (4. A. 35) 
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Appendix 4.B Specification Test and Skewness in 
Inefficiency Term11 
The validity of stochastic frontier specification of the model can be checked by the 
likelihood ratio test, constructed based on the log-likelihood values of the OLS and 
the stochastic frontier model. However, specification test using the likelihood ratio can 
be conducted after building and estimating the model. Before determining the model 
specification, an OLS residual test provides helpful information whether the stochastic 
frontier specification is appropriate for the data. 
An OLS residual test is proposed by Schmidt and Lin (1984) and is adequate as 
pre-test of the model before the ML estimation, because the test statistic is not difficult 
to calculate. Stochastic production frontier funtion contains composed error term 𝑣𝑖 −
𝑢𝑖, and 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 is negative because technical inefficiency term 𝑢𝑖 is a non-negative 
and 𝑣𝑖 follows the normal distribution with the zero value of the mean. It can be 
expected that the residuals from the corresponding OLS estimation shows negative 
skewness if the data fits stochastic frontier specification. Thus, the null hypothesis of 
the test is that there is no skewness in the data. If the sign of estimated skewness is 
negative, the null hypothesis is rejected and the existence of the one-sided error is 
supported. To test the skewness of OLS residuals, a sample-moment based statistics 
should be calculated; 
√𝑏1 =
𝑚3
𝑚2√𝑚2
                                                                 (4. B. 1) 
where, 𝑚2  and 𝑚3  are the second and the third sample moments of the OLS 
residuals. Each moment of a random variable 𝑥 is defined as follows: 
𝑚2 =  
∑(𝑥 − ?̅?)2
𝑛
, 𝑚3 =
∑(𝑥 − ?̅?)3
𝑛
                                          (4. B. 2) 
√𝑏1
̂
< 0 implies that the OLS residuals are skewed to the left and stochastic frontier 
                                                                
11 This section is based on the book of Kumbhakar, Wang and Horncastle (2015) 
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specification is preferred to OLS. The distribution of √𝑏1 is tabulated in a number of 
literature including D'Agostino and Pearson (1973). 
On the other hand, Coelli (1995) suggests a modified form of the test discussed 
above. He focuses on that negative skewness comes from the negative value of third 
moment (𝑚3). Thus, he proposes the test of whether the third moment is greater than 
or equal to zero. Under the null hypothese of no skewness, the third moment of OLS 
residuals is asymptotically distributed as a normal random variable with mean 0 and 
variance 6𝑚2
3 𝑁⁄ . Thus, the statistics is defined as follows: 
𝑀3𝑇 =
𝑚3
√6𝑚23 𝑁⁄
                                                                      (4. B. 3) 
The statistics is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal random variable. 
Significance of the statistics is decided by the critical value of normal distribution. 
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5. Efficiency of Diversification Strategies of the 
Private Railway Companies in Japan 
PRCs in Japan have diversified into various businesses including railway business, 
focusing on the businesses utilising their assets, such as terminal building and land 
along railway lines. Diversification strategy is also one of the most remarkable 
features of railway industry in Japan. In this chapter, by estimating production function 
of diversified PRCs in Japan and predicting their technical efficiency, this study aims 
to investigate the effect of diversification strategies on the firm’s technical efficiency, 
focusing on the use of relatedness and the firm’s strategic background. 
 
Analytical Premise 
Although this study reviewed the econometric frameworks and techniques for the 
structure of multiple output production in chapter 4, single output production funtions 
are the beginnings describing production technology of the firm and multiple output 
models are derived and expanded from those for single output. However, single 
output model considers only aggregate output of the firm. Multiple output production 
function allows to interpret relationship between various outputs. For example, partial 
differential coefficients of logarithm of each output (𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑀 𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑚
∗⁄  ) describe the 
shadow share or contribution of this output (𝑦𝑚
∗ ) relative to normalising output, 𝑦𝑀, 
and the coefficients of interaction term of outputs (𝛼𝑚𝑛 = (𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑀 𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑚
∗⁄ ) 𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑛
∗⁄  ) 
represent the change in relative share of 𝑦𝑚
∗  from a change in output 𝑦𝑛
∗ (Paul & 
Nehring, 2005). The relationship between transportation segment, including railway 
business, and other diversified business is the one of the important points which this 
study focuses on. Thus, it is expected that multiple output function gives some 
insights for production system of diversified PRCs. 
On the other hand, multiple output production system can be described by cost 
functions, as well as production function discussed above. In order to estimate cost 
function of the firm, information on input prices is needed, but, it is difficult to obtain 
61 
 
input prices for labour, assets and other intermediate inputs from the disclosed 
financial statements, although labour price may be calculated by dividing labour costs 
by the number of employees and rate of depreciation can be used as proxy of asset 
price. In fact, technical efficiency assumes that producers aim to maximise outputs 
as minimising waste of input uses. In addition, producers have high objective of 
maximasation of outputs at minimum cost, not just pursuing to avoid waste, and this 
is associated with cost efficiency. However, to predict cost efficiency by estimation of 
cost function, economic behavioural objective, such as cost minimisation, is needed 
to be added to provide additional characterisations of the structure of production 
technology, as well as information on the prices of the inputs and the outputs 
(Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2003). PRCs seek to minimise costs as private enterprise, but 
it is difficult to conclude that they are motivated to minimise cost in railway business 
because regulation on safety of railway service. In addition, this study focuses on the 
capabilities transferring owned resources to core competencies which are associated 
with the firm’s future growth, rather than improving profitability which may be 
accomplished by cost minimisation. For such a reason, this study focuses on the 
firm’s behaviour seeking the efficient use of its assets and resources to deploy 
diversification strategies, rather than achieving minimising cost. Thus, considering 
the relationship among diversified businesses, and the status of transportation 
segment as the firm’s core business, multiple output production function is adopted 
to describe production technology of Japanese PRCs. 
 
Hypothesis 
Although many researchers have investigated the relationship between 
diversification strategies and the firm’s performance so far, most of these studies 
focus on the financial performance by adapting accounting-based measure, thereby 
overlooking core competence which exist beyond high profitability. In addition, 
diversification strategies of Japanese PRCs have some different aspects compared 
to that of manufacturing firms, focused firms operating single industry and non-
regulated firms. Therefore, it is more appropriate to compare efficiencies among 
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railway companies using internal benchmarking. 
This study has argued that the firm can improve capability combining its resources 
and assets effectively through deploying diversification strategies, thereby acquiring 
competitive advantages which enable it to be differentiated from competitors. As 
pointed out by previous literature, however, excessive expansion of diversified 
business is costly because it is hard to match its own resources or assets to new 
products or service and some resources, such as strategic assets represented by 
experience, knowledge, and know-how, is hard to be traded inside a firm. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1: The broad extent of diversification cannot secure high 
efficiency of the firm. 
In addition, this study has emphasised importance of utilisation of related tangible 
and intangible assets in employing diversification strategies. As Shoji (2001) pointed 
out, in the case of in-house level, it is difficult to determine some diversified business 
or segment as vertical or relatedness because standardised rule to classify segment 
doesn’t exist, while there is no doubt that railway business is the core business of 
PRCs. In the case of group-level diversification, defining vertical and related business 
is more complicated than the case of in-house level, because various businesses are 
included in one segment, in spite of the different contents of each business. For 
example, real estate segment contains both housing development in the area along 
the railway line and real estate agency in the area where the railway service of the 
firm is not operated, although the features of each business are not same in terms of 
verticality and relatedness. Nevertheless, in classifying the type of diversification, 
Yoshida (1986) and Shoji (2001) define that real estate business is close to related 
business. Shoji (2001) also argues that the managers of distribution business 
emphasis the importance of utilising terminals and main stations in survey of group-
level diversification strategies of five PRCs in the Kansai region, although they 
recognise the necessity to be independent from railway business. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 2: Deploying diversification strategies focusing on the real 
estate and distribution (retail) business which utilise the 
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firm’s assets more related to railway business positively 
influeces on technical efficiency of the firm. 
This study has argued that increase of the extent of diversification causes technical 
inefficiency by hindering the process of sharing resources and assets. As discussed 
in the research of Shoji and Killeen (2001), minor PRCs which operate railway 
business in inferior demand condition diversify into various businesses like major 
PRCs. The history of diversification strategies of major PRCs is quite long, as 
mentioned above, thus, it can be assumed that they have accumulated plentiful 
experience and establish dominant logic to utilise their strategic assets and to control 
strategic variety, thereby minimising negative effect of expanding diversification 
strategies (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Therefore,  
Hypothesis 3: Although expansion of the extent of diversification is likely to 
decrease technical efficiency of the firm, major PRCs may 
overcome inefficiency by experience and dominant logic 
which are to utilise strategic assets and to control strategic 
variety. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Concept of Estimation of Production Function of Japanese PRCs 
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Data and Variables 
This study focuses on the diversified PRCs that provide services like distribution 
(retail), leisure, and real estate in addition to transportation services. The PRCs, 
providing only transportation services and operating only freight and sightseeing 
railway are not includeed in the empirical analysis. Although, three JR companies 
were privatised in 1986 and have been considered as private operators, they are 
excluded from the sample because they operate intercity high-speed railway unlike 
other PRCs and have different strategic background12 from other PRCs. The sample 
includes 34 diversified PRCs which consist of 15 major PRCs and 18 minor PRCs 
from 2000 to 2012 fiscal years. As a result, 442 observations are included in the 
sample. The data is gathered from the NIKKEI Financial Quest database and eol 
corporate information database, which contain information about the consolidated 
financial statements published by each company. 
Previous studies on estimation of production function of the firm define inputs as 
capital and labour. The variables generally used for capital and labour, are fixed 
assets and the number of employees (Baek, 2004), capital stock and production 
worker hours (Schoar, 2002), as well as total physical capital and wage bill (Piesse & 
Thirtle, 2000). Although the output using capital and labour is value-added, value-
added production function is hardly applicable to PRCs because they mostly diversify 
into service industry13 . Therefore, to estimate production function focused on the 
sales, it is desirable to include intermediate inputs, which are typically subtracted out 
in a value-added production function, in order to control correlation between input 
levels and the unobserved productivity process (Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003). Because 
operating costs include selling, general and administrative expenses, and labour cost, 
                                                                
12 As mentioned in chapter 2, three JR companies in Honshu area were formed by 
privatisation in 1986. Owing to the privatisation, they started with huge assets and high-
speed intercity railway (Shinkansen). This background causes many differences in 
contents of diversification strategies. 
13 In previous studies of manufacturing firm (e.g. auto producers), value-added (Chen, et al., 
2015) or value-added per employee (Lieberman & Dhawan, 2005) are defined as output 
variable, thus, only input variables for capital and labour are needed. 
65 
 
it is used as proxy for intermediate inputs and labour14. Thus, this study uses the book 
value of fixed assets as the variable for capital and operating costs as the variable 
for intermediate inputs and labour. For output variables, net sales (Baek, 2004) and 
firm sales (Nesta, 2008) are used to estimate production function of the firm in 
previous research. Therefore, it seems reasonable to use the sales of each segment 
as multiple-output variables. However, each PRC classifies business segment by own 
rules because of absence of standardised rules in the present accounting standards. 
To standardise segment categories, different segments of each PRC are regrouped 
into four categories: transportation, real estate, distribution and others (i.e. leisure 
and service, etc.). Each category is considered as the main diversified business of 
PRCs by previous research (Killeen, 1999; Shoji, 2001; Kamata & Yamauchi, 2010).  
The inefficiency model is specified with the following explanatory variables: 
diversification index, the ratio of sales of real estate and distribution to total sales and 
major PRC dummy. Herfindahl index (DI =  1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2 , 𝑠𝑖 = the share of the 𝑖th segment 
from the firm’s total sales) is included to describe the extent of diversification 
(Geringer, et al., 2000; Miller, 2006; Goddard, et al., 2008). Although there are many 
differences between major and minor PRCs, such as operating region, scale of 
diversification, and contents of diversified businesses, the sample includes both 
major and minor PRCs. Therefore, dummy variable for major PRCs is included to 
investigate differences in diversification strategies between major and minor. Major 
PRC dummy equals to one if the firm is classified into sixteen major PRCs. With 
regard to explanatory variables of inefficiency model, as well as variables related to 
diversification and form of the firm, the effect of regulation, corporate governance and 
financial leverage are of concern to efficiency, considering their role as external 
monitoring. However, in this study, the effect of diversification strategies and form of 
the firm are only considered, because the prior purpose of this study is to investigate 
the relationship between diversification strategies and inefficiency, and the model 
                                                                
14 Although some research proposes the use of capital investment as proxy of intermediate 
inputs (Olley & Pakes, 1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) refer that it is difficult to define 
universal proxy for intermediate inputs and the choice of proxy depends on the details of 
data. 
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may not be converged if too many variables are included in the model. Therefore, the 
final model estimated in this study as follows: 
− ln(TR)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln(RE TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 ln(RT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 ln(OT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln(FA)𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽2 ln(OC)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼11 ∙
1
2
∙ [ln(RE TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡]
2 + 𝛼22 ∙
1
2
∙ [ln(RT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡]
2 
+𝛼33 ∙
1
2
∙ [ln(OT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡]
2 + 𝛽11 ∙
1
2
∙ ln(FA)𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽22 ∙
1
2
∙ ln(OC)𝑖𝑡
2 
+𝛼12 ∙
1
2
∙ ln(RE TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 ∙ ln(RT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼13 ∙
1
2
∙ ln(RE TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 ∙ ln(OT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 
+𝛼23 ∙
1
2
∙ ln(RT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 ∙ ln(OT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 ∙
1
2
∙ ln(FA)𝑖𝑡 ∙ ln(OC)𝑖𝑡 
+𝛿11 ∙ ln(FA)𝑖𝑡 ∙ ln(RE TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿12 ∙ ln(FA)𝑖𝑡 ∙ ln(RT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 
+𝛿13 ∙ ln(FA)𝑖𝑡 ∙ ln(OT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿21 ∙ ln(OC)𝑖𝑡 ∙ ln(RE TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 
+𝛿22 ∙ ln(OC)𝑖𝑡 ∙ ln(RT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿23 ∙ ln(OC)𝑖𝑡 ∙ ln(OT TR⁄ )𝑖𝑡 
+𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                     (5.1) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 ∙ (DI) + 𝜃2 ∙ (DI) ∙ (MJ) + 𝜃2 ∙ (rRET)                     (5.2) 
All variables are deflated by the 2005 GDP deflator. Table 1 illustrates the detail of 
data and descriptive statistics. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outputs 
(million Yen) 
TR (Transportation) 75279 96245 1 482429 
RE (Real estate) 29898 42544 1 191428 
RT (Distribution) 80250 125540 1 678239 
OT (Others) 70655 105811 1 677833 
Inputs 
(million Yen) 
FA (Fixed assets) 415312 541085 1 2172927 
OC (Operating costs) 222745 292474 1 1315036 
Inefficiency 
model 
DI (Diversification index) 0.5688 0.1743 0 0.7501 
rRET 
(The ratio of real estate 
and distribution) 
0.3377 0.2274 0 0.8145 
MJ 
(Dummy for major 
PRCs) 
0.4412 0.4971 0 1 
 
Specification Tests 
Although it is desirable to conduct the specification tests of the model before the 
estimation, the tests are usually conducted to examine the specification of the models 
after the estimation as a way of confirmation. In this study, two specification tests are 
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conducted. These are tested by imposing restrictions on the model and using the 
likelihood ratio static ( λ ) to determine the significance of the restrictions. The 
likelihood ratio statistic is described as follows: 
λ = −2{ln[𝐿(𝐻0)] − ln[𝐿(𝐻1)]}                                           (5.3) 
where ln[𝐿(𝐻0)] and ln[𝐿(𝐻1)] are the values of the log likelihood function under null 
(𝐻0) and alternative (𝐻1) hypotheses.  
First, the existence of technical inefficiency is tested to check the validity of model 
as stochastic frontier. The null hypothesis is that technical inefficiency effects do not 
exist in the production system of PRCs, thus, it indicates that the distribution of 
residuals is not one-sided. According to hypothesis, likelihood ratio (LR) test can be 
constructed based on the log-likelihood values of the OLS (restricted) and the 
stochastic frontier (unrestricted) model. Proposed hypothesis is that 𝜎𝑢
2 = 0, and the 
degree of freedom is one because only one parameter, 𝜎𝑢
2, is restricted in the test. 
By comparing the test static with the critical values of the distribution (see, Kodde and 
Palm (1986)), the result shows whether the null hypothesis can be rejected or not 
(Kumbhakar, et al., 2015). Second, the test of functional form is also conducted. 
Considering the principle of parsimony, less restrictive translog form is chosen if the 
null hypothesis that Cobb-Douglas form is adequate is rejected. Although Cobb-
Douglas form is easy to estimate and interpret and requires estimation of a few 
parameters, it is simplistic to analyse the production structure of multiple firms at the 
same time, because Cobb-Douglas form assumes that all firms have the same 
production elasticities and that substitution elasticities equal to one. Table 5.2 
illustrates the results of specification tests. 
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Table 5.2 The results of specification tests 
1. Existence of inefficiency 
𝐻0: The significant inefficiency doesn’t exist (𝜎𝑢
2 = 0). 
𝐻1: The significant inefficiency exists (𝜎𝑢
2 ≠ 0). 
 Statistic: 219.51 
 Critical value: 𝜒1,0.01
2  = 5.412 
 
Reject null hypothesis at 1% significance. 
2. Functional form 
𝐻0: Cobb-Douglas output distance function (𝛼𝑚𝑛, 𝛽𝑘𝑙, 𝛿𝑘𝑚 = 0). 
𝐻1: Translog output distance function (At least one parameter ≠ 0). 
 Statistic: 520.41 
 Critical value: 𝜒15,0.01
2  = 29.927 
Reject null hypothesis at 1% significance. 
As a result, the likelihood ratio is 219.51 in the test of the existence of inefficiency 
and null hypothesis of OLS is rejected at 1% level. Therefore, SF specification can 
be applicable. In addition, the likelihood ratio is 520.41 in the test of functional form 
and the null hypothesis of Cobb-Douglas form is rejected at 1% level. Thus, it is 
proved that translog is a better model for the production system of PRCs in this study.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
Since the sales of transportation segment are adopted as dependent variable, the 
adjusted sales of other segments are normalised by the sales of transportation to 
estimate the multi-output production frontier. The parameter estimates for the variable 
of output distance function are presented in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Parameter estimates of stochastic frontier production function and 
inefficiency model a 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
RE (𝛼1) -0.1192 
*** 0.0319 -0.1225 *** 0.0310 -0.1603 *** 0.0305 
RT (𝛼2) 0.0631 
*** 0.0083 0.0603 *** 0.0081 0.0585 *** 0.0077 
OT (𝛼3) 0.3230 
*** 0.0559 0.3403 *** 0.0545 0.3591 *** 0.0524 
FA (𝛽1) -0.0109 
 0.1085 -0.0503  0.1057 0.0459  0.1024 
OC (𝛽2) -0.6977 
*** 0.1112 -0.6743 *** 0.1081 -0.7816 *** 0.1052 
           
(RE)2 (𝛼11) 0.0366 
*** 0.0029 0.0343 *** 0.0028 0.0300 *** 0.0027 
(RT)2 (𝛼22) 0.0472 
*** 0.0011 0.0460 *** 0.0011 0.0403 *** 0.0011 
(OT)2 (𝛼33) 0.1032 
*** 0.0143 0.0914 *** 0.0141 0.0911 *** 0.0136 
(FA)2 (𝛽11) -0.0149 
 0.0224 -0.0302  0.0220 -0.0329 0.0212 
(OC)2 (𝛽22) -0.0316 
 0.0354 -0.0551  0.0347 -0.0421 0.0334 
          
RE × RT (𝛼12) -0.0161 
*** 0.0023 -0.0148 *** 0.0022 -0.0141 *** 0.0021 
RE × OT (𝛼13) -0.0353 
*** 0.0125 -0.0202  0.0125 -0.0286 ** 0.0120 
RT × OT (𝛼23) -0.0435 
*** 0.0028 -0.0399 *** 0.0028 -0.0352 *** 0.0027 
FA × OC (𝛽12) 0.0236 
 0.0557 0.0654  0.0548 0.0561  0.0528 
FA × RE (𝛿11) -0.0217 
*** 0.0082 -0.0186 ** 0.0080 -0.0153 ** 0.0078 
FA × RT (𝛿12) -0.0084 
*** 0.0029 -0.0099 *** 0.0028 -0.0067 ** 0.0028 
FA × OT (𝛿13) 0.0515 
*** 0.0162 0.0471 *** 0.0158 0.0499 *** 0.0150 
OC × RE (𝛿21) 0.0489 
*** 0.0091 0.0457 *** 0.0088 0.0436 *** 0.0085 
OC × RE (𝛿22) 0.0280 
*** 0.0033 0.0295 *** 0.0032 0.0231 *** 0.0032 
OC × OT (𝛿23) -0.0616 
*** 0.0185 -0.0573 *** 0.0180 -0.0601 *** 0.0172 
           
Constant (𝛼0) 0.0000 
 0.0001 0.0001  0.0002 0.0001  0.0001 
Inefficiency model 
DI  (𝜃1) 1.0289 
*** 0.0567 0.9669 *** 0.0561 1.0772 *** 0.0570 
MJ × DI  (𝜃2)   0.1170 
*** 0.0246 0.1007 *** 0.0239 
rRET  (𝜃3)     -0.2731 
*** 0.0333 
Constant (𝜃0) -0.1851 
*** 0.0192 -0.1659 *** 0.0188 -0.1602 *** 0.0181 
         
𝜔𝑢  -5.8280 
*** 0.0670 -5.8839 *** 0.0670 -5.9612 *** 0.0673 
𝜔𝑣  -22.2623 
*** 5.8159 -22.1358 *** 7.9143 -22.6728 *** 7.4336 
        
Obs.  442 442 442 
Log-likelihood 699.429 710.3432 729.1220 
a ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level 
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As well as estimated coefficients, elasticities of output and input variables give an 
important information to check specification of output distance function and 
economies of scale. Stochastic distance function satisfies monotonicity which is non-
decreasing in 𝑦 and non-increasing in 𝑥. To confirm monotonicity of the stochastic 
multi-output function, equation (4.10) can be rewritten as the function of ln(𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡): 
ln(𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡) =  TL(𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡⁄ , 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿) + ln(𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡)      𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁                (5.4) 
By the properties of multiple output distance function, estimated function must be 
an increasing function of each output and a decrease function of each input. 
Regarding a Cobb-Douglas function, if the coefficients of input variables is greater 
than or equal to zero, the estimated function satisfies monotonicity. However, to a 
translog function, local monotonicity must be checked to confirm whether the 
estimated function satisfies monotonicty: 𝜕𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝜕⁄ 𝑦𝑚𝑖 = (𝜕 ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑚𝑖⁄ ) ∙
(𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝑦𝑚𝑖⁄ ) ≥ 0 , or equivalently 𝜕 ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑚𝑖⁄ ≥ 0 and 𝜕 ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝜕 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖⁄ ≤ 0 (Lan & 
Lin, 2006). Table 5.4 presents elasticities of output and input variables of each model.  
Table 5.4 Output and input elasticities 
 
Elasticity 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Output 
Real estate 0.1319 0.1281 0.1134 
Distribution 0.1766 0.1734 0.1516 
Others 0.2700 0.2728 0.2941 
Input 
Fixed assets -0.0211 -0.0071 -0.0051 
Operating costs -1.0208 -1.0166 -1.0162 
For all models, the first partial derivatives of output variables are greater than zero 
and those of input variables are less than zero, therefore, the models are adequately 
estimated as satisfying monotonicity.  
In addition, the sum of the elasticities of each input variable shows increase of 
output by increasing 1 percent in each input, similar to a returns to scale estimate 
from a production function. Elasticity for input, − 𝜕 ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝜕 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖⁄ = 𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑀𝑖 𝜕 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖⁄ , 
represents the percent change in 𝑦𝑀𝑖 by changing a 1 percent in 𝑥𝑘𝑖. Therefore, the 
output-oriented distance function based scale economy measure is calculated by 
summing these elasticities (Färe & Primont, 1995). − ∑ 𝜕 ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝜕 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖⁄𝑘 =
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∑ 𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑀𝑖 𝜕 ln 𝑥𝑘𝑖⁄𝑘 > 1 implies increasing returns to scale. In other words, increase 
in inputs results in output expansion (Paul & Nehring, 2005). In Table 5.4, the sum of 
elasticities for inputs is greater than 1, although it is negative value. However, 
considering the dependent variable of each model is the nagative value of natural log 
of the sales of transportation, the nagative value of the sum is not irrational, thus, it 
indicates slight increasing returns scale. 
 
Discussion 
By estimating stochastic production function of PRCs and inefficiency model 
simutaneously, this study obtains implications of production system of PRCs and 
impact of diversification strategies on the firm’s technical efficiency. 
First of all, the output distance elasticities in Table 5.4 provide information about 
the share of each product in total output, and the output elasticity of arbitrary output, 
which is used to normalise (the sales of transportation in this research) other outputs, 
can be calculated by homogeneity of distance function (Newman & Matthews, 2006). 
Thus, the output elasticity, − 𝜕𝐷𝑂𝑖 𝜕𝑦𝑚𝑖⁄ = 𝜕𝑦𝑀𝑖 𝜕𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗⁄ , implies the shadow value of 
𝑦𝑚𝑖 relative to 𝑦𝑀𝑖. The input distance elasticities also reflect the share of each input 
to all inputs (Paul & Nehring, 2005; Newman & Matthews, 2006). The distance 
elasticity for transportation is 0.4215 (Model 1), 0.4257 (Model 2), and 0.4409 (Model 
3). In all models, the distance elasticity for transportation is higher than that for other 
outputs. In addition, the input distance elasticity of operating costs which include 
labour cost and variable cost is higher than that of fixed assets in all models 
overwhelmingly. It means that transportation business still largely contributes to total 
production of Japanese PRCs and is placed as core business of PRCs. In addition,  
production greatly depends on labour and intermediate inputs to be needed to 
operation and large elasticity of operating costs reflects the characteristic of 
diversified businesses of PRCs which are concentrated in tertiary sector of industry 
that is labour intensitve and is related to providing service. Lan and Lin (2006) argue 
that greater input elasticity of employees implies overstaffing in the railway transport 
industry and reducing employees can be essential strategy according to their analysis 
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which uses the number of passenger cars, freight cars, and employees as input 
variables. Thus, in the case of Japanese PRCs, improving operation system to cut 
operating costs may be critical to enhance technical efficiency. 
The estimated coefficients of inefficiency model are main interest of this study. In 
inefficiency model, negative coefficient indicates positive relationship with technical 
efficiency because the dependent variable of inefficiency model is technical 
inefficiency, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, which indicates distance between production set and the curve of 
production frontier. The coefficient of diversification index is positive and statistically 
significant in all models, which implies that the extent of diversification is related to 
technical efficiency negatively. This result corresponds with previous studies which 
measure the firm’s performance by accounting indices (e.g. return on equity) and 
market value (e.g. Tobin’s q). These previous studies report a neutral or negative 
relationship between the extent of diversification and performance (Montgomery, 
1994). In this study, the type of diversification strategies based on Rumelt’s method 
is not applied because of difficulities to classify related and unrelated business using 
currently disclosed financial data of Japanese PRCs. Nevertheless, Montgomery 
(1982) proves that continuous measure is highly related to categorical measure of 
Rumelt and it increases consistently as unrelatedness of type of diversification is 
increased (see also Montgomery & Wernerfelt (1988), Chatterjee & Wernerfelt 
(1991)). Thus, it is reasonable to regard higher diversification index as evidence of 
expansion of diversification strategies. In previous research of Japanese major PRCs, 
increase of diversification index is likely to correspond with expanding diversification 
strategies, and diversification index of the firm which is classified into unrelated is 
greater than 0.37 approximately (Shoji, 2001; Kamata & Yamauchi, 2010). With 
regard to relationship between diversification strategies and profitability of Japanese 
PRCs, Shoji (2001) points out that diversifying more than necessary can cause 
decline of profitability. Therefore, it is considered that expanding diversification 
strategies can negatively influence the firm’s efficiency and hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Because related or dominant type firms, which diversify focusing on the businesses 
close to their main business, show the highest profitability in comparison of 
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diversification strategies and profitability, it is not surprise that high diversification is 
not associated with high efficiency. 
Moreover, the coefficient of the ratio of the sales of real estate and distribution 
business to total sales is negative and statistically significant. This implies that 
increasing the proportion of real estate and distribution business in PRCs may 
contribute to improvement of efficiency. As mentioned before, although some PRCs 
deploy diversified business outside their operating region in which is the area along 
a railway line by the form of real estate agency and department store, land along a 
railway line and terminal building are still important assets for PRCs. Shoji (2001) 
assumes that real estate business is likely to be related vertically and technologically, 
considering that it exploits physical assets of railways (e.g. terminal building, land) 
and know-how accumulated by operating railway, although he investigates the case 
of diversfication at the in-house level (division), not in group-level (subsidiary). As well 
as utilising assets and knowledge, large scale of development is still conducted 
around main station and terminal buildings (e.g. development of areas surrounding 
Umeda station by Hankyu-Hanshin holdings, development plan of Shinagawa station 
by Keikyu, redevelopment of Sibuya station and nearby area by Tokyu). Therefore, 
real estate business has relatedness with transportation business in terms of sharing 
tangible assets and knowledge. In addtion, distribution business emphasises 
availability of terminal in city center and building of main station of railways (Shoji, 
2001), and seeks to exploit synergy effect with railway and to capture railway 
passengers as their customers. PRCs are also motivated by exploiting brand image 
and trust derived from railway business and highly regard the importance of location 
in terminal building in center city and main station of railways (Shoji, 2001). Thus, 
distribution business can be considered as highly related business to transportation 
business. Therefore, negative and significant coefficient of the ratio of distribution and 
real estate businesses to total sales indicates that concentrating the firm’s 
competence to its related business like distribution and real estate influences 
positively on efficiency and hypothesis 2 is also supported. 
Interaction term of diversification index and dummy for major PRC is included to 
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investigate whether major PRCs overcome disadvantages resulting from expanding 
diversification beyond relatedness by examining hypothesis 3. Although increase of 
variety of diversified business is considered to be not efficient comparing to related 
diversification and major PRCs deploy businesses over various field, as mentioned 
before, it is expected that major PRCs may properly cope with difficulties from 
deploying new businesses because they have stronger dominant logic and more 
efficient organisational system to exploit their strategic assets than other PRCs, given 
their history and scale. In addition, while related diversification can achieve 
economies of scope by adopting cooperative organisational arrangements, 
expansion of the extent of diversified businesses can realise benefit of governance 
economies, which attenuate information disadvantages of stockholders and induce 
efficient allocation of capital and funds by exposing divisions to internal governance 
system, through adopting competitive organisational system (Hill, et al., 1992). 
However, the coefficient of interaction term is positive and statistically significant 
indicating negative impact to technical efficiency, and hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
This implies that negative effect of expanding the extent of diversification becomes 
greater for major PRCs. Major PRCs deploy not only traditional diversified businesses 
(real estate, distribution) but also new territory which the firm has not tried yet, such 
as insurance, consumer finance, and cable TV. In addition, geographical 
diversification of major PRCs has accelerated in recent years, as well as business 
diversification. For example, Tokyu corporation operates real estate agency in Kansai 
region and owns resort and leisure facilities in various places of country, beyond its 
original opertating area. Business expansion into oversee is also one of the trends of 
diversification of major PRCs, although its proportion is not high. Seibu holdings 
operates “Hawaii segment” managing hotel and leisure business in Hawaii and Tokyu 
corporation undertakes real estate development in Austrailia. Likewise, major PRCs 
have extended their business area beyond traditional business sector which they 
have deployed and the area along the railway line. In other words, their 
compentencies are widely dispersed over various businesses and major PRCs may 
not have enough dominant logic or appropriate organisational structure to control 
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competencies in expanding diversification. Therefore, based on the rich strategical 
assets like geographical conditions of terminals and main stations and business 
know-how resulting from diversification for a long time, it can be said that major PRCs 
should control expansion of diversification strategies as strengthening governance or 
establishing dominant logic to exploit resources to enhance efficiency.  
 
Summary 
In this chapter, the quantitative analysis of effect of diversification strategies on the 
firm’s technical efficiency is conducted by estimating production function of Japanese 
diversified PRCs using stochastic frontier analysis. The production function is defined 
as multiple output distance function and inefficiency model is also estimatied using 
technical inefficiency as dependent variable simultaneously. To investigate what 
influence technical efficiency of Japanese PRCs, three hypotheses are proposed: 1) 
The broad extent of diversification cannot secure high efficiency of the firm; 2) 
Deploying diversification strategies focusing on the real estate and distribution 
business which utilise the firm’s assets more related to railway business; 3) For major 
PRCs, negative effect of expansion of diversification strategies is attenuated 
considering their know-how and rich strategical assets, such as terminal building and 
railway demand, and dominant logic. 
The sample includes 34 diversified PRCs which consist of 15 major PRCs and 18 
minor PRCs from 2000 to 2012 fiscal year.  As a result, 442 observations are obtained. 
The estimated model is defined by two input variables (the book value of fixed assets, 
operating costs) and four output variables (the sales of transportation, real estate, 
distribution, and others segment). The inefficiency model is specified with 
diversification index (Herfindahl index), the ratio of sales of real estate and distribution 
to total sales and major PRC dummy.  
Empirical results indicate that diversified PRCs in Japan achieve economies of 
scope in deploying diversified businesses. It is also confirmed that transportation 
business still contributes to total production of Japanese PRCs and production greatly 
depends on labour and intermediate inputs to be needed to operation. In the 
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inefficiency model, the extent of diversification influences the technical efficiency 
negatively, while the ratio of the sales of real estate and distribution business to total 
sales is positively related to technical efficiency. The negative effect of the extent of 
diversification is amplified if the firm is major PRCs. By the estimation, like previous 
research using accounting-based measure as dependent variable, it is found that 
excessive diversification expanded into unrelated businesses is negatively related to 
performance expressed by technical efficiency. This is supported by the positive 
effect of the proportion of real estate and distribution business in PRCs. The tendency 
of diversification of major PRCs, expanding their businesses in unfamiliar place and 
new territory, affect technical efficiency negatively and this is confirmed by interaction 
term of the extent of diversification and dummy variable for major PRCs. 
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Appendix 5.A Estimates of Parameters in the Translog 
Frontier Production Function 
 
OLS Pooled SFA Panel OLS (GLS) Frontier (BC 88)15 
Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err 
RE (𝛼1) -0.1101 
*** 0.0408 -0.1101 *** 0.0398 0.2352 *** 0.0477 0.2514 *** 0.0482 
RT (𝛼2) 0.0560 
*** 0.0107 0.0560 *** 0.0104 0.0101   0.0132 0.0077   0.0138 
OT (𝛼3) 0.2273 
*** 0.0716 0.2273 *** 0.0699 0.1894 *** 0.0646 0.1709 *** 0.0630 
FA (𝛽1) -0.2472 
* 0.1375 -0.2472 * 0.1341 -0.4682 *** 0.1266 -0.4024 *** 0.1207 
OC (𝛽2) -0.5323 
*** 0.1421 -0.5323 *** 0.1387 -0.2604 ** 0.1321 -0.3308 *** 0.1258 
             
(RE)2 (𝛼11) 0.0260 0.0036 0.0260 
*** 0.0035 -0.0051 *** 0.0032 0.0339 *** 0.0032 
(RT)2 (𝛼22) 0.0515 0.0014 0.0515 
*** 0.0013 0.0387 *** 0.0015 0.0377 *** 0.0014 
(OT)2 (𝛼33) 0.1640 0.0180 0.1640 
*** 0.0175 0.1457 *** 0.0155 0.1487 *** 0.0147 
(FA)2 (𝛽11) 0.0868 0.0281 0.0868 
*** 0.0275 -0.0723 ** 0.0334 -0.0847 *** 0.0324 
(OC)2 (𝛽22) 0.0536 0.0453 0.0536 
 0.0442 -0.1629 *** 0.0460 -0.1678 *** 0.0439 
             
RE × RT (𝛼12) -0.0030 0.0027 -0.0030 0.0027 -0.0051 
* 0.0028 -0.0051 * 0.0029 
RE × OT (𝛼13) -0.0443 0.0160 -0.0443 
*** 0.0156 -0.0014   0.0137 -0.0101   0.0130 
RT × OT (𝛼23) -0.0456 0.0035 -0.0456 
*** 0.0035 -0.0463 *** 0.0031 -0.0454 *** 0.0030 
FA × OC (𝛽12) -0.1586 0.0709 -0.1586 
** 0.0692 0.2088 *** 0.0767 0.2266 *** 0.0738 
FA × RE (𝛿11) -0.0470 0.0105 -0.0470 
*** 0.0102 -0.0167 ** 0.0085 -0.0111   0.0080 
FA × RT (𝛿12) -0.0184 0.0036 -0.0184 
*** 0.0035 -0.0122 *** 0.0041 -0.0094 ** 0.0039 
FA × OT (𝛿13) 0.0998 0.0207 0.0998 
*** 0.0202 -0.0299 * 0.0171 -0.0326 ** 0.0161 
OC × RE (𝛿21) 0.0720 0.0115 0.0720 
*** 0.0113 0.0100   0.0099 0.0023   0.0094 
OC × RT (𝛿22) 0.0412 0.0041 0.0412 
*** 0.0040 0.0330 *** 0.0045 0.0299 *** 0.0044 
OC × OT (𝛿23) -0.1049 0.0237 -0.1049 
*** 0.0232 0.0364 * 0.0203 0.0403 ** 0.0193 
             
Constant (𝛼0) 0.0035 0.0152 0.0041 0.0289 -0.0076 
 0.0192 0.3777 *** 0.1014 
             
lnsig2v    -5.3714 *** 0.0673       
lnsig2u    -14.6227  93.0732       
Sigma          -4.2767 *** 0.2477 
Gamma          2.4769 *** 0.2812 
Mu          0.3886 *** 0.1031 
 
  
                                                                
15 The estimates are calculated using the definition of technical efficiency of Battese and 
Coelli (1988). 
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Appendix 5.B Test of Monotonicity 
Monotonicity of production function indicates an increase function of each output 
and a decrease function of each input. Monotonicity can also be confirmed by the 
derivative of the function with respect to each input and normalised output variable. 
According to definition of monotonicity, the derivative of input variables is negative 
and that of normalised output variables is positive. 
(1) Checking monotonicity of output variables 
Real estate: 
𝜕 ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝜕 ln 𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼1 + 𝛼11 ∙ ln(𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) +
1
2
∙ 𝛼12 ∙ ln(𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) 
+
1
2
∙ 𝛼13 ∙ ln(𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) + 𝛿11 ∙ ln 𝐹𝐴 + 𝛿21 ∙ ln 𝑂𝐶 
Distribution: 
𝜕 ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝜕 ln 𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼2 + 𝛼22 ∙ ln(𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) +
1
2
∙ 𝛼12 ∙ ln(𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) 
+
1
2
∙ 𝛼23 ∙ ln(𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) + 𝛿12 ∙ ln 𝐹𝐴 + 𝛿22 ∙ ln 𝑂𝐶 
Others: 
𝜕 ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝜕 ln 𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼3 + 𝛼33 ∙ ln(𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) +
1
2
∙ 𝛼13 ∙ ln(𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) 
+
1
2
∙ 𝛼23 ∙ ln(𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) + 𝛿13 ∙ ln 𝐹𝐴 + 𝛿23 ∙ ln 𝑂𝐶 
 
(2) Checking monotonicity of input variables 
Fixed assets: 
𝜕 ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝜕 ln 𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽11 ∙ ln 𝐹𝐴 +
1
2
∙ 𝛽12 ∙ ln 𝑂𝐶 + 𝛿11 ∙ ln(𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) 
+𝛿12 ∙ ln(𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) + 𝛿13 ∙ ln(𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) 
Operating costs: 
𝜕 ln 𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝜕 ln 𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽2 + 𝛽22 ∙ ln 𝑂𝐶 +
1
2
∙ 𝛽12 ∙ ln 𝐹𝐴 + 𝛿21 ∙ ln(𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) 
+𝛿22 ∙ ln(𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) + 𝛿23 ∙ ln(𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡⁄ ) 
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6. Effects of Diversification Strategies on Investment 
in Railway Business of Private Railway Companies 
Diversification strategy of PRCs in Japan has generally been considered to be 
motivated and deployed in order to support the railway business. However, they make 
their own business portfolio including investment decisions and compete with other 
companies in some routes based on the market principle as private enterprises (Shoji, 
2001). Although diversification strategies seem to play a key role in PRCs, it has not 
been investigated how they influence the railway business in terms of internal capital 
resource allocation for investment, focusing on the coexistence of railways, which are 
considered as to be public utilities, and diversified business. Previous research has 
noted the diversification strategies of Japanese PRCs, and investigated their effects, 
focusing on their contribution to the profitability of the railway business and to the 
entire company. However, most previous studies focus on the relationship between 
diversification and performance at the in-house level; finding research on how 
diversification strategies influence investment in the railway business for acquiring 
and upgrading assets is more challenging. Based on the foregoing, this chapter aims 
to investigate whether the internal capital of PRCs is utilised for investment in the 
railway business to improve railway services (e.g. route expansion and maintenance), 
considering the diversified business portfolio of the firm, and whether it is utilised to 
invest or improve other diversified businesses if it is not reinvested in the railway 
business. For these purposes, this research explores the investment decisions of 
PRCs from the perspective of internal capital markets, as well as free cash-flow and 
life-cycle theory, which are discussed in corporate finance, with reference to the case 
of Japanese PRCs in this chapter. 
 
Two Roles of Japanese PRCs 
Japanese PRCs play two different roles: 1) as an operator providing public 
transportation services and 2) as a private enterprise pursuing profit maximisation. 
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Their diversification strategies are reasonable behaviour in terms of profit seeking, 
but we should not forget that they provide ‘public’ transportation services. In view of 
profitability, the transportation segments of diversified companies including bus and 
taxi modes as well as railways are profitable. The operating income of the 
transportation business can cover its own total costs and can generate sufficient 
additional capital and cash flow. Although cross-subsidies between transportation 
segments and other segments to make up for the operating loss are prohibited by 
law (Railway acounting rules), as private firms, they have the right to allocate their 
own funds as they see appropriate. Thus, the headquarters can transfer the capital 
resources of the transportation segments to other segments and subsidise it to invest 
in or improve the capital resources of other segments. On the contrary, as operator 
of public transportation, PRCs have an obligation to continue to offer high-quality 
services; indeed, they cannot cease the supply of transportation services because of 
exit regulations. Hence, they are obliged to invest in the railway business continually, 
as providers of a public service. Thus, it is important for them to balance the 
profitability and sustainability of transportation services. For example, they seek 
profit-making businesses to ensure the profitability of the entire company but also 
strategically invest in diversified businesses. The headquarters prioritise segment-
level investment in this way. If the headquarters were concerned only about future 
profitability and the cost of capital motivated by profit-seeking, the transportation 
business would be neglected due to its limited ability to generate profitability. 
 
Diversified Firms and Internal Capital Markets 
A firm’s investment decision is generally based on the firm’s internal financial 
environment and external financial factors. The resource allocation in diversified firms 
is different from that in focused firms because the former consist of many subsidiaries, 
divisions, or business units that operate various businesses. Internal capital markets 
(ICMs) allocate limited resources to the various divisions or segments inside the 
diversified company and the headquarters then have the authority to allocate (Stein, 
1997; Peyer, 2002). Stein (1997) defines ICMs as channel allocating limited 
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resources to different uses inside a firm. In addition, Peyer (2002) regards ICMs as 
the mechanism by which headquaters allocates capital to the various divisions of firm. 
In diversified firms, each business unit or subsidiary strives to acquire more capitals 
than their competitive business units or subsidaries under the existence of various 
and different business portfolios in the firm. Therefore, it is not too much to say that 
business units and subsidiaries in diversified firm are exposed to an internal 
competition due to investment interdependence (Stein, 1997). 
ICMs are differentiated from external capital markets because of differences in 
information, incentives, asset specificity, control rights, or transaction costs (Lamont, 
1997). While the providers of external capital, such as the bond market, the stock 
market, banks, and finance companies, mainly pay attention to the firm’s value and 
growth opportunity which can be gained in external capital markets as return of 
investment, ICMs are formed in diversified firms in order to make investment decision 
and allocate capital resource efficiently. For investment decision, Lamont (1997) and 
Shin and Stulz (1998) argue that diversified firms are likely to overlook the value of 
investment represented by Tobin’s q, which is a traditional market indicators, and this 
behaviour is largely different from that of focused firms. 
 Peyer (2002) points out that establishing ICMs gives a potential benefit of 
diversification with two main advantages. The first is that internal resource allocation 
can be more efficient than allocation by external capital markets because of the 
relaxed constraints on managerial behaviour and use of less strict monitoring 
systems (Jensen, 1986). The second advantage is that internal capital markets affect 
transactions with external capital markets by reducing information asymmetry, 
because the headquaters can reallocate investment across divisions based on a 
more precise estimation of value-maximising investment needs compared with 
external investors. If reallocating capital is based on productivity of a segment 
(Khanna & Tice, 2001; Maksimovic & Phillips, 2002) and if the headquaters do not 
pursue the incentive, but rather engage in acting in the interest of outside shareholdes 
(Stein, 1997), the ICMs can facillitate efficient resource allocation. Stein (2003) also 
suggests two major benefits of ICMs, namely the ‘more-money’ effect and the 
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‘smarter-money’ effect. Generally, the ‘smarter-money’ effect is more emphasised as 
bright side of ICMs. The more-money effect is that diversified firms can acquire more 
total external financing than stand-alones, which is beneficial for the underinvestment 
problem. The smarter-money effect is based on the two premises: 1) the CEO in ICMs 
knows about the prospects of the firm’s divisions well; 2) the CEO uses high-quality 
information to make reallocations across divisions. Likewise, well-informed managers 
can find valuable project to invest and allocate capital actively if he or she behaves 
in the interests of external shareholders. Stein (1997) insists that the managers are 
more likely to shift funds from low profitable project to the project which is expect to 
achieve high profitability and to have high future growth due to the smarter-money 
effect, when the firm operates in related lines of business. In addition, Shin and Stulz 
(1998) refers that ICMs enable diversifies firms to provide funds for profitable projects 
which the extenal capital markets would not be able to finance because of information 
asymmetries and agency costs. 
On the contrary, some previous research emphasises the negative sides of ICMs 
which are the tendency towards overinvestment and misallocation of capital 
resources. Problem of overinvestment results from larger capital of diversified firms 
than that of focused firms due to the more-money effect ironically (Stein, 2003). 
Rather than tendency of overinvestment, however, the latter one, misallocation is 
more discussed in previous research. Lang and Stulz (1994), and Berger and Ofek 
(1995) argue that misallocation problem is related to low value of diversified firms on 
average compared to single-segment firms. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) 
synthesise three theoretical frameworks and propose their perspective to explain how 
the diversified firms show different behaviour to the focused firms and why value-
destructive misallocation occurs in diversified firms.  
With regard to the reason the diversified firms bahave different to the focused firms, 
first, efficient ICMs models is suggested, although the model insists that 
diversification creates value. The model assumes that ICMs, as pool of internally 
generated cash flow, can allocate resources to their best use, thus cannot explain 
misallocation to segments with poor opportunities (Stein, 1997; Matsusaka & Nanda, 
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2002). Second, agency cost model explains the potential investment distortions in 
diversified firms. As pointed out above, top managements in diversified firms have 
greater opportunities to initiate projects and plentiful resources to accomplish it 
because they are relatevely easy to secure funds by the more money effect, 
compared to focused firms, and can utilise high-quality information to evaluate 
projects. However, plentiful cash pool and high-quality information lead managers to 
overinvestment, rather than rational decision to investment (Stulz, 1990; Matsusaka 
& Nanda, 2002). However, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) point out that the 
model is more adequate to explain generic overinvestment, which is motivated to 
strengthen CEO’s power, instead of overinvestment coming from the CEO’s decision. 
Thus, the model is difficult to explain why the internal misallocation of funds occurred 
rationally, because CEO should exploit all potential sources of value inside the firm 
as searching her/his rents only from overall pie. Third, influence cost models focus 
on the manager’s behaviour in which his/her divisions have a dark future and he/she 
appeal to top managent of the firm, thereby allocating resources to his/her division 
(Meyer, et al., 1992). While costs are incurred because of lobbying activities, it is hard 
to say that resources are misallocated to the divisions. Finally, Rajan, Servaes and 
Zingales (2000) propose their own model definitising explanation of misallocation of 
funds in diversified firms and value difference caused by misallocation. They assume 
that resource misallocation is caused by power-seeking and political principal inside 
the firm. Divisional managers are independent in choosing projects to invest and self-
interested. Given the unclear incentive system, the divisional managers are reluctant 
to share some of the surplus created with the other division to keep bargaining power 
and political power, in spite of efficiency of invested other division’s projects. As a 
result, they prefer the defensive investment that would benefit her/him more directly, 
especially when her/his resources and opportunities are much better than the other 
divisions.  
 
Life-Cycle Theory and Free Cash-Flow Theory 
Free cash-flow theory, developed by Jensen (1986), refers to the problem of 
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agency costs and overinvestment. Before Jensen (1986), Mueller (1972) proposed 
life-cycle theory which focuses on the tendency of managers pursuing growth as the 
firm grows and matures. He assumed that a profit maximising firm aims to take 
advantage of a Schumpeterian innovation involving a new product, process, 
marketing or organisational technique (Grabowski & Mueller, 1975). A firm begins as 
exploiting an innovative idea of its creator. By exploiting creative and new idea, a firm 
comes into new areas which are closely related to its initial product line at first. It 
continues to expand its business and diversifies even further, thereby causing 
dispersion of its organisational structure and autonomy of divisions. As a result, a 
firm’s efficiency decreases due to further expansion and it confronts with limitation of 
innovation (Mueller, 1972). Then, the firm experiences the decreased marginal 
returns from investment in the core business as a consequence of the life-cycle 
effects (also see Markides, 1995; Thompson, 1999). He also argued that firms 
operating core businesses in mature industries that generate enough cash to be 
reinvested are likely to aim to maximise growth, rather than profit and stockholder’s 
welfare, and that internal capital makes investment funds available to managers. 
Especially, if a firm operating matured core business uses internal funds as the 
primary means of investment, it tends to invest in the project of low profitability. This, 
therefore, motivates managers to expand investment into different activities through 
conglomerate mergers.  
While Mueller (1972) focused on maturity and limitation of continual innovation of 
core business to explain the diversifying behaviour utilising internal fund, Jensen 
(1986) assumes that overinvestment results from the firm’s weak governance, and 
insists that free cash-flow tends to be invested in unprofitable expansion owing to 
managerial behaviour, which is characterised by the pursuit of rent. Thompson (1999) 
proposes constraints on managerial behaviour of the firm which influence on the level 
of corperate governance mechnisms: 1) threat of takeover, 2) threat of bankruptcy, 3) 
debt constraint, 4) shareholder voice, 5) product market competition, 6) stock market 
surveillance, and 7) management compensation mechanism. Jensen (1986) also 
argues that the conflict interest over payouts between corporate managers and 
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shareholders leads the managers to unprofitable diversification. According to Jensen 
(1986), managers are motivated to grow the size of a firm beyond the optimal size 
because it gives managers some incentives which are associated with growth of the 
managers’ power by enhancing the control right of the resources (Murphy, 1985). The 
rewarding policy which is to promote middle managers also causes organisational 
bias towarding growth (Baker, 1986). Due to a such reason as mentioned above, the 
managers deploy diversification strategies by mergers and takeovers using large free 
cash-flows, and it usually generates lower total gains, while the firm may achieve less 
waste of resources as investing them internally in unprofitable projects. Here, Jensen 
(1986) also emphasises that the firm operating in the industry, which generates large 
cash flows with few growth opportunites, tends to diversify, as Mueller (1972) 
discussed. However, he argues that this value-decreasing behaviour can be held 
back by the precommitment of cash flows generated by the core business to value-
maximising projects. In addition to facilitating growth, corporate income fluctuations 
can further be attenuated by this investment expenditure (Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
Although the debt created in value-increasing takeovers by increased leverage has 
costs like bankruptcy costs, the threat of failure to debt service payments acts as 
monitoring force at the optimal debt-equity ratio that is the point where the marginal 
costs of debt offset the marginal benefits. By increased leverage, the firm should 
confront with the crisis to cut in expansion plans and to sell its divisions which are 
more valueable outside the firm. This process may lead the firm to consider strategies 
and optimal organisational structure continually. 
 
Investment Opportunities and Cash Flow 
Investment opportunities and cash flows are critical factors, defining whether ICMs 
are efficient or not. Shin and Stulz (1998) define the ICMs to be efficient if 1) it regards 
the level of investment opportunities of the segment as the most important factor in 
the allocation of funds; 2) it makes the segment’s investment less sensitive to its own 
cash flow as well as to other segments’ cash flow; and 3) it allocates smaller funds to 
some segment with low investment opportunities when other segments with better 
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investment opportunities appear. Likewise, investment opportunities and cash flow 
are closely associated with efficiency of ICMs. 
In traditional view of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the firm’s investment is likely to 
depend on the profitability of its perceived investment opportunities measured by 
Tobin’s q, and is not related to liquidity position or its leverage ratio. Several corporate 
finance studies have focused on Tobin’s q, which is the value of the investment 
opportunity divided by the cost of the required investment (Maksimovic & Philips, 
2008). Previous studies of this topic suggest that segments of diversified firms do not 
tend to respond properly to investment opportunities, although opportunities 
measured by the firm’s Tobin’s q should be firstly considered  to decide the level of 
investment. This finding implies that diversified firms tend to underinvest in high 
opportunities, although they have a tendency to overinvest in low opportunities (Rajan, 
et al., 2000; Scharfstein & Stein, 2000). Previous research argues that investment 
distortion, which overlooks the signal represented by investment opportunities, such 
as Tobin’s q, is caused by rent-seeking behaviour of the manager (Scharfstein & Stein, 
2000; Matsusaka & Nanda, 2002; Chou, 2010). However, the evidence which ICMs 
respond to investment opportunities properly can be also found, given the condition 
of imperfect external capital markets (Matsusaka & Nanda, 2002; Kuppuswamy & 
Villalonga, 2010; Hovakiman, 2011). 
Although investment opportunities have been considered the most critical factors 
influencing on the firm’s investment decision, a firm also depends on cash flow of the 
segment. Much previous research suggests that a segment in diversified firms may 
rely both on its own cash flows and on those of other segments (Lamont, 1997; Shin 
& Stulz, 1998; Whited, 2001). A positive coefficient of the other segments implies 
transfer or subsidies among the segments (Shin & Stulz, 1998), with some previous 
studies investigating the effects of such transfers and subsidies (Rajan, et al., 2000; 
Khanna & Tice, 2001; Billett & Mauer, 2003). Furthermore, for highly diversified firms, 
segment investment is less sensitive to its cash flow compared to focused firms (Shin 
& Stulz, 1998). Cash flow becomes more influential in capital allocation when the firm 
faces with financing constraints (Shin & Stulz, 1998; Almeida, et al., 2004) and 
87 
 
industrial shock (Lamont, 1997; Khanna & Tice, 2001). 
Based on the discussion above, previous studies suggest the following investment 
equation, including investing opportunities and cash flow of a segment and a firm 
(Lamont, 1997; Shin & Stulz, 1998; Maksimovic & Philips, 2008): 
𝐼𝑗 = β × 𝑞𝑗 + δ × 𝐶𝐹𝑗 + 𝜑 × 𝐶𝐹others + 𝛾𝑖 × 𝑧𝑖 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚       (6.1) 
where 𝐼𝑗 is segment 𝑗’s capital expenditure, 𝑞𝑗 is the Tobin’s q of segment 𝑗, 𝐶𝐹𝑗 is the 
cash flow of segment 𝑗, 𝐶𝐹others is the cash flow of other segments except segment 
𝑗, and 𝑧𝑖 represents the other explanatory variables of each firm. 
 
Data and Variables 
To focus on the investment policy of PRCs which operates in urban area and 
diversify widely, the sample includes 14 major PRCs16 , which are diversified and 
which report segment information in their consolidated financial statements, and 
three JR companies (JR East, JR Central, JR West), which were privatised in 1986 
and listed on the stock markets for the 1999-2012 fiscal years. Therefore, 17 
companies are included in the sample. The data on all sample firms is obtain from 
the pool during 1999-2012 fiscal years since time-lagged data on decision timing is 
used, but the regressions cover from 2000 to 2012. As a result, 215 observations are 
included in the sample. The data are extracted from the NIKKEI Finantial quest 
database, which contains data on the consolidated financial statements published by 
each company. 
To investigate how the internal capital market affects investment in the 
transportation segment, the capital expenditures of the transporatation segment are 
used as the dependent variable. Capital expenditures are normalised by the total 
assets of a firm in the previous year to represent investment sensitivity of a segment. 
As presented in equation (6.1), cash flow is a proxy of the stream of capital alloction 
in internal capital markets, and many studies estimating investment equations define 
                                                                
16 Two PRCs are excluded from the sample. Seibu Holdings is excluded because of 
incomplete data due to delisting and Tokyo Metro is excluded because it is not diversified. 
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cash flow as the sum of operating income and depreciation (Lamont, 1997; Shin & 
Stulz, 1998; Ahn, et al., 2006; Duchin, 2010). On the contrary, cash flow is also 
defined as the segment’s after-tax cash flow (Billett & Mauer, 2003), net cash from 
operations minus dividends (Peyer, 2002), and free cash-flow (Faulkender, et al., 
2012; Takami, 2012). The definition of cash flows influences the conclusion drawn on 
the efficiency of ICMs. Indeed, Shin and Stulz (1998) regress a segment’s capital 
expenditures on an imputed segment’s Tobin’s q, the segment’s own cash flow, and 
the cash flow of the firm’s other segments and suggest that a positive coefficient 
estimate on the other segments’ cash flow implies cross-subsidised capital 
expenditures between segments. However, Billett and Mauer (2003) support the 
efficiency of ICMs. In this research, a firm’s cash flow is defined as its after-tax cash 
flow in line with Faulkender, Flannery and Hankins (2012) and Takami (2012), 
considering the characteristics of accounting system of Japanese firms, and is 
decribed as follows: 
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑘 = Operating profit𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + Depreciation𝑖𝑡
𝑘   
− (Interest expense𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + Corporate tax𝑖𝑡
𝑘 )
Assets𝑖𝑡
𝑘
∑ Assets𝑖𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑘
 
− Working capital𝑖𝑡
𝑘 Operating income𝑖𝑡
𝑘
∑ Operating income𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘
− Capital expenditure𝑖𝑡
𝑘                (6.2) 
 
Figure 6.1 Change in the passenger KM of major PRCs in Japan 
Source: Annual report on railway statistics, Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport 
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Figure 6.1 shows the changes in the passenger KM of major PRCs in Japan from 
2000 to 2012. While the passenger KM increased temporarily in 2007, it tended to 
decreased gradually over time. This study expects cash flow to lead headquaters in 
diversified firms to invest in growing business instead of the passenger-decreasing 
transportation segment, which has matured and thus had restricted profitability. In 
terms of the extra cash holdings of the firm, the cash flow of other segments also 
affects investment in the transportation segment because of the limited capital 
resources. Hence, this study uses the cash flow of the transportation segment and 
that of the other segments in the same period of investment and the variables are 
normalised by the total assets of a firm in the previous year. 
As proxy of investment opportunities, Tobin’s q has been widely used in the 
literature. Whited (2001), however, states that Tobin’s q is an inadequate variable with 
which to control for investment opportunities. At the firm-level, Tobin’s q is generally 
calculated by using disclosed financial data, as the ratio of the total market value of 
the firm (the sum of total stock market value and total liabilities) to the total asset 
value, while it is not observed directly at the segment level because the segments of 
diversified firms are not traded. Therefore, the median of the Tobin’s qs of the focused 
firms are used in many previous literature, particulary based on a segment’s three-
digit industry SIC code in the case of U.S. However, Whited (2001) insists that a 
segment’s Tobin’s q tends to lie below the industry median when a diversification 
discount exists. Much of the empirical literature also suggests that investment 
opportunities of same-industry focused firms are not representative of those of the 
segments of diversified firms (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Billett & 
Mauer, 2003; Villalonga, 2004). Moreover, most of empirical studies use data on U.S. 
manufacturing companies, which classify segments by using SIC codes, thus, it is 
easy to understand structure of diversified business. However, in Japan, segment 
classification is not based on SIC code or on the standardised rule, but rather on the 
decision of a firm’s manager. This distinction implies that matching the segments of 
diversified and focused firms is difficult because various businesses are mixed in one 
segment in case, as is shown in the case of PRCs. In addtion, there is a huge gap 
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between diversified major PRCs and focused other PRCs in the size of firm, due to 
difference in operating area and demand condition of railway business. Thus, using 
industry median Tobin’s q like some previous research may distort investment 
opportunities of transportation segment of major PRCs. Given the difficulties and 
limitations mentioned above, Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) use a segment’s ROA 
which is the ratio of operating income to segment assets, as a proxy of investment 
opportunities. In this vein, the segment ROA is also used as a variable of investment 
opportunities in this study. 
For diversification strategies, the extent of diversification is also regarded to 
influence investment decisions (Shin & Stulz, 1998; Maksimovic & Phillips, 2002). 
The number of segments (Shin & Stulz, 1998) and Herfindahl index (Rajan, et al., 
2000; Khanna & Tice, 2001; Maksimovic & Phillips, 2002) are used as variables 
representing the extent of diversification. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) show that 
investment sensitivity increases with a firm’s Herfindahl index17. Thus, in this research, 
the Herfindahl index is used as a variable to define the extent of diversification, which 
computes a firm’s dispersion across the segment in which it operates by summing 
the squared shares of total firm sales for each segment. 
To consider environmental factors which can affect investment decision, previous 
corporate finance studies typically contain control variables to focus on the targeted 
relationship in their estimations. Therefore, firm fixed effects are included to control 
for any heterogeneity across firms, calendar-year dummies, firm size, and a firm’s 
specific character. Logarithm of total employees is used as a variable of firm size, 
segment sales in the previous period to avoid correlation with investment 
opportunities, and leverage in the previous period to control for the effect of external 
capital markets. Thus, the final model estimated in this study is described as follows: 
                                                                
17 As well as Herfindahl index, entropy measure of diversification can be also applied and 
Palepu (1985) used entropy measure in his research on profit performance of 
diversification strategy. However, due to the characteristics that various businesses are 
mixed in same segment, determining relatedness among businesses is difficult in the case 
of Japanese PRCs, thus, this study uses Herfindahl index. For the details of the 
diversification index, see Appendix 6.A. 
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𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1
 
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∙
𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2 ∙
𝐶𝐹𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3 ∙ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑡−1 
+𝛼4 ∙ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛼5 ∙ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1 
+𝛼6 ∙ 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑡−1 + 𝛼7 ∙ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1 
+𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚                                                                                                 (6.3) 
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regresssions. 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Investment sensitivity 215 0.0304 0.0176 0.0039 0.0927 
Free cash flow of the transportation 
segment (million Yen) 
215 -22841 55234 -237520 259485 
Free cash flow of the other 
segments (million Yen) 
215 -65174 60753 -309031 17072 
Return on assets (ROA) of the 
transportation segment (%) 
215 4.1256 1.4360 0.96 8.44 
Herfindahl index 215 0.6950 0.1037 0.2450 0.8280 
Long-term leverage 215 0.3522 0.0824 0.1560 0.5327 
Segment sales in t-1 (million Yen) 215 357999 472550 35722 1955944 
Total sales in t-1 (million Yen) 215 732026 608641 168582 2703563 
 
Estimation Results 
To investigate investment decisions of the transportation segment by ICMs in order 
to confirm the robustness of the analysis, the baseline equation is estimated at first 
and model including the diversification index for the total sample is also estimated. 
Then, the sample is categorised into two groups by operation region, namely the 
Kanto region surraounding the Tokyo metropolitan area (TMA) and the Kansai 
regions including Osaka, Nagoya, and Fukuoka. Finally, the same models for both 
groups are estimated. Shoji (2001) suggests that the business strategies and the 
types of diversification strategies differ between Kanto and Kansai regions, as well 
as the trend of population along the railway line and demand of railway service.  
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Figure 6.2 Change in the passenger of the Kanto region and the Kansai regions 
(2004 = 100, Year means of annual passenger) 
Source: Annual report on railway statistics, Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport 
Thus, it is expected that categorising the sample into two groups offers implications 
on relations among railway demand, diversification, and investment in the railway 
business. This is especially so considering the different levels of two regions: railway 
demand is gradually increasing in the Kanto region because of the poluation influx 
into the TMA, whereas demand is decreasing in the Kansai region (see Figure 6.2). 
The regression is estimated by using unbalanced panel data. All regressions contain 
firm-fixed effects and calender-year dummies for each year, and the 
heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. However, the 
coefficients of calender-year dummies have been omitted because of space 
restrictions. Table 6.2 presents the estimates of the baseline investment equation and 
the model including the diversification index, which implies the extent of diversification. 
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Table 6.2 Variable estimation of the investment equation 
 
Capital expenditures in t/Total assets in t-1 
Total Kanto Kansai Total Kanto Kansai 
Own cash flow (𝛼1)  
-0.6026 *** -0.7570 *** -0.4749 *** -0.5958 *** -0.7875 *** -0.4632 *** 
(-8.43) (-9.99) (-4.04) (-8.29) (-13.21) (-4.17) 
Other cash flow (𝛼2) 
0.1098 ** 0.2738 *** 0.0950 * 0.1205 *** 0.0899 ** 0.1294 ** 
(4.29) (3.86) (1.96) (4.94) (3.22) (2.42) 
Segment's ROA (𝛼3) 
0.0016 ** 0.0004  0.0007  0.0015 ** 0.0001  -0.0003  
(2.67) (1.46) (0.73) (2.60) (0.22) (-0.25) 
Diversification 
Index (𝛼4) 
      0.0370 * -0.0512  0.0862 ** 
   (1.82) (-1.09) (2.36) 
Leverage in t-1 (𝛼5) 
-0.0024  -0.0292  -0.0025  -0.0109  -0.0310  -0.0238  
(-0.16) (-1.74) (-0.11) (-0.86) (-1.81) (-1.06) 
Segment sales 
in t-1 (𝛼6) 
-0.0126  0.0713  0.0320  -0.0058  0.0990  0.0494  
(-0.39) (0.9) (0.71) (-0.21) (1.54) (1.59) 
Firm size (log of 
total sales) (𝛼7) 
-0.0027  0.0069  -0.0048  -0.0042  0.0052  -0.0148  
(-0.57) (1.34) (-0.51) (-0.86) (0.79) (-1.37) 
Constant (𝛼0) 
0.0468  -0.0744  0.0658  0.0462  -0.0198  0.1543  
(0.72) (-1.12) (0.55) (0.71) (-0.19) (1.18) 
Observations 
(Groups) 
215 104 111 215 104 111 
(17) (8) (9) (17) (8) (9) 
R2 0.7826 0.9074 0.6901 0.7895 0.9129 0.7269 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level 
In the estimation of the total sample, the coefficients of cash flow are statistically 
significant in all models and the absolute value of the coefficients of a transportation 
segment’s cash flow is larger than that of cash flow of other segments. This finding 
corresponds with those of other previous research that the investment decision 
depends more on its own segment’s cash flow; however, the sign of the coefficient of 
own cash flow is negative. This implies that an increase in the cash flow of the 
transportation segment is not always connected with additional investment in 
segment. 
On the contrary, segment ROA, which is a proxy for investment opportunities, is 
significant, but the coefficients are small compared with those of other variables and 
this is a remarkable difference to that for non-regulated firms. As discussed above, 
investment opportunities affect the decisions of the ICMs and are positively related 
to a segment’s investment. This finding implies that investment in the transportation 
segment is unlikely to depend on the profit decision completely, in contrast to a non-
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regulated firm’s segments. In the model including diversification, the coefficient of the 
diversification index is positive and statistically significant. This finding means that 
deploying a diversification strategy positively influences transportation investment. 
Considering the demand side, the firms operating in the Kanto region, where 
passenger demand tends to grow, are more influenced by their own cash flow than 
those of firms operating in the Kansai regions. In the Kansai region where decreased 
passenger damand is likely, the coefficient of the diversification index is positive and 
significant and its effect is twice as large as that in the Kanto region. Thus, expanding 
the extent of diversification strategies can positively affect investment in the 
transportation segment if the number of railway passengers is likely to decrease. 
 
Discussion 
Estimation results of the investment equation of PRCs indicate that the investment 
policy of these companies is different from that of firms operating in non-regulated or 
manufacturing industries. Based on the coefficients of segment’s own cash flow, other 
segments’ cash flow, and segment ROA, ICMs are not efficient on investment in 
transportation segment, because it is more sensitive to cash flow of its own segment 
and other segments than investment opportunities, represented by segment ROA. 
The most remarkable finding of this study is that the diversified strategies of PRCs 
may not ensure additional financing to the transportation business. The railway 
business, similar to other diversified businesses of major PRCs, is profitable, allowing 
it to generate the cash necessary for investment. If a firm only operates in the railway 
business, all generated cash is reinvested in railways. However, in a diversified firm, 
the cash flow generated by a transportation segment’s activities may be invested in 
another segment. Hence, while it may be anticipated to gain the benefit by improving 
efficiency and focusing on core businesses by allowing private operations and 
diversifying business portfolio, this may become distorted as private operators 
choose expansion to diversification, not concerning profitability and investment 
opportunities (Thompson, 1999). 
Given that the railway business is the core business of a firm and that diversification 
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is motivated to support it, it is supposed that the railway segment is prioritised above 
other segments when deciding on investment. Indeed, it is confirmed that the extent 
of diversification strategies positively influences investment in a transportation 
segment and the cash generated from other segments also flows into transportation. 
If the diversified businesses have ability to create enough cash, generated cash may 
contribute to investment in transportation segment, including railway business. 
However, it is necessary to focus on the negative impact of the cash flow of the 
transportation segment, whereby cash flows out of the transportation segment into 
other diversified segments. In addition, the impact of the cash outflow from the 
transportation segment is about three times larger than that of the cash inflow from 
other segments in all models. This finding indicates that the effect of the cash inflow 
from other segments can be offset by the cash outflow from the transportation 
segment. Further, it can be considered that the railway business has thus far been a 
cash generator in the firm based on the stable demand factor, as discussed above. It 
is observed that investment in non-core segments depends on the cash of core 
business in the case of oil companies (Lamont, 1997). Thompson (1999) also points 
out that a firm whose core businesses are stable cash generators, but market-
matured and regulated by price regulations, has few real opportunities to grow its 
core businesses and tends to invest other businesses that are expected to achieve 
growth in the case of newly privatised UK utilities. 
 
Figure 6.3 Change of ROA of transportation segment and diversified segments of 
major PRCs and JR companies in Japan (Year means) 
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However, it is needed to beware of understanding that transportation investment is 
not performed or is negative. Capital expenditures are used not only to acquire 
physical assets, but also to upgrade current assets. As shown in the models of the 
total sample, the coefficient of the ROA of the transportation segment, which is a 
proxy of investment opportunities, is significant and positive, but its impact is slight. 
This finding means that investment opportunities, which emphasise profitability and 
affect investment decisions, are not always critical to decision of investment in the 
transportation segment compared with other factors. The slight impact of ROA may 
come from the regulations placed on the railway business. Government-regulated 
PRCs must thus control service quality and maintain safety by regulation or law 
related to operation and safety. They also have a responsibility to maintain a certain 
level of service because their core business is the railway business and the firm’s 
characteristics are defined by operation of railway business. In other words, a firm is 
obliged to undertake the required level of investment following the regulation. 
However, profitability and growth are important factors for private firms when deciding 
on investment. In terms of new investment, the headquaters may be reluctant to 
allocate capital to acquire new assets or enhance transportation facilities based on 
future demand and predicted profitability. As presented in Figure 6.3, the profitability 
of transportation segments presented by ROA have been greater than that of other 
diversified segments. However, the gap between two types of segments has been 
smaller, and ROA of diversified segments is almost the same as that of transportation 
segment in 2012. It implies that investment in transportation segment is not attractive 
and the best alternative to use internal capital in diversified PRCs. 
Consequently, a firm may only invest at the required level and it becomes less 
inclined to invest in the development of new routes and in large-scale changes not 
obligated by the regulations and cash is allocated to expand diversification when the 
railway business is making a profit and generating cash for investment. The interview 
is performed to the managers of three major PRCs in the Kansai region and it is 
confirmed that most PRCs tend to rely on funds from Development Bank of Japan 
(e.g. low interest loans) or financial support programmes which are provided if PRCs 
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operate jointly with the public sector (e.g. the establishment of the quasi-public sector) 
when they plan to construct or improve infrastructure at the large scale. Of course, it 
seems that Japanese PRCs may not utilise internal capital because of the existence 
of such support schemes, although the support is minimal compared with other 
countries. However, given the low promise of the future growth of railway business, 
support schemes offered by public sector, although not large, may serve as insurance 
to guarantee a certain level of quality in the provision of railway services. Moreover, 
the support schemes allow transportation segment of PRCs to acquire external funds 
easily compared with diversified segment. PRCs generally diversify into non-
regulated industries, as discussed above, and this indicates that acquiring external 
capital for diversified business is more difficult than railway business because the 
project may be strictly evaluated in terms of profitability and the external agency 
would not have consideration for low interest based on the market principle. Lamont 
(1997) proves that relatively better external financial condition of oil business allows 
the firm to invest in non-oil segments in the case of U.S. oil companies. Therefore, 
negative relationship between investment sensitivity and cash flow of transportation 
segment is caused by aggravated investment opportunities of transportation 
segement, which is represented by ROA, and external financial constraint of each 
segment. As a result, it is hard to expect to allocate internal capital for railway 
business more than other segments.  
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(Actual value is used until 2010, and estimated value is used from 2015) 
Figure 6.4 Trend of productive age population (2005 = 100) 
Source: (Actual value) National census, Japanese Statistics Bureau and Statistics Centre 
(2010) 
(Estimated value) Regional Future Estimated Population in Japan, National Institute 
of Population and Social Security Research (2013) 
Moreover, the different impacts of the transportation segment’s cash flow and the 
extent of diversification between two regions are remarkable. First, in terms of 
productive age population, which generates stable demand for railway companies by 
commuting, the population in the Kansai region is shrinking at a greater rate than that 
in the Kanto region (see Figure 6.4). Second, in the Kansai region, three companies 
(JR, Hankyu, and Hanshin) are competing on the same route from Kobe to Osaka, 
while there are hardly any competing routes in the Kanto region. The companies in 
the Kanto region where the number of passengers has increased are likely to respond 
more sensitively to the transportation segment’s negative cash flow than the 
companies in the Kansai region, as shown in Figure 6.2. The coefficient of 
diversification index of the companies in the Kanto region is also negative, but is not 
statistically significant, while that of the companies in the Kansai area is positive and 
significant. As mentioned above, although the population is decreasing in both 
regions, the Kanto region shows a smaller drop than the Kansai region. This indicates 
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that potential demand for the railway business is more stable in the Kanto region. 
Considering that revenue from the railway business still accounts for an important 
part of the revenue of railway companies and that diversified segments, such as 
distribution including retail and restaurant, recognise passengers of railway service 
as their potential customer as Shoji (2001) discussed, this suggests that the cash 
flow of railway segment is an important capital resource for their diversification. 
Because companies that have sufficient railway demand tend to have an interest in 
higher profitability businesses based on the assurance for future demand, rather than 
securing further demand by enhancing railway services, they restrict new investment 
in the transportation segment. 
The existence of competitors on the same route also influences the relationship 
between diversification and investment in the railway business. This competitive 
situation may drive railway companies to build and integrate strategies in order to 
strengthen the railway business, which is their core business. Although reinvestment 
in the railway business by its own cash flows may decrease because of the use of 
diversification strategies, cash from the transportation segment may be deployed to 
support diversified segments, which supports the railway business and makes it 
attractive to passengers. This view is supported by Shoji (2001), who suggests that 
the proportion of dominated and related types according to Rumelt’s categorisation 
in the Kansai region is higher than that in the Kanto region. Therefore, the expectation 
of future demand and existence of competitors may act importantly in capital 
allocation among PRCs. In spite of tendency which capital is allocated to diversified 
segments, restricting the diversification of private operators is not a desirable choice. 
The aggravated environment surrounding passenger railway services, such as 
competition with individual transportation and decrease in population size, becomes 
a burden to railway operators; thus they need strategies to guarantee their financial 
sustainablity, and diversification may paly a role in this regard. Diversification may be 
incentive for operators bacause it opens up the possibility of creating various income 
sources and seeking further growth opportunities. This indicates that the firm may 
overcome the limited profitability of railway services owing to fare regulation by 
100 
 
diversifying. Therefore, designing financial support programmes for improving 
infrastructure and formulating a regulatory scheme to monitor the weak governance 
systems of private operators, which is related to wasteful investment (Mueller, 1972; 
Jensen, 1986; Markides, 1995; Thompson, 1999), is needed to minimise the 
influence on railways. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, how diversification influences investment in the railway business is 
examined focusing on the capital allocation performed by the firm’s headquaters in 
ICMs and empirical model is estimated using data on Japanese PRCs. The railway 
business is usually considered to take priority when the firms establish their 
investment policies because diversification strategies of PRCs result from the effort 
taken to support railways. Thus, it is demonstrated that diversification has a positive 
impact on investment in the railway business, but that the diversification strategies 
used are questionable in terms of supporting railway business. 
One practical implication of this research is that it is difficult for diversified PRCs to 
utilise internal capital for investment to improve and expand railways. This results 
from the external capital condition of railway business relatively flexible comparing to 
diversified other segments, and being aggravated profitability. As confirmed in the 
interview with the managers of three major PRCs in the Kansai region, PRCs is still 
likely to rely on the financial schemes by public sector to construct or improve 
infrastructure in large scale. Further, diversifying properly can therefore contribute to 
creating abundant capital resources inside a firm. However, the allocation decision is 
made by the headquaters, which consider future profitability and growth first. 
Although private operators have the flexibility and freedom to design service and 
business strategies, owing to the expected decreasing railway demand, enhancing 
railway infrastructure may be overwhelmed by other, more profitable segments. It is 
also confirmed that the internal capital of PRCs is mainly used to diversify businesses, 
rather than railway business. As well as existence of competitors in railway business, 
differences in the operating region of PRCs and form of diversification strategies are 
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influential factors to determine allocation of internal capital. This result infers that it is 
difficult to expect that generated cash inside a firm is used for improvement of railway 
business. Even though internal capital generated by diversification is not likely to be 
utilise for railway business, restricting diversification is not appropriate considering 
aggravated environment of railway services. Rather than expecting use of internal 
capital for railway, it may be better that financial schemes or support programmes are 
set by public sector to support or encourage constuction of railway infrastructure 
continually. Regulation and monitoring to manage negative influence of diversification 
are also needed. 
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Appendix 6.A Measure of Diversification18 
Although Rumelt (1974) proposed categorical measurement of diversification 
which captures well the subtleties of a firm’s diversification strategies, it is subjective 
in terms of determining relatedness and verticality of business, and very time-
consuming (Palepu, 1985). In case of PRCs in Japan, because different types of 
businesses are included in a segment in group-level, use of Rumelt’s classification 
may cause excessive intervention of subjectivity of the researcher to define 
relatedness. Therefore, among the industrial organisation researchers prefer the 
index approach to the categorical approach (Montgomery, 1982). Although the 
diversification indices, such as Herfindahl index and entropy index, have a 
disadvantage which do not distinguish between related and unrelated diversification, 
they are easy to calculate, objective, and replicable, comparing to the categorical 
approach (Palepu, 1985). These diversification indices describe industrial 
concentration of diversified firm, thus are computed using the shares of each product 
or segment. 
Of the diversification indice, Herfindahl index is the most widely used measurement 
due to its convenience of computation and understanding 19 . Most measures of 
corporate diversification takes the form: 
𝐼 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝜔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                      (6. A. 1) 
where 𝑃𝑖 is the share of the 𝑖th segment or industry and 𝜔𝑖 is an assigned weight. 
Generally, weight is assigned to the share of each segment or industry of the firm 
while the share of all other segments or industries within the firm receive a weight of 
zero. Thus, Herfindahl’s contribution can be described as follows: 
𝐻 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                      (6. A. 2) 
                                                                
18 This section is based on Jacquemin and Berry (1979) and Palepu (1985). 
19 For details, see Jacquemin and Berry (1979). 
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However, the degree of diversification of the firm is determined by the level of product 
or business aggregation, because concentration will be lower the more aggregated 
the industry or product definitions on which the measure is based. Thus, generally, 
Herfindahl index of diversification is defined as follows to make it increase with 
increasing diversification: 
𝐻 = (1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
)                                                       (6. A. 3) 
20 As well as Herfindahl index, entropy measure of diversification can be also 
applied and Palepu (1985) used entropy measure in his research on profit 
performance of diversification strategy. Entropy measure is based on the number of 
product segments, the distribution of the firm’s total sales across the product 
segments, the degree of relatedness among the various product segments (Palepu 
(1985, p.244)). Because entropy measure is able to consider degree of relatedness, 
it overcomes the limitation of Herfindahl index. Thus, it can decompose a firm’s total 
diversity into two addictive components: 1) an unrelated component that measures 
the extent to which a firm’s output is distributed in products across unrelated industry 
groups, and 2) a related component that measures the distribution of the output 
among related products within the industry groups (Palepu (1985, p.244)). 
If a firm operates in N industry segments, the entropy measure of total 
diversification DT is defined as follows: 
DT =  ∑ 𝑃𝑖 ln(1 𝑃𝑖⁄ )
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                            (6. A. 4) 
where, 𝑃𝑖 is the share of the 𝑖th segment in the total sales of the firm. In equation 
(6.A.4), the weight for each segment is the logarithm of the inverse of its share, thus, 
this is a weighted average of shares of the segments. 
As mentioned above, the entropy measure is distinguished from other indice 
because it takes into account the degree of relatedness among the various segments 
                                                                
20 For details, see Palepu (1985). 
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of the firm. If it is assumed that a set of related segments is defined as an industry 
group, then, the segments within an industry group are expected to be more related 
than other segments which are classified into other industry groups. In addition, it can 
be assumed that there are N industry segments of the firm and these segments can 
be aggregated into M industry groups (𝑁 ≥ 𝑀 ). Thus, 𝐷𝑅𝑗 , which is the related 
diversification resulting from operating in several segments within an industry group 
𝑗, can be defined as follows: 
𝐷𝑅𝑗 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑗
ln(1 𝑃𝑖
𝑗⁄ )
𝑖∈𝑗
                                               (6. A. 5) 
where, 𝑃𝑖
𝑗
 is the share of the segment 𝑖 of group 𝑗 in the total sales of the group. 
However, the firm is assumed to operate in several industry groups, total related 
diversification 𝐷𝑅 is the sum of 𝐷𝑅𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑀. 
𝐷𝑅 = ∑ 𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑃
𝑗
𝑀
𝑗=1
                                                           (6. A. 6) 
where, 𝑃𝑗 is the share of the 𝑗th group sales in the total sales of the firm. 
On the other hand, 𝐷𝑈 represents the unrelated diversification and originate from 
operating across several industry groups. 𝐷𝑈 is defined as follows: 
𝐷𝑈 = ∑ 𝑃𝑗 ln(1 𝑃𝑗⁄ )
𝑀
𝑗=1
                                                 (6. A. 7) 
Therefore, under the above definitions, the total diversification is described as the 
sum of the related and unrelated components. Note that 𝑃𝑖
𝑗 = 𝑃𝑖 𝑃
𝑗⁄  and 𝑃𝑗 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑗
𝑖∈𝑗 . 
𝐷𝑅 + 𝐷𝑈 = ∑ 𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑃
𝑗
𝑀
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝑃𝑗 ln(1 𝑃𝑗⁄ )
𝑀
𝑗=1
= ∑ 𝑃𝑗 [∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑗
ln(1 𝑃𝑖
𝑗⁄ )
𝑖∈𝑗
+ ln(1 𝑃𝑗⁄ )]
𝑀
𝑗=1
 
= ∑ 𝑃𝑗 [∑(𝑃𝑖 𝑃
𝑗⁄ ) ln(𝑃𝑗 𝑃𝑖⁄ )
𝑖∈𝑗
+ ln(1 𝑃𝑗⁄ )]
𝑀
𝑗=1
 
= ∑ [∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑖∈𝑗
ln(1 𝑃𝑖⁄ ) + ln(𝑃
𝑗) + ln(1 𝑃𝑗⁄ )]
𝑀
𝑗=1
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= ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑖∈𝑗
ln(1 𝑃𝑖⁄ )
𝑀
𝑗=1
= 𝐷𝑇                                                                                (6. A. 8) 
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7. Summary and Conclusion 
Summary 
The aims of this study were to examine the effect of diversification strategies of 
Japanese PRCs quantitavely and to provide implication for operators, who pursue 
innovative business moder for future growth and profitability, and for authorities who 
struggle to improve efficiency of operation of public transportation. 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of diversification strategies by reviewing previous 
literature in strategic management and industrial organisation. With motivation and 
type of diversification strategies, topics of relationship diversification strategies and 
the firm’s performance are scrutinised to provide implications of behaviour of 
Japanese PRCs. Considering strategic environment of Japanese PRC, this study 
also focuses on the diversification strategies of the firm whose main business area is 
service industry, and of the public utility firms. 
Chapter 3 describes features of urban transportation system in Japan and gives 
overview of diversification strategies of Japanese PRCs. The most distinctive 
features of Japanese PRCs are private operation independent of the government and 
diversification strategies deployed widely. While transportation segment including 
railway business is still profitable, the proportion of diversified segments in total 
operating profit has increased and its business area has been also expanded. 
Chapter 4 gives an outline of production function and stochastic frontier analysis 
measuring technical efficiency. In chaper 5, the relationship between diversification 
stategies and the firm’s technical efficiency is examined by estimating output oriented 
production function using stochastic frontier analysis. With estimation of production 
function, the model clarifying the factors influencing inefficiency (inefficiency model) 
is also estimated. In estimation, the sample consisting of data of 34 diversified PRCs 
from 2000 to 2012 is used. Diversification strategy influences the firm’s technical 
efficiency which represents the firm’s capabilities transferring resources and assets 
to core competencies which assure the firm competitive advantages, while excessive 
diversification strategies have negative effect on efficiency. 
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In chapter 6, the effect of diversification on investment decision of Japanese PRCs 
is investigated. The role and efficiency of ICMs which are the channel allocating funds 
for each segment are discussed, and life-cycle theory and free cash-flow theory are 
applied to clarify the use of cash flow inside the firm. 
 
Findings and Implications 
This study consists of two analyses: the efficiency of diversification strategies of 
PRCs and the effect of diversification strategies on investment of railway business. 
This study contributes to investigating the influence of diversification from the two 
aspects: 1) examining influence on the efficiency of entire firm which indicates the 
capability sharing resources and utilising relatedness, 2) exploring possibility of use 
of internal capital for investment of railway business in diversified environment. Based 
on the discussions earlier, this study can provide some insights for private operation 
and design of innovative future business model for railway business. 
First of all, the results from analysis of technical efficiency and the factors 
influencing inefficiency show that diversification strategies, which just pursue 
expansion of business, cannot contribute to improvement of the firm’s efficiency. 
Although there are some previous studies estimating the regression of diversification 
strategies on railway demand quatitatively and comparing the type of diversification 
strategies and profitability of PRCs simply, the efficiency of PRCs as performance 
has not been considered so far. In diversified firms, assets and resources can be 
transferred among divisions, however, the use of them entails costs. In addition, the 
inefficiency model provides an evidence that increase of the proportion of real estate 
and distribution business improves the firm’s efficiency. As mentioned above, 
technical efficiency is related to capability transforming and sharing resources. As 
well as profitability, retaining competitive advantage and exploring core competencies 
through appropriate use of strategy are an important factor to guarantee the firm’s 
sustainability and to open the possibility for future growth. Through the estimated 
model, this study proposes that diversified PRCs should expand businesses using 
physical assets highly regarded in railway business and focusing on the related 
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business.  
Although diversification strategies of major PRCs, which expands into new 
business area and outside operating region, have raised the question about their 
efficiency, it has not been enough explored so far. As including interaction term of the 
extent of diversification and dummy variable for major PRC, this study tries to discuss 
effectiveness of their diversification strategies which seek expansion of business 
areas numerically. Some major PRCs tend to try emerge from the range of 
transportation companies, thereby entering into businesses unfamiliar with traditional 
diversification and deploying businesses outside the area operating railway. It seems 
like some kind of innovation to break the limitation as transportation companies, 
however, it causes ineffectiveness in governance and transaction costs resulting from 
expanding of organisation and sharing idea and resource between heterogeneous 
divisions. 
In view of investment, this study clarifies that it is hard to expect utilising internal 
capital for railway investment. This implies that diversification may not play a role as 
supporter of railway business by supplying cash. However, diversification strategies 
are still valid for PRCs because it is expected that diversification contributes to the 
firm’s future growth and mitigation of income fluctuation due to decreaseing demand 
of railway business. Considering negative effect of excessive expansion as 
mentioned above, the strategy, which utilises internal capital for the diversified 
businesses that are close to railways and are growing, will be effective to 
sustainability of PRCs.  
In addition, to prevent diversification strategies of PRCs from being biased in 
growth and profitability excessively, the role of public authorities is still emphasised. 
Especially, to prevent value-decreasing diversification and negative influence on 
railway business, government should not loosen to monitor the firm’s behaviour which 
threatens sustainbility and public interest of railway business. Although PRCs make 
their own strategies and act based on the market principal, they should be continued 
to provide stable public transport service. Therefore, as a surveillant, government 
should keep watch on the firm’s behaviour and retain the accounting report system 
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for transparent operation of railways by continuing railway accounting rule which is  
referred above. Moreover, government should provide financial support programmes 
and schemes for improvement and construction railway infrastructure which need a 
huge cost. Indeed, minimal regulation and support are needed to retain public 
transport and satisfy public interest considering their speciality as public transport 
operator, although PRCs exist as private firms. 
As a result, for PRCs and operators, this study proposes that it is necessary to 
exploit assets of railway business, such as terminals and main stations, know-how, 
and passengers, and diversify businesses in which their core competencies can be 
utilised effectively, thereby improving efficiency of the firm and establishing future-
oriented management system which considers the firm’s sustainability. For the 
authorities which consider introducing diversification to railway operators, they should 
not forget that diversification is hardly to be solution for offering capital to railway 
business. As discussed above, in diversified railway operators, internal capital is likely 
to be used for diversified business, given the condition which the firm allocates capital 
by its own decision. Thus, if the authorities expect diversified operators to utilise 
internal capital for railway investment, the regulation which obligates the firm to use 
certain proportion of internal capital generated by diversification for railway 
investment may be needed. However, rather than obligation, it is desirable that the 
authorities back the operators up by supporting scheme encourage construction and 
improvement of infrastructure. In addition, they should recognise diversification 
strategies as the tool aiming enhancement of profitablity of the operators, thereby 
reducing subsidies for operating deficit. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Although the results and findings from this study provide implications of 
diversification strategies of railway operators, there are some limitations of this study 
which should be recognised for future research. 
First of all, in the analysis of the efficiency of diversification strategies of PRCs, 
although production distance function is estimated to obtain technical efficiency and 
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to investigate factors which affect inefficiency by stochastic frontier, estimating cost 
frontier is also considered to describe the production technology of PRCs, thereby 
predicting cost efficiency. To estimate cost frontier, it is needed to assume that firms 
minimise costs, as well as getting price data of inputs. According to Smith (2006), 
some previous literature (e.g. Caves, Christensen and Swanson (1981)) points out 
the inappropriateness of cost function estimation of railway sector because managers 
do not have authorities to adjust the level of capital input optimally. In fact, PRCs 
determine the amount of expenditures for capital input as independent private 
enterprises and this is recorded in the firm’s financial statement as capital 
expenditures. In addition, it may be desirable to assume that PRCs seek to maximise 
profit even for the railway business, although it is regulated and is forced to consider 
public interest. Therefore, further research is necessary to compare technical 
efficiencies derived from production frontier and cost frontier in order to provide in-
depth implications considering both effective use of inputs and cost impact of different 
businesses. 
Although the factors, which are related to diversification strategy, such as the extent 
of diversification strategy and the ratio of the sales of physical related businesses 
(e.g. real estate, retail), are mainly considered in inefficiency model, other factors like 
regulation on railway business, governance, organisation structure of the firm and 
source of capital resource (leverage) may influence technical efficiency which 
represents the capability sharing resources in thie research. In fact, external capital 
condition, such as financial support scheme of railway business, is referred as the 
factor influencing relationship between investment sensitivity and cash flow in chapter 
6. This study focuses on the diversification strategies and the scale of the firm, owing 
to the limitation of inefficiency model which is hard to converge if too many 
explanatory variables are included, and to investigate the effect of diversification 
strategies intensively. Other forms of quantitative models (e.g. logistics regression) 
can be applied to include various factors and to control other factors which are 
possible to influnce on the firm’s technical efficiency. This proposed work may 
examine the effect of diversification strategies on the firm’s technical efficiency clearly.  
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Some questions also remain with respect to whether diversification strategies 
influence a firm’s profitability or value by affecting technical efficiency. Although this 
study considers improving technical efficiency as a critical performance of a firm, 
accomplishing high profitability and value in the market are still important goal to be 
reckoned with for a firm. It is not certain whether the effect on profitability and the 
firm’s value result from the effective strategy sharing strategic assets which can form 
competitive advantages of the firm or economies of scope obtained by simply 
operating multiple businesses, while diversification strategies influence technical 
efficiency positively. As discussed above, the distinct benefit of diversification, like 
competitive advantage, is driven not by the simple utilization of resources, but by the 
intangible and inimitable resources of a firm. Thus, to ensure the effect of 
diversification strategies, it is important to investigate the effect of diversification 
strategy on a firm’s efficiency, separating from economies of scope. 
In terms of effect of diversification strategies on investment of railway business, 
this study cannot investigate whether diversification is deployed desirably for future 
growth and financial sustainability. This study confirms that transfer of cash flow from 
transportation segment to diversified businesses occur in PRCs, because core 
business, which is railway business, is matured and it is hard to expect high future 
growth based on life-cycle theory and free cash-flow theory. In addition, it is referred 
that cash may be used to deploy diversified businesses which can exploit synergy 
effect with railway business. Thus, it would be instructive to investigate whether the 
cash generated from railway business is transferred to the segments which can 
contribute to the future growth of the firm or support railway business. 
As Jensen (1986) discussed, weak governance system can trigger investment 
distortion which the manager uses capital for the project that is hard to expect high 
investment opportunity and future growth. The way of capital allocation may also be 
different between subsidiaries in conglomerate and business division inside the firm. 
Thus, further research of the extent of the governance systems of PRCs and the 
influence of organisation system of PRCs will give valuable implications to investigate 
the effect of diversification strategies on investment of railway business. In addition, 
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studying the forms of external capital that affect the investment decisions of the 
railway business such as loans, subsidies, and stocks, and examining the support 
programmes to mitigate the tax rate or interest are also recommended to clarify the 
relationship between diversification and investment further, when focusing on internal 
capital market inside a firm. These questions are left to future research. 
  
113 
 
Bibliography 
Ahn, S., Denis, D. J. & Denis, D. K., 2006. Leverage and investment in diversified 
firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2), pp. 317-337. 
Aigner, D. J., Lovell, C. A. K. & Schmidt, P., 1977. Formulation and estimation of 
stochastic frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics, 6(1), 
pp. 21-37. 
Almeida, H., Campello, M. & Weisbach, M. S., 2004. The cash flow sensitivity of cash. 
The Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1777-1804. 
Amihud, Y. & Lev, B., 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate 
mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), pp. 605-617. 
Amit, R. & Schoemaker, P. J. H., 1993. Strategic assets and organizational rent. 
Strategic Management Journal, 14(1), pp. 33-46. 
Ansoff, J. I., 1957. Strategies for diversification. Harvard Business Review, Sep-Oct, 
35(5), pp. 113-124. 
Baek, H. Y., 2004. Corporate diversification and performance evidence on production 
efficiency. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 14(2), pp. 135-152. 
Baker, G., 1986. Compensation and Hierarchies. s.l.:Harvard Business School. 
Battese, G. E. & Coelli, T. J., 1988. Prediction of firm-level technical efficiencies with 
a generalized frontier production function and panel data. Journal of 
Econometrics, 38(3), pp. 387-399. 
Battese, G. E. & Coelli, T. J., 1992. Frontier production functions, technical efficiency 
and panel data: With application to paddy farmers in India. The Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, 3(1/2), pp. 153-169. 
Battese, G. E. & Coelli, T. J., 1993. A stochastic frontier production function 
incorporating a model for technical inefficiency effects. Working Papers in 
Econometrics and Applied Statistics No. 69: Department of Econometrics, 
University of New England, Armidale. 
Battese, G. E. & Coelli, T. J., 1995. A model for technical inefficiency effects in a 
stochastic frontier production function for panel data. Empirical Economics, 
20(2), pp. 325-332. 
Beckers, D. E. & Hammond, C. J., 1987. A tractable likelihood function for the normal-
gamma stochastic frontier model. Economis Letters, 24(1), pp. 33-38. 
Berger, P. G. & Ofek, E., 1995. Diversification’s effect on firm value. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 37(1), pp. 39-65. 
Berthon, P., Pitt, L., Constantine, S. K. & Paul, J., 1999. Virtual services go 
international: International services in the marketspace. Journal of 
International Marketing , 7(3), pp. 84-105. 
Bettis, R. A., 1981. Performance differences in related and unrelated diversified firms. 
Strategic Management Journal, 2(4), pp. 379-393. 
Billett, M. T. & Mauer, D. C., 2003. Cross-subsidies, external financing, constraints, 
and the contribution of the internal capital market to firm value. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 16(4), pp. 1167-1201. 
Capar, N. & Kotabe, M., 2003. The relationship between international diversification 
114 
 
and performance in service firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 
Volume 34, pp. 345-355. 
Caves, D. W., Christensen, L. R. & Swanson, J. A., 1981. Productivity growth, scale 
economies, and capacity utilization in U.S. railroads, 1955-74. The American 
Economic Review, 71(5), pp. 994-1002. 
Channon, D. F., 1979. The Service Industries: Strategy, Structure and Financial 
Performance. 1 ed. London: Macmillan. 
Chatterjee, S. & Wernerfelt, B., 1991. The link between resources and type of 
diversification: Theory and evidence. Strategic Management Journal, 12(1), 
pp. 33-48. 
Chen, C. M., Delmas, M. A. & Lieberman, M. B., 2015. Production frontier 
methodologies and efficiency as a performance measure in strategic 
management research. Strategic Management Journal, 36(1), pp. 19-36. 
Chou, E. S. W., 2010. Can socialism in internal capital markets occur in the absence 
of managerial rent seeking?. Applied Economics, 42(1), pp. 107-120. 
Coelli, T., 1995. Estimators and hypothesis tests for a stochastic frontier function: A 
Monte Carlo analysis. The Journal of Productivity Analysis, 6(3), pp. 247-268. 
Coelli, T. J. & Perelman, S., 2000. Technical efficiency of European railways: A 
distance function approach. Applied Economics, 32(15), pp. 1967-1976. 
Coelli, T. J., Rao, D. S. P., O'Donnell, C. J. & Battese, G. E., 2005. An Introduction to 
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis. 2nd ed. New York: Springer. 
Cornwell, C., Schmidt, P. & Sickles, R. C., 1990. Production frontiers with cross-
sectional and time-series variation in efficiency levels. Journal of 
Econometrics, 46(1-2), pp. 185-200. 
Cuesta, R. A., 2000. A production model with firm-specific temporal variation in 
technical inefficiency: With application to Spanish dairy farms. Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, 13(2), pp. 139-158. 
D'Agostino, R. B. & Pearson, E. S., 1973. Tests for departure from normality. 
Empirical results for the distributions of b2 and √b1. Biometrika, 60(3), pp. 
613-622. 
Delmas, M. & Tokat, Y., 2005. Deregulation, governance structures, and efficiency: 
the U.S. electric utility sector. Strategic Management Journal, 26(5), pp. 441-
460. 
Duchin, R., 2010. Cash holdings and corporate diversification. The Journal of Finance, 
65(3), pp. 955-992. 
Dutta, S., Narasimhan, O. & Rajiv, S., 2005. Conceptualizing and measuring 
capabilities: Methodology and empirical application. Strategic Management 
Journal, 26(3), pp. 277-285. 
Färe, R. S. & Primont, D., 1995. Multi-Output Production and Duality: Theory and 
Applications. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Faulkender, M., Flannery, M. J., Hankins, K. W. & Smith, J. M., 2012. Cash flows and 
leverage adjustments. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(3), pp. 632-646. 
Gassenheimer, J. B. & Keep, W. W., 1998. Generalizing diversification theory across 
economic sectors: Theoretical and empirical considerations. Journal of 
Marketing Theory and Practice, 6(1), pp. 38-47. 
115 
 
Geringer, J. M., Tallman, S. & Olsen, D. M., 2000. Product and international 
diverisification among Japanese multinational firms. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21(1), pp. 51-80. 
Goddard, J., Mckillop, D. & Wilson, J. O. S., 2008. The diversification and financial 
performance of US credit unions. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(9), pp. 
1836-1849. 
Grabowski, H. G. & Mueller, D. C., 1975. Life-cycle effects on corporate returns on 
retentions. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 57(4), pp. 400-409. 
Greene, W. H., 1980. Maximum likelihood estimation of econometruc frontier 
functions. Journal of Econometrics, 13(1), pp. 27-56. 
Greene, W. H., 1980. On the estimation of a flexible frontier production model. Journal 
of Econometrics, 13(1), pp. 101-115. 
Hensher, D. A. & Stanley, J., 2008. Transacting under a performance-based contract: 
The role of negotiation and competitive tendering. Transportation Research 
Part A, Volume 42, pp. 1143-1151. 
Hill, C. W. L., Hitt, M. A. & Hoskisson, R. E., 1992. Cooperative versus competitive 
structures in related and unrelated diversified firms. Organization Science, 
3(4), pp. 501-521. 
Hovakiman, G., 2011. Financial constraints and investment efficiency: Internal capital 
allocation across the business cycle. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
20(2), pp. 264-283. 
Huang, C. J. & Liu, J. T., 1994. Estimation of a non-neutral stochastic frontier 
production function. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 5(2), pp. 171-180. 
Jacquemin, A. & Berry, C. H., 1979. Entropy measure of diversification and corporate 
growth. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 27(4), pp. 359-369. 
Jandik, T. & Makhija, A. K., 2005. Can diversification create value? Evidence from the 
electric utility industry. Financial Management, 34(1), pp. 61-93. 
Jensen, M., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flows, corporate finance and takeovers. 
American Economic Review, Volume 76, pp. 323-329. 
Jondrow, J., Lovell, C. A. K., Materov, I. S. & Schmidt, P., 1982. On the estimation of 
technical inefficiency in the stochastic frontier production function model. 
Journal of Econometrics, 19(2-3), pp. 233-238. 
Joshi, M. P., Kashlak, R. J. & Sherman, H. D., 1998. How alliances are reshaping 
telecommunications. Long Range Planning, 31(4), pp. 542-548. 
Kamata, H. & Yamauchi, H., 2010. An analysis of the diversification strategies of 
railway companies in Japan (Tetsudo kaisha no takakuka sennryakuni 
kansuru bunseki). Journal of Transportation (Koutsugaku Kenkyu), Volume 54, 
pp. 95-104 (in Japanese). 
Kashlak, R. J. & Joshi, M. P., 1994. Core business regulation and dual diversification 
patterns in the telecommunications industry. Strategic Management Journal, 
15(8), pp. 603-611. 
Kennedy, J. & Smith, A. S. J., 2004. Assessing the efficient cost of sustaining Britain's 
rail network: Perspectives based on zonal comparisons. Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy, 38(2), pp. 157-190. 
Khanna, N. & Tice, S., 2001. The Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets. The Journal 
of Finance, 56(4), pp. 1489-1528. 
116 
 
Killeen, J. B., 1999. Business diversification and integration strategy of urban private 
railways in Japan: An economic analysis of strategy, market performance and 
policy implications. Doctor of Commerce Thesis, Graduate School of Business 
Administration, Kobe University. 
Kodde, D. A. & Palm, F. C., 1986. Wald criteria for jointly testing equality and 
inequality restrictions. Econometrica, 54(5), pp. 1243-1248. 
Kumbhakar, S. C., 1990. Production frontiers, panel data, and time-varying technical 
inefficiency. Journal of Econometrics, 46(1-2), pp. 201-211. 
Kumbhakar, S. C., Ghosh, S. & McGukin, J. T., 1991. A generalized production frontier 
approach for estimating determinants of inefficiency in U.S. dairy farms. 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 9(3), pp. 279-286. 
Kumbhakar, S. C. & Lovell, C. A. K., 2003. Stochastic Frontier Analysis. 1st ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kumbhakar, S. C., Wang, H. J. & Horncastle, A. P., 2015. A Practitioner's Guide to 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis Using Stata. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kuppuswamy, V. & Villalonga, B., 2010. Does Diversification Create Value in the 
Presence of External Financing Constraints? Evidence from the 2007-2009 
Financial Crisis. s.l.:Harvard Business School Finance Working Paper No. 10-
101. 
Lamont, O., 1997. Cash flow and investment: Evidence from internal capital markets. 
The Journal of Finance, 52(1), pp. 83-109. 
Lang, L., Ofek, E. & Stulz, R. M., 1996. Leverage, investment, and firm growth. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 40(1), pp. 3-29. 
Lang, L. & Stulz, R. M., 1994. Tobin's Q, corporate diversification, and firm 
performance. Journal of political economy, 102(6), pp. 1248-1280. 
Lan, L. W. & Lin, E. T. J., 2006. Performance measurement for railway transport: 
Stochastic distance functions with inefficiency and ineffectiveness effects. 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 40(3), pp. 383-408. 
Lee, Y. H. & Schmidt, P., 1993. A production frontier model with flexible temporal 
variation in technical efficiency. In: O. E. Harold, S. S. Schmidt & C. A. K. 
Lovell, eds. The measurement of productive efficiency: Techniques and 
applications. s.l.:Oxford University Press, pp. 237-255. 
Levinsohn, J. & Petrin, A., 2003. Estimating production functions using inputs to 
control for unobservables. Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), pp. 317-341. 
Lieberman, M. B. & Dhawan, R., 2005. Assessing the resource base of Japanese and 
U.S. auto producers: A stochastic frontier production function approach. 
Management Science, 51(7), pp. 1060-1075. 
Lovell, C. A. K., Travers, P., Richardson, S. & Wood, L., 1994. Resources and 
functionings: A new view of inequality in Australia. In: W. Eichhorn, ed. Models 
and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 
787-807. 
Lovelock, C. H. & Wright, L., 2002. Principles of Service Marketing and Management. 
2 ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Lubatkin, M. & Chatterjee, S., 1994. Extending modern portfolio theory into the 
domain of corporate diversification: Does it apply?. Academy of Management 
117 
 
Journal, 37(1), pp. 109-136. 
Maksimovic, V. & Philips, G., 2008. Conglomerate firms and internal capital markets. 
In: B. E. Eckbo, ed. Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Coporate 
Finance. North-Holland: North-Holland, pp. 423-479. 
Maksimovic, V. & Phillips, G., 2002. Do conglomerate firms allocate resources 
inefficiently across industries? Theory and evidence. The Journal of Finance, 
57(2), pp. 721-767. 
Markides, C., 1995. Diversification, restucturing and economic performance. 
Strategic Management Journal, 16(2), pp. 101-118. 
Markides, C. C. & Williamson, P. J., 1994. Related diversification, core competences 
and corporate performance. Strategic Management Journal, 15(S2), pp. 149-
165. 
Matsusaka, J. & Nanda, V., 2002. Internal capital markets and corporate refocusing. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 11(2), pp. 176-211. 
McGuinness, T. & Thomas, D., 1997. The diversification strategies of the privatised 
water and sewerage companies in England and Wales: A resource based view. 
Utilities Policy, 6(4), pp. 325-339. 
McGuinness, T. & Thomas, D., 1997. The diversification strategies of the privatised 
water and sewerage companies in England and Wales: A resource based view. 
Utilities Policy, 6(4), pp. 325-339. 
Meeusen, W. & van den Broeck, J., 1977. Efficiency estimation from Cobb-Douglas 
production functions with composed error. International Economic Review, 
18(2), pp. 435-444. 
Meyer, M., Milgrom, P. & Roberts, J., 1992. Organizational prospects, influence costs, 
and ownership changes. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 
Volume 1, pp. 9-35. 
Miller, D. J., 2006. Technological diversity, related diversification, and firm 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 27(7), pp. 601-619. 
Mizutani, F., 2006. The role of private provision in transport markets: Effects of private 
ownership and business diversification. In: K. Kobayashi, T. R. Lakshman & 
W. P. Anderson, eds. Structural Change in Transportation and 
Communications in the Knowledge Society. s.l.:Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 
227-247. 
Mizutani, F., Kozumi, H. & Matsushima, N., 2009. Does yardstick regulation really 
work? Empirical evidence from Japan’s rail industry. Journal of Regulatory 
Economics, 36(3), pp. 308-323. 
Modigliani, F. & Miller, M. H., 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance and the 
theory of investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), pp. 261-297. 
Montgomery, C. A., 1982. The measurement of firm diversification: Some new 
empirical evidence. Academy of Management, 25(2), pp. 299-307. 
Montgomery, C. A., 1994. Corporate diversification. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 8(3), pp. 163-178. 
Montgomery, C. A. & Wernerfelt, B., 1988. Diversification, ricardian rents, and Tobin's 
q. RAND Journal of Economics, 19(4), pp. 623-632. 
Mueller, D., 1972. A life cycle theory of the firm. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 
20(3), pp. 199-219. 
118 
 
Murphy, K. J., 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An 
empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), pp. 11-42. 
Nayyar, P. R., 1990. Information asymmetries: A source of competitive advantage for 
diversified service firms. Strategic Management Journal, 11(7), pp. 513-519. 
Nayyar, P. R., 1992. On the measurement of corporate diversification strategy: 
Evidence from large U.S. service firms. Strategic Management Journal, 13(3), 
pp. 219-235. 
Nayyar, P. R., 1993. Performance effects of information asymmetry and economies 
of scope in diversified service firms. Academy of Management Journal, 36(1), 
pp. 28-57. 
Nesta, L., 2008. Knowledge and productivity in the world’s largest manufacturing 
corporations. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67(3-4), pp. 886-
902. 
Newman, C. & Matthews, A., 2006. The productivity performance of Irish dairy farms 
1984-2000: A multiple output distance function approach. Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, 26(2), pp. 191-205. 
Normann, R., 2001. Service Management: Strategy and Leadership in Service 
Businesses. 3rd ed. New York: Wiley. 
OFWAT, 2006. The development of the water industry in England and Wales. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publication/the-development-of-the-
water-industry-in-england-and-wales/ 
OFWAT, 2015. Towards Water 2020 - policy issues: promoting markets. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publication/towards-water-2020-policy-
issues-promoting-markets-2/ 
Olley, G. S. & Pakes, A., 1996. The dynamics of productivity in the 
telecommunications equipment industry. Econometrica, 64(6), pp. 1263-1297. 
Palepu, K., 1985. Diversification strategy, profit performance and the entropy 
measure. Strategic Management Journal, 6(3), pp. 239-255. 
Palich, L. E., Cardinal, L. B. & Miller, C. C., 2000. Curvilinearity in the diversification–
performance linkage: an examination of over three decades of research. 
Strategic Management Journal, 21(2), pp. 155-174. 
Park, T. A. & King, R. P., 2007. Evaluating food retailing efficiency: The role of 
information technology. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 27(2), pp. 101-113. 
Paul, C. J. M. & Nehring, R., 2005. Product diversification, production systems, and 
economic performance in U.S. agricultural production. Journal of 
Econometrics, 126(2), pp. 525-548. 
Paul, C. J. M. & Nehring, R., 2005. Product diversification, production systems, and 
economic performance in U.S. agricultural production. Journal of 
Econometrics, 126(2), pp. 525-548. 
Peyer, U., 2002. Internal and External Capital Markets. INSEAD: Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=309746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.309746. 
Piesse, J. & Thirtle, C., 2000. A stochastic frontier approach to firm level efficiency, 
technological change, and productivity during the early transition in Hungary. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 28(3), pp. 473-501. 
Pitt, M. M. & Lee, L. F., 1981. The measurement and sources of technical inefficiency 
in the Indonesian weaving industry. Journal of Development Economics, 9(1), 
119 
 
pp. 43-64. 
Porter, M. E., 1980. Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysing Industries and 
Competitors. New York: Free Press. 
Porter, M. E., 1985. Competitive Advantage. 1st ed. New York: Free Press. 
Prahalad, C. K. & Bettis, R. A., 1986. The dominant logic: A new linkage between 
diversity and performance. Strategic Management Journal, 7(6), pp. 485-501. 
Rajan, R., Servaes, H. & Zingales, L., 2000. The cost of diversity: The diversification 
discount and inefficient investment. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), pp. 35-80. 
Reifschneider, D. & Stevenson, R., 1991. Systematic departures from the frontier: A 
framework for the analysis of firm inefficiency. International Economic Review, 
32(3), pp. 715-723. 
Robins, J. & Wiersema, M. F., 1995. A resource-based approach to the multibusiness 
firm: Empirical analysis of portfolio interrelationships and corporate financial 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 16(4), pp. 277-299. 
Rumelt, R. P., 1974. Strategy, Structure, and Economic Performance. Boston: 
Harvard Business School. 
Rumelt, R. P., 1982. Diversification strategy and profitability. Strategic Management 
Journal, 3(4), pp. 359-369. 
Russo, M., 1992. Power plays: Regulation, diversification, and backward integration 
in the electric utility industry. Strategic Management Journal, 13(1), pp. 13-27. 
Saito, T., 1993. Private railways: Development of Japanese style railway 
management (Shitetsu sangyo: Nihongata tetsudo keiei no tenkai). Kyoto: 
Koyo Shobo (in Japanese). 
Scharfstein, D. S. & Stein, J. C., 2000. The dark side of internal capital markets: 
Divisional rent-seeking and inefficient investment. The Journal of Finance, 
55(6), pp. 2537-2564. 
Schmidt, P. & Lin, T. F., 1984. Simple tests of alternative specifications in stochastic 
frontier models. Journal of Econometrics, 24(3), pp. 349-361. 
Schoar, A., 2002. Effects of corporate diversificaion on productivity. Journal of 
Finance, 39(6), pp. 2379-2403. 
Shin, H. H. & Stulz, R. M., 1998. Are internal capital markets efficient?. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 113(2), pp. 531-552. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R., 1989. Management entrenchment: The case of manager 
specific assets. Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 25, pp. 123-140. 
Shoji, K., 2001. The Policy of Urban Public Transportation (Toshi Koukyou Koutsu 
Seisaku) (in Japanese). Tokyo: Chikura Shobo. 
Shoji, K. & Killeen, B. J., 2001. A sketch of diversification strategy of Japanese ` minor' 
private railway companies (Chuushou Shitetsu no Takakuka Senryaku ni 
Tsuite: Yobiteki Kousatsu). Journal of National Economics (Kokumin Keizai 
Zasshi), 184(5), pp. 1-16 (in Japanese). 
Smith, A. S. J., 2006. Are Britain's railways costing too much? Perspectives based on 
TFP comparisons with British Rail 1963-2002. Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy, 40(1), pp. 1-44. 
Stein, J. C., 1997. Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate 
resources. The Journal of Finance, 52(1), pp. 111-133. 
120 
 
Stein, J. C., 2003. Agency, information and corporate investment. In: G. M. 
Constantinides, M. Harris & R. M. Stulz, eds. Handbook of the Economics of 
Finance. North Holland: Elsevier, pp. 111-165. 
Stevenson, R. E., 1980. Likelihood functions for generalized stochastic frontier 
estimation. Journal of Econometrics, 13(1), pp. 57-66. 
Stimpert, J. L. & Duhaime, I. M., 1997. Seeing the big picture: The influence of 
industry, diversification, and business strategy on performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 40(3), pp. 560-583. 
Stulz, R. M., 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 26(1), pp. 3-27. 
Sugiyama, T., 2000. Diversification strategy of major private railway companies: 
Existence of cross-traffic effect (Ote shitetsu kigyo no takakuka senryaku: 
Cross-traffic kouka no sonzai). Unpublished Master's Thesis, Kobe University 
(in Japanese). 
Takami, S., 2012. How effective internal capital markets have contributed to the 
reactions against the worldwide financial crisis caused by the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers? An analysis on 553 listed Japanese manufacturing firms 
[in Japanese]. Japan Journal of Finance, 32(1 & 2), pp. 2-22. 
Thompson, S., 1999. Increasingly marginal utilities: Diversification and free cash flow 
in newly privatized UK utilities. Review of Industrial Organization, 15(1), pp. 
25-42. 
Villalonga, B., 2004. Diversification discound or premium? New evidence from the 
business information tracking series. Journal of Finance, 59(2), pp. 479-506. 
Ware, H., 1998. Competition and diversification trends in telecommunications: 
Regulatory, technological and market pressures. Journal of Regulatory 
Economies, 13(1), pp. 59-94. 
Whited, T. M., 2001. Is it inefficient investment that causes the diversification 
discount?. The Journal of Finance, 56(5), pp. 1667-1691. 
Wrigley, L., 1970. Divisional Autonomy and Diversification, Doctoral dissertation: 
Harvard University. 
Yokoyama, H., 2007. Business Diversification Strategies in U.S. and Japanese 
Electric Utilities, Harvard University: USJP Occasional Paper 07-16. 
Yoshida, S., 1986. Diversification in the transportation industry - the case of Japan 
(Kotsu jigyou no takakuka - Nihon no kotsu jigyo wo chushin ni). Journal of 
Transportation and Economy (Unyu to Keizai), 46(4), pp. 27-36 (in Japanese). 
Yvrande-Billon, A., 2006. The attribution process of delegation contracts in the French 
urban public transport sector: Why competitive tendering is a myth. Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics, 77(4), pp. 453-487. 
 
